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Markets and improved market access plays an important role in improving rural incomes of 
smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan African countries, particularly in Tanzania. Despite this, 
participation of smallholder farmers in markets in Tanzania remains low due to a range of 
constraints. In rural areas, farmers are lacking sufficient means to overcome the costs of 
entering the market due to high transaction costs. Poor infrastructure and weak institutions 
raise transaction costs that considerably alter production and market participation decisions. It 
is widely acknowledged that the involvement of small farmers into markets can contribute to 
higher productivity and income growth which, in turn, can enhance food security, poverty 
reduction efforts, and overall economic growth. Following the liberalisation of agricultural 
markets in Tanzania, smallholder farmers have alternative market channels for selling their 
agricultural produce, including maize and pigeonpea. These market channels offer different 
prices and sales services, which determine farmers’ choices of the channel and impact on 
household income and welfare outcome. However, in Tanzania, where smallholder farmers’ 
market access is a constraining factor, quantitative evidence of the relationship between 
market participation, market channel choice and impacts on household welfare specifically in 
maize and pigeonpea farmers is scant. The main objective of this study was to determine 
factors influencing smallholder farmers’ market participation decision, channel choice and 
the impacts of market participation and channel choice on household welfare. 
 
The research focused on four districts: Karatu and Mbulu in the northern zone and Kilosa and 
Mvomero in the eastern zone of Tanzania. A multi-stage sampling procedure was used to 
select villages and households, whereby a total of 700 farm households were surveyed. 
Heckman selection model results showed that fixed transaction costs associated with market 
information and household characteristics (such as gender and education level of the 
household head) had a statistically significant influence on maize and pigeonpea market 
participation. Similarly, distance to market, output prices, farm size, labour force, 
membership of farmer associations and geographical location of households influenced both 
market participation and intensity of participation. These results suggest that policies aimed 
at improving rural road infrastructure, market information systems, smallholder asset 
accumulation, human capital and promotion of farmer associations could reduce transaction 




The multinomial logit results revealed that transaction costs (as a result of distance to 
markets, quality of road to market, lack of price information, and lack of trust in working 
relationships with buyers), household wealth, membership in farmer association/group, 
access to extension services and access to credit significantly influence the choice of 
profitable market channels by maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers. The results suggest 
that policies aimed at reducing transaction costs (such as through increased investment in 
rural infrastructure, improved market information systems and farm households’ access to 
assets) appear to be important intervention avenues that can affect profitable channel choice 
in the study area. Promoting farmers’ groups/associations (such as producer and marketing 
groups) is among the efforts that need to be focused to facilitate smallholders’ technology and 
information transfer, bargaining power and trust between farmers and buyers.  
 
This study also examined the impact of market participation and channel choice on household 
welfare. The propensity score matching and endogenous switching regression results 
indicated that participation in maize and pigeonpea markets has positive and significant 
impact on household welfare, measured by consumption expenditure per capita among 
sample of rural households. The results also showed that the level of market participation has 
significant positive impact on consumption expenditure per capita.  This confirms the role of 
market participation and level of participation in improving rural household welfare, as 
higher gain of consumption expenditure from market participation and level of participation 
also means improved food security and reduced poverty. The empirical results from 
multinomial endogenous treatment regression showed that market channel choice has positive 
impact on household welfare. Participation in rural traders and wholesalers market channels 
has significant positive impact on consumption expenditure per capita relative to brokers 
channel, for both maize and pigeonpea. The study suggests that policies and programs that 
support household capacity to produce surplus production and inclusion of smallholder 
farmers in more profitable markets could increase market participation, improve household 
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Agriculture is the largest employer of labour in many sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies, 
with the greatest potential for enhancing food security and poverty reduction (World Bank, 
2008). It employs 62% of the population of SSA (excluding South Africa) and generates 27% 
of GDP of these countries, with the majority of the poor living in rural areas (FAO, 2006; 
World Bank, 2008)1. In Tanzania, agricultural sector plays a key role in the country’s 
economy - contributing about 43%t to GDP, employing about 70% of the national labour 
force and generating three quarters of merchandise exports. The sector is characterized by 
high smallholder participation and represents a source of livelihood to about 80% of the 
population (World Bank, 2008). Thus, the sector has a considerable impact on rural incomes, 
poverty reduction and food security. Maize is the most important cereal crop, staple and 
source of farm income for the smallholder farmers in Tanzania. It is grown in all the agro-
ecological zones of the country, and constitutes over 45% and 75% of the total cultivated land 
and cereal production, respectively (USAID, 2010). About 85% of Tanzania’s population 
depends on maize as an income-generating commodity. Maize accounts for 31% of the total 
food production and constitutes more than 75% of the cereal consumption in the country. It is 
estimated that the annual per capita consumption of maize in Tanzania is over 115 kg 
(Amani, 2004). On the other hand, pigeonpea is an important grain legume grown in the 
semi-arid regions of Tanzania. The crop constitutes about 5% of the total output of pulses and 
4% of the total area under pulses, making it the third most produced pulse after beans and 
cowpeas in the country (Simtowe et al., 2011). At smallholder level, pigeonpea is used 
mainly as food, both as dry grain and as a green vegetable, and provides a cheap source of 
protein. In either form, it makes an important contribution to the diet of resource-poor 
farmers, especially when the main staple crop fails as a result of drought. Only 35% of the 
total pigeonpea production is consumed on-farm while about 65% is exported to international 
markets (Shiferaw et al., 2005). 
 
                                                 
1 For SSA including South Africa, agriculture employs 59% of the population and generates 17% of GDP. 
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Considering that agriculture remains a major sector in most economies in sub-Saharan Africa 
including Tanzania, commercialization of the sector requires improving the ability of 
smallholder farmers to participate in markets.  Markets and improved market access plays an 
important role in improving rural incomes of smallholder farmers (Ouma, et al., 2010). 
Despite these factors, participation of smallholder farmers in markets in most sub-Saharan 
Africa countries remains low due to a range of constraints. One of the limiting constraints 
faced by smallholder farmers is linked to poor market access (Makhura, 2001). In rural areas, 
farmers lack sufficient means to overcome the costs of entering the market due to high 
transaction costs (Barrett, 2008; Komarek, 2010). Poor infrastructure and weak institutions 
cause transaction costs to rise, which considerably alter production and market-participation 
decisions. The majority of smallholder farmers are located in remote areas with poor 
transport and market infrastructures, contributing to the high transaction costs they are 
already facing. In addition, they lack reliable market information as well as information on 
potential exchange partners (Ouma et al., 2010). Furthermore, in many instances, the poor do 
not possess the level of assets required to protect themselves from market, natural, political 
and social shocks (Handley et al., 2009). According to Barret (2008), private asset 
accumulation, public infrastructure and services are the prerequisites that smallholders need 
to escape from subsistence production and produce marketable surplus.  
 
On one hand, farmers’ choice of market channel is a very important aspect in market 
participation decision. Following the liberalization of agricultural markets in Tanzania in the 
early 1990s, smallholder farmers have alternative market channels for selling their 
agricultural produce, including maize and pigeonpea. These market channels include the 
informal and formal channels that offer different prices and sales services, which determine 
farmers’ choices of the channel for marketing their produce (USAID, 2010). Informal 
markets embrace unofficial transactions between farmers and from farmers directly to 
consumers, such as intermediary (brokers), other farmers, relatives or neighbours. Formal 
markets (such as traders, wholesalers and cooperatives) have clearly defined grades, quality 
standards, and safety regulations (Grimsdell, 1996). Smallholder farmers find it difficult to 
penetrate the formal markets due to high transaction costs, high risks, missing markets, and 
lack of collective action (Jari and Fraser, 2009). Most farmers in developing countries are 
fragmented and geographically isolated, and outside the reach of formal market institutions. 
Research in South Africa has shown that there are few small-scale farmers that are integrated 
into formal agribusiness value chains either for supermarkets or agri-processors (Sartorius 
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and Kirsten, 2006). Most small-scale farmers in remote areas still supply to traditional 
markets such as hawkers and wet/open markets because of high transaction costs (Louw et 
al., 2008).  
 
The issue of welfare gains to smallholder farmers from participation in market and channel 
choice, specifically in sub-Saharan Africa countries has acquired much significance in recent 
times (Barrett, 2008; Bellemare and Barrett, 2006; Barrett et al., 2012). According to Barret 
(2008) there is a high potential for smallholder farmers to derive livelihoods from market-
oriented agriculture. Increasing participation in agricultural markets is a key factor to lifting 
rural households out of poverty in African countries (Heltberg and Tarp 2002; Balagtas and 
Coulibaly, 2007). Similarly, the choice of market channels by smallholder farmers plays an 
important role in improving rural incomes (USAID, 2010). Rural agricultural households are 
thus a logical focus for food security and poverty alleviation policies. These policies 
commonly regard boosting agricultural productivity and increasing rates of market 
participation and channel choice as key instruments for improving the living standards of 
agricultural households (Rios et al., 2009). Increasing market participation and rural incomes 
will require some form of transformation out of the semi-subsistence, that currently 
characterize much of rural households in Tanzania.  However, commercialization of the 
agricultural sector requires improving the ability of smallholder farmers to produce 
marketable surplus, market participation and choice of profitable markets channels. The next 
section presents the detailed research problem and justification, followed by objectives of the 
study in section 1.3. Research hypotheses are presented in section 1.4, and section 1.5 
provides an outline of the rest of the thesis.  
 
1.2 Problem statement and justification 
 
Previous studies indicate that smallholders find it difficult to participate in markets because 
of a range of constraints that reduce the incentives for participation, which may be reflected 
in hidden costs that make access to markets and productive assets difficult (Makhura et al., 
2001). In rural areas, farmers are lacking sufficient means to overcome the costs of entering 
the market, such as assets, access to information (Barrett, 2008; Uchezuba et al., 2009). 
According to Barret (2008), private asset accumulation, public infrastructure and services are 
the prerequisites for smallholders to escape from subsistence production and produce 
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marketable surplus. In this regards, commercialisation of the agricultural sector in sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly in Tanzania, requires the ability of smallholder farmers to 
improve, in order for them to produce a marketable surplus and participate in markets. 
Increasing market participation and rural incomes will require smallholder farmers to 
understand the factors that influence smallholder market participation and the level of 
participation. However, very few studies have empirically investigated the factors that 
influence smallholder farmers’ market participation in Tanzania (Rios et al., 2009; Asfaw et 
al., 2012). This study is important from a policy perspective, as little is understood about the 
factors that influence smallholder market participation, particularly the role of transaction 
costs and assets in Tanzania. Understanding factors that influence smallholder farmers’ 
market participation and level of participation will assist policy makers to develop strategies 
required to improve market participation and household income.  
 
High transaction costs are major marketing constraints for smallholder farmers in developing 
countries specifically in Tanzania. Transaction costs such as distance to market, poor 
infrastructure, lack of market information, insufficient expertise on and use of grades and 
standards have under-use of different market channels (Jari and Fraser, 2009). Overcoming 
these constraints requires understanding factors influencing smallholder famers’ choice of 
marketing channel. These can be a key strategy for increasing access of smallholders to 
assets, information, services and markets necessary to raise their incomes. However, no 
empirical study has been carried out to investigate factors influencing the choice of marketing 
channel by smallholder farmers specifically in maize and pigeonpea markets in Tanzania. No 
empirical evidence about why producers choose specific market channels and how 
transaction costs influence market channel choices. A study of this nature is, therefore, 
important from a policy perspective as it will inform practical interventions required to 
improve smallholders’ market choice and in ultimately increasing their welfare. 
 
A farmer’s decision to participate in agricultural markets is one of the most important 
determinants of household welfare (Smale, 2006; Barrett, 2008; World Bank, 2008). In sub-
Saharan Africa specifically in Tanzania, quantitative evidence of the relationship between 
smallholder market participation and household welfare is scarce (Minten and Barrett 2008). 
Should participation in markets lead to welfare gains, it offers credible opportunities for 
smallholder farmers to transform their livelihoods. In more recent study in Zambia, Lubungu 
(2013) used propensity-score matching to investigate the welfare effects of smallholder 
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farmers’ participation in livestock markets, and concluded that participation in cattle markets 
raises household income by over 50% on average among cattle selling households. Asfaw et 
al. (2012) found that maize and pigeonpea market participation in northern Tanzania results 
in higher per capita expenditure.  
 
Other studies on the welfare impact of market participation in developing countries; Bozzoli 
and Brück (2009) analyses the market participation of farm households in the post-war 
environment in northern Mozambique and finds that market participation has positive welfare 
effects. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) found that French beans market participation 
significantly lower poverty by 14% in Senegal. Similarly, Maertens et al. (2011) in Senegal 
found that market participation in the tomato agro-industry increases household incomes by 
47% to 57% on average. Moreover, Smale et al. (2012) showed that input market 
participation in Mali contributes to increased food security. Kamara (2004) found that 
improvement in market access in Kenya increases productivity hence reduces poverty.  
 
While all these studies have analyzed welfare impact of market participation, there is hardly 
any work that has examined the impact of level of market participation on household welfare. 
These studies have documented the welfare effects of market participation for binary 
treatment (i.e. mean impacts) but failed to examine the effects of level of market participation 
on household welfare. In this study, this research gap is addressed by analyzing the impacts 
of market participation and level of participation on household welfare among maize and 
pigeonpea smallholder farmers in northern and eastern Tanzania. Studying the welfare effects 
of level of market participation allow to go beyond the simple mean impacts that dominate 
the literature. Level of market participation is commonly measured as the ratio of percentage 
value of marketed output to total farm production (Haddad and Bouis, 1990). It involves the 
transition from subsistence farming to increased market-oriented production (Omiti et al., 
2006). Analyzing welfare impact of level of market participation plays a critical role in 
meeting the overall goals for food security, poverty alleviation, and sustainable agriculture, 
particularly among smallholder farmers in developing countries (Altshul et al., 1998). 
Understanding the impact of level of market participation has potential impact on smallholder 
farmers’ participation in commercial agriculture. This is potential for unlocking suitable 
opportunity sets necessary for providing better incomes and sustainable livelihoods for 
smallholder farmers. Commercial orientation of smallholder agriculture leads to a gradual 
decline in real food prices due to increased competition and lower costs in food marketing 
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and processing (Jayne et al., 1995). These changes improve the welfare of smallholder 
farmers in two ways: for consumers, low food prices increase the purchasing power for food, 
while for producers a decline in food prices enables the reallocation of limited household 
incomes to high-value non-food agribusiness sectors and more profitable non-farm 
enterprises. Promoting investments in agricultural commercialization among smallholder 
farmers could reduce poverty (Geda et al., 2001). The potential benefits of higher product 
prices and lower input prices due to commercialization are effectively transmitted to poor 
households when market access is guaranteed (IFAD, 2001). 
 
Market participation effects are likely to be heterogeneous, suggesting that all participants 
may not benefit in the same way from participation. Looking at features of the distribution of 
impacts other than just the mean provides a more accurate picture on welfare impacts (Kassie 
et al., 2014). However, in sub-Saharan Africa, where smallholder farmers’ market access is a 
constraining factor, quantitative evidence of the heterogeneous impact of market participation 
on household welfare is scarce (Barrett, 2008). By analyzing impact of market participation 
and level of participation, this study also aims to fill this gap in the literature by evaluating 
the heterogeneous impacts of market participation on household welfare.  
Unlike other studies (e.g. Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Maertens et al., 2011; Lubungu, 
2013), who used per capita income as a measure of household welfare, this study rely on per 
capita consumption expenditure as a measure of household welfare which is more reliable 
welfare indicator and less prone to measurement error than total household income. Besides, 
household income indicates the ability of the household to purchase its basic needs of life 
while per capita expenditure reflects the effective consumption of households and therefore 
provides information on food security status of households. Unlike previous study in 
Tanzania (Asfaw et al., 2012) that focused on maize and pigeonpea largely in only northern 
zone of Tanzania, this study focuses on the northern and eastern zones of Tanzania, making it 
more representative of maize-legume producing area in the country. Due to the facts that 
eastern zone is also important in maize and pigeonpea production, this can be representative 
of the major maize–legume farming systems in the country. Given that poverty is more 
widespread in rural sub-Saharan Africa especially in Tanzania, new empirical results on links 
between market participation, level of participation and household welfare are crucial to 




Recent developments in Africa highlight an increasing trend toward liberalized domestic 
markets, whereby smallholder farmers have alternative market channels for selling their 
agricultural produce. These market channels offer different prices and sales services, which 
determine farmers’ choices of the channel and impact on household income and welfare 
outcome (USAID, 2010). The market channel choice and the price that smallholders receive 
for their agricultural products have great implications for household welfare and poverty 
alleviation. In many sub-Saharan African countries, including Tanzania, smallholder farmers 
typically have a choice between selling their products to brokers, who travel back-and-forth 
between villages and markets or transporting their products themselves to the nearest market 
(Fafchamps and Vargas-Hill, 2005). The different market avenues affect the share of the 
benefit that goes to farmers. Brokers may take advantage of a farmers ignorance of the 
market price, seeking to extract a rent from them by offering very low prices for their 
products (Fafchamps and Vargas-Hill, 2005; Mérel et al., 2009). Access to better-paying 
markets for agricultural products is vital in enhancing and diversifying the livelihoods of poor 
subsistence or semi-subsistence farmers (Kirui et al., 2013). 
 
Increased profitability for farmers from marketing decisions may lead them to change their 
production, investment in productive assets, new agricultural technologies and improve 
household welfare (Jensen, 2010). However, in sub-Saharan Africa, specifically in Tanzania, 
where smallholder farmers’ market access is a constraining factor, quantitative evidence of 
the relationship between market channel choice and household welfare is thin (Barrett, 2008).  
For example, while there are early signs of improving market integration in sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is unclear how smallholders participate or if they benefit from participating in 
different market channels (Gomez et al., 2011). Moreover, in this study, the possibility of 
self-selection into market channel choice by the smallholder farmers was explicitly 
considered and, as such, this represents the study’s main contribution to the existing literature 
on impact of market channel choice among smallholder farmers. In this regard, understanding 
the link between smallholder market channel choice and household welfare is potentially 
beneficial to policy makers aimed at improving welfare of rural households. It is also 
important for supporting the economic inclusion of rural farm households and in ultimately 




1.3 The objectives of the study 
 
In the context of rural Tanzania, the general objective of this study is to generate empirical 
evidence on smallholder market participation, channel choice decisions and welfare impacts 
among maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers.  
 
The specific objectives are to: 
 
i) identify the factors that influence smallholder farmers’ decision to participate and 
explain the intensity of their participation in maize and pigeonpea markets;  
ii) examine the factors affecting the choice of marketing channels by smallholder 
farmers; and 
iii) assess the impact of market participation and channel choice on household welfare. 
 
To achieve the above objectives, the study uses quantitative data gathered through household 
survey in Northern and Eastern zones of Tanzania. Different conceptual and empirical 




Hypothesis (i): Farmers with better access and endowment to assets (wealth) do not 
participate in the market.  
Household asset holdings have been recognized as key determinants of market participation 
in many empirical studies (Nyoro et al., 1999; Cadot et al., 2006; Boughton et al., 2007) in 
sub-Saharan Africa. According to Goetz (1992) and Asfaw et al. (2012), access to assets 
(such as land, livestock, transport and communication assets) enhances smallholder market 
participation. Livestock ownership is a proxy for wealth and provides a risk diversification 
benefit and increasing the labour efficiency of the household (Binswanger and McIntire, 
1987; Kalinda et al., 2000). Ownership of physical assets such as cart, bicycle and motorized 
vehicle lower transportation, communication and information costs and subsequently fewer 




Hypothesis (ii): Transaction costs do not influence smallholder farmers’ market participation 
and channel choice.   
Several studies show that transaction costs are significant barriers to market participation by 
smallholder farmers (Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000; Makhura et al., 2001; Gabre-Madhin et 
al., 2002; Alene et al., 2008; Barrett, 2008; Jagwe et al., 2010). Transaction costs 
significantly hinder market participation whereas better market information stimulates it 
(Alene et al., 2008). Access to markets and roads are expected to reduce marketing costs, 
thus encourage market participation. Distance to market as a proxy for transaction costs has a 
negative effect on market participation; that is, the greater distance to the market increases 
transaction costs (Barrett, 2007; Key et al., 2001). Most smallholders do not participate as 
sellers because they face high transaction costs which limit household’s market access 
(Barrett, 2008). Lack of market information hinder market participation by raising search, 
screening and bargaining costs (Cadot et al., 2006; Alene et al., 2008). On the other hand, 
transaction costs play an important role in market channel choice by smallholder farmers. 
Payment delay, as a proxy for negotiation costs had a negative influence on market channel 
choice (Chitika, 2009). Poor infrastructure, lack of market transport, lack of market 
information, insufficient expertise on and use of grades and standards have led to inefficient 
use of different market channels (Jari and Fraser, 2009). 
 
Hypothesis (iii): Market participation and channel choice do not influence household welfare.  
Market participation and channel choice motivates smallholder farmers to move from 
subsistence farming to commercial farming (Makhura, 2001; Rao and Qaim, 2011). 
Commercial farming increases farm’s output, hence enabling the farmer to earn more income. 
Smallholder farmers’ market participation and channel choice is very vital for sustaining 
economic growth, food security and poverty alleviation (Jari and Fraser, 2009; Little, 1994). 
Most farmers who participated in the market tend to be food secure because the income they 
derives from the sale of their output has enabled them to purchase the staple food. It is widely 
acknowledged that the involvement of small farmers into markets can contribute to higher 
productivity and income growth, which in turn can enhance food security, poverty reduction 
and overall economic growth (Barrett, 2008). 





1.5 Outline of the thesis  
 
This thesis is organized under six chapters, including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 
provides the literature review of the study. Having defines some key concepts and 
terminologies, it provides an overview of the factors affecting market participation and 
channel choice by smallholder farmers in developing countries. It also provides the 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the welfare impact of market participation and channel 
choice. Chapter 3 assesses the determinants of smallholder farmers’ participation in maize 
and pigeonpea markets in Tanzania. It analyses the factors influencing market participation 
decisions and the intensity of participation among maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers. 
Chapter 4 analyses the factors that influence smallholder farmers’ choice of marketing 
channel in Tanzania. Chapter 5 examines the welfare impacts of market participation and 
channel choice by maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers, measured by household 
expenditures. Finally, chapter 6 presents the conclusions and policy implications of the 








This chapter reviews theoretical and empirical literature relating to smallholder market 
participation, channel choice and impacts on household welfare. The chapter starts by 
offering some definitional aspects of the terms and concepts of the study, namely, 
smallholder farmers, market participation, market channel choice and the concept of 
transaction costs. An exact understanding of these terminologies is important in explaining 
smallholder farmers’ market participation, channel choice and welfare impacts in the study 
area. The chapter also reviews literature on the determinants of smallholder market 
participation decision and channel choice in developing countries. This is followed by 
presentation on the theoretical and empirical evidence on the welfare impacts of market 
participation and channel choice.   
 
2.2 Concepts and Definitions  
2.2.1 Smallholder farmers 
 
Smallholder farmers are defined in various ways depending on context, country and 
ecological zone. This explains interchangeable use of the term ‘smallholder’ with ‘small-
scale’, ‘resource poor’ and ‘peasant farmer’. The World Bank’s Rural Development Strategy 
defines smallholders as those with a low asset base, operating less than 2 hectares of cropland 
and depending on household members for most of the labour (World Bank, 2003). FAO study 
defines smallholders as farmers with limited resource endowments, relative to other farmers 
in the sector (Dixon et al., 2003). According to Ellis (1988), smallholder farmers are farm 
households with access to means of livelihoods in land relying primarily on family labour for 
farm production to produce for self-subsistence and often for market sale. Todaro (1989) 
defines smallholder farmers as owning small-based plots of land on which they grow 
subsistence crops and one or two cash crops relying almost exclusively on family labour. 
These definitions have a similar theme in the characteristics of smallholder farmers, namely 
constraints in land and labour. In addition, Dixon et al. (2005) suggests that most 
smallholders have diverse sources of livelihood including significant off-farm income yet are 
still vulnerable to economic and climatic shocks. Smallholder farmers differ in individual 
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characteristics, farm sizes, resource distribution between food and cash crops, livestock and 
off-farm activities, their use of external inputs and hired labour, the proportion of food crops 
sold and household expenditure patterns. These differences and constraints highlighted above 
are typical characteristics of smallholder farmers in Tanzania. The next sub-section describes 
the concept of market participation. 
 
2.2.2 Market participation 
 
Various definitions of market participation have been suggested by different authors. Some 
studies consider market participation as any market related activity which promotes the sale 
of produce (Key et al., 2000; Holloway and Ehui, 2002; Lapar et al., 2003). According to 
William et al. (2008), market participation defined in terms of sales as a fraction of total 
output, for the sum of all agricultural crop production in the household which includes 
annuals and perennials, locally-processed and industrial crops, fruits and agro-forestry. This 
sales index would be zero for a household that sells nothing, and could be greater than unity 
for households that add value to their crop production via further processing and/or storage. 
Improvements in market participation are necessary to link smallholder farmers to markets in 
order to expand demand for agricultural products as well as set opportunities for income 
generation (Pingali, 1997).  
 
Goetz (1992) defined market participation using household purchases and sales, whereby 
volume of produce traded are used to determine market participation. According to Latt and 
Nieuwoudt (1988) market participation can be referred to as commercialization, which means 
that increased market participation implies the transition from subsistence farming to a 
market engagement mode, whereby frequent use of markets is made for the purpose of 
exchanging products and services. In an agricultural market economy, market participation of 
commercialization occurs mainly when farmers stop being mostly subsistence and become 
profit-oriented (Makhura et al., 2001). Hazell et al. (2007) found out that agricultural 
commercialization as the degree of participation in the output markets with the focus very 
much on cash incomes. Increased market participation implies the transition from subsistence 
farming to a market engagement mode, whereby frequent use of markets is made for the 
purpose of exchanging products and services. The next sub-section describes the concept of 
market channel choice. 
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2.2.3 Marketing channel choice 
 
Marketing channels are defined as downstream part of the value chain consisted of numerous 
chain actors at different outlets, where final products are available to final consumers 
(Arinloye, 2012). Coughlan et al. (2001) see those chain actors as utility creating parties that 
offer end-users a combination of attractive products and services. According to Giles (1973), 
the marketing channels refer to the system of marketing institutions through which goods or 
services are transferred from the original producers to the ultimate users or consumers. Most 
frequently a physical product transfer is involved, but sometimes an intermediate marketing 
institution may take title to goods without actually handling them. Kohls and Uhl (1990) 
focuses on the marketing of agricultural products, define marketing channels as alternative 
routes of product flows from producers to consumers. Kotler (2003) also explains marketing 
channels as a set of interdependent organizations involved in the process of making a product 
or services available for use or consumption. Most producers do not sell their goods directly 
to the final users; between them stands a set of intermediaries performing a variety of 
functions. These intermediaries constitute a marketing channel. According to Stern et al. 
(1996) marketing channels refers as sets of interdependent organisations involved in the 
process of making a product or service available for use or consumption. The channel follows 
a vertical structure where products flow from producer to the ultimate consumer and in which 
actors meet each other at markets. Producers, wholesalers and retailers as well as other 
channel actors exist in channel arrangements to perform marketing functions (business 
activities) that contribute to the product flow.  
 
Marketing channel choice is one of the most important farm household decisions and has a 
great impact on the household income. Before choosing a marketing channel, farmers 
consider the costs associated with transportation, profits, level of trust among the available 
channels and familiarity of the markets, among other factors (Makhura, 2001). In other 
instances, farmers market their produce through channels offering low prices because they 
either lack market knowledge or have difficulties in accessing markets that are more 
rewarding. The choice of the channel to use is a fundamental decision for the smallholder 
farmers where a number of factors have to be considered as a basis for such decision. 
Farmers need a clear understanding of market characteristics before beginning the selection 
of channel. The next sub-section presents the concept of transaction costs. 
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2.2.4 The concept of transaction costs 
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) defines transaction costs as costs relating to searching 
and gathering on agents and goods or services. They involve costs of bargaining and 
negotiating contracts while including costs of monitoring and enforcement (Bromley, 1991). 
However, Eggertson (1990) defines transaction costs as costs which arise when activities 
such as information search, bargaining, contracting, monitoring, enforcement and protection 
of property rights are done. Transactions costs are the embodiment of barriers to market 
participation by smallholder farmers and have been used as a definitional characteristic of 
smallholders and as factor responsible for significant market failures in developing countries 
(de Janvry et al., 1991; Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). Transaction costs, occasionally 
referred to as “hidden costs”, are the observable and non-observable costs associated with 
exchange of goods and services (Jagwe et al., 2010). These costs arise due to the frictions 
involved in the exchange process, as it entails transfer and enforcement of property rights.   
 
Transactions costs can explain why some farmers participate in markets while others are 
simply self-sufficient. Differences in transactions costs, as well as differential access to assets 
and services to mitigate these transactions costs are possible factors underlying 
heterogeneous market participation among smallholders (Alene et al., 2008). According to 
Scott (1995), transaction costs include ex-ante costs of determining whether an exchange is 
advantageous, cost of carrying out the exchange such as finding buyers or sellers and cost of 
transportation, and, where applicable, ex-post costs of ensuring that all requirements of the 
exchange were met. Transaction costs are present every time that there is a trade or a 
marketing transaction. Transaction costs also imply imperfect knowledge of market 
opportunities, prices, buyers, quality grades and standards, among others. Together with 
information asymmetry, these factors increase the cost of information. When transaction 
costs are large, total costs (the combined sum of production and transaction costs) can exceed 
total revenue, resulting in “market failure” which means that firms forgo investments that 
would otherwise be profitable (Jagwe et al., 2010). 
Key et al. (2000) categorized transaction costs into fixed and variable or proportional 
transaction costs. Fixed transaction costs (FTCs) are invariant to the volume of output traded 
and affect smallholder farmers’ market participation decisions. These costs include the costs 
of (a) searching for a trading partner; (b) negotiating and bargaining, particularly when there 
is imperfect information about prices; and (c) enforcing contracts and supervision, 
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particularly when credit sales are involved, as sellers have to screen buyers for reliability to 
lower the likelihood of defaults (Fafchamps, 2004). Variable or proportional transaction costs 
(PTCs), on the other hand, are per unit costs of accessing markets that vary with the volumes 
traded and may affect the decision to participate in the market, as well as the quantity traded. 
They include costs associated with the transfer of the output being traded, such as transport 
costs and time spent delivering the product to the market. These costs are largely 
unobservable or cannot easily be recorded in a survey. In essence, the variable transaction 
costs raise the real price of the commodity purchased and lower the real price received for 
commodity sold (Ouma et al., 2010).  
 
Hobbs (1997) applied the transaction cost economics framework to the choice of marketing 
in agricultural products, and identifies three types of transaction costs in agricultural 
marketing: information costs, negotiation and bargaining costs, and monitoring and 
enforcement costs. Information costs (ex-ante transaction costs) are the costs of identifying 
markets and trading partners, and costs of obtaining price and product information. 
Negotiation costs are the costs of physically carrying out the transaction, including the costs 
of physically negotiating, bargaining and formally drawing up the terms of exchange. 
Monitoring and enforcement costs (ex-post transaction costs) are the costs of ensuring that 
the trading partners follow the terms of the transaction, such as quality standards or payment 
arrangements.  
 
According to Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995), transaction costs include costs resulting from 
distance from markets, poor infrastructure, high marketing margins, imperfect information, 
supervision and incentive costs. The transaction costs emanate from a number of sources; 
smallholder farmers are located in remote areas far away from service providers and major 
consumers of farm products. The distance to the market, together with the poor infrastructure, 
poor access to assets and information is manifested in high exchange costs. The next section 
reviews empirical evidence on the factors influencing market participation by smallholder 





2.3 Determinants of market participation by smallholder farmers in developing 
countries 
 
2.3.1 Transaction costs 
 
The key argument in the most of literature on smallholder market participation in developing 
countries is the effects of transactions costs. Transaction costs hamper market participation 
because they impose added cost burdens to the efficient conduct of market entry activities. 
The majority of smallholder farmers in developing countries are located in remote areas with 
poor infrastructure and they often fail to participate to markets due to the high transaction 
costs involved (Goetz, 1992; Key, 2000; Makhura, 2001). Several studies show that 
transaction costs are significant barriers to market participation by smallholder farmers 
(Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000; Makhura et al., 2001; Gabre-Madhin et al., 2002; Obare et 
al., 2003; Cadot et al., 2006; Alene et al., 2008; Barrett, 2008; Jagwe et al., 2010; Asfaw et 
al., 2012).  
 
Goetz (1992), in his pioneering work, estimated a switching regression model of market 
participation and amount traded to grain market in Senegal; separating the decision of 
whether or not to participate in markets from the decision of how much to trade. He found 
that fixed transactions costs significantly hindered, while better information stimulated, 
smallholder’s market participation. Elaborating the works by Goetz (1992), Key et al. (2000) 
develop a model of supply response when transaction costs cause some producers to buy, 
others to sell, and others not to participate in markets. They consider fixed transaction costs 
(FTCs) and proportional transaction costs (PTCs). Fixed transaction costs are invariant to the 
quantity of the good traded, whereas proportional transaction costs increase proportionally in 
quantity. Thus, PTCs corresponds to constant marginal transaction costs. They estimated the 
model using data consisting of Mexican corn producers and the results indicate that both 
types of transactions costs – fixed and proportional – play significant role in explaining 
household behaviour, with proportional transaction costs being more important in selling 
decisions. 
 
Alene et al. (2008) argue that transaction costs significantly hinder market participation 
whereas better market information stimulates it. Access to markets and roads are expected to 
reduce marketing costs, thus encourage market participation. Barrett (2007); Gabre-Madhin 
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et al. (2002), examined the role of marketing costs in limiting the level of smallholder market 
participation. Results show that distance to market considered as a proxy for transaction costs 
and has a negative effect on market participation; that is, the greater distance to the market 
increases transaction costs.  
 
Barrett (2008) provides a detailed literature review on smallholder market participation in 
eastern and southern Africa, focusing on staple food-grains markets. He found that the 
empirical evidence suggests that most smallholders do not participate as sellers because they 
face two basic classes of barriers to entry; at the micro-level, households have insufficient 
access to productive assets, financing, and new production technologies; and at the macro-
level, especially in remote areas, high transaction costs limit household’s market access. Key 
et al. (2000) and Makhura et al. (2001) found that distance to the market negatively 
influences both the decision to participate in markets and the proportion of output sold. Thus, 
the variable transport costs per unit of distance increases with the potential marketable load 
size. For farmers in very remote rural areas, geographic isolation through distance creates a 
wedge between farm gate and market prices. 
 
Asfaw et al. (2012); Cadot et al. (2006); and Alene et al. (2008) found that, the nearer a 
farmer is to the main market, the greater the likelihood of market participation and marketed 
surplus. On the other hand, lack of market information hinder market participation by raising 
search, screening and bargaining costs. Furthermore, poor state of roads as well as inadequate 
road networks obviously hinders market participation. During rainy season many rural roads 
are impassable resulting in high transport costs and in cases where buyers provide transport, 
this further reduces the price that buyers are prepared to pay farmers. Obare et al. (2003) 
revealed that insufficient road infrastructure is associated with poor development of markets 
through high transaction costs. Thus, the farther a household is away from the town, the 
higher the transaction costs of obtaining information and market outlet. Furthermore, 
proximity to towns reflects how far farmers have to travel to reach sources of information 
(Makhura et al., 2001).  
 
Renkow et al. (2004) studying Kenyan smallholder households, found that fixed transactions 
costs, on average is slightly lower in areas with reliable motorized transport service and that 
are closer to markets. Nevertheless, information costs are often considered to be fixed 
transaction costs that influence market entry decisions (Omamo, 1998). This means that the 
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type of information source has a significant effect on the intensity of market participation. 
Thus, formal sources (for example radio, television and public and private institutional 
channels) are significant in improving the proportion of output sold. On the other hand, 
informal sources (mainly friends, neighbours and other non-institutional sources) are more 
effective for providing relevant market information that increases the intensity of 
participation. 
 
Studies in Asia also show that transaction costs have significant negative effect on market 
participation by smallholder farmers. For instance, in Peru, market participation was low 
among smallholder potato producers because of the high transaction costs and formal markets 
became inaccessible (Maltsoglou and Tanyeri-Abur, 2005). A case study from the Philippines 
also shows that high transaction costs played a significant part in decreasing market 
participation among smallholder livestock producers (Lapar et al., 2003).  
 
2.3.2 Household characteristics  
 
Most previous studies find that household characteristics have significant influence on output 
markets participation (Key et al., 2000; Makhura, 2001; Matungul et al., 2001; Lapar et al., 
2003; Benfica et al., 2006; Alene et al., 2008; Barrett, 2008; Randela et al., 2008; Asfaw et 
al., 2012). While admitting that transaction costs is important in encouraging market 
participation, Goetz (1992) showed empirical evidence in his study of a significant parabolic 
relationship between age and market participation. This is also true for the food markets in 
Tanzania and Ethiopia (Asfaw et al., 2011). Age affects supply participation in that older 
heads of households have more experience and greater contacts allowing for trade 
opportunities to be discovered at lower costs. Age also indicates increased trust between 
trading partners through repeated exchange with the same party. The relationship between 
participation and age is parabolic indicating that beyond a certain age, farmers produce less 
(they grow older and get past their productive age) and participation in the market reduces 
(Goetz, 1992). 
 
Age and education not only enhance production, they also mitigate transaction costs as they 
increase the ability of farmers to obtain market information. Matungul et al. (2001), also 
found that age have significant influence on market participation, as older and more 
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experienced household heads tend to have more personal contacts, allowing discovery of 
trading opportunities at low cost. According to Randela et al. (2008), a positive and 
significant relationship was found between household market participation and age of the 
household heads. Moreover, Makhura (2001) argues that being aged (old) also assists farmers 
to overcome fixed transaction costs since some experiences about the market have been 
accumulated overtime.  
 
Education level also play a role in enhancing production and mitigating transaction costs by 
increasing the ability of farmers to obtain market information. Benfica et al. (2006) 
investigated the determinants of participation of tobacco contract farmers in the Zambezi 
Valley of Mozambique. He found that education have a positive effect on smallholder 
farmers participation in markets; due to the fact that educated households are expected to 
have better skills and better access to information.  According to Makhura et al. (2001) 
household head’s formal education is posited to increase a household’s understanding of 
market dynamics and therefore improve decisions about the amount of output sold. Asfaw et 
al. (2011) in their study of small holder farmers participation in markets in Tanzania and 
Ethiopia also found that education level, measured in years of schooling had a positive 
impact on entry to markets and marketed surplus, suggesting that a higher level of education 
increases productivity and provides a greater opportunity of producing a marketed surplus. 
Education also reduces transaction costs and market entry barriers as it enables farmers to 
obtain and process market information, and gives them better negotiation skills (Makhura et 
al., 2001). 
 
Household size reflecting access to family labours supply for production, and also increases 
domestic consumption requirements and hence lowers market participation (Makhura et al., 
2001).  Therefore household with large household members are expected to produce more 
marketable output or store it for household consumption. However, a larger household size 
also meant that more food was needed to feed the household members (Goetz, 1992). The 
larger the consumption requirement, the less a household could sell. Lapar et al. (2003) 
revealed that the propensity to participate into the market economy declines with higher 
numbers of household members. Asfaw et al. (2012) also found that household size 
negatively affects market participation, as larger families consumed much of farm output. 




Literature shows that gender is a significant determinant of market participation, with female-
headed households being significantly disadvantaged in terms of both participation and level 
of participation (Tiruneh et al., 2001). Female-headed households in sub-Saharan Africa are 
disadvantaged because of unequal distribution of resources as well as cultural barriers 
(Blackden, 1993; Ongile, 1999; Nyakudya et al., 2006). Female-headed households are more 
likely to be autarkic than to be net sellers, and are more likely to be net buyers than to be 
autarkic (Bellemare and Barrett, 2006). Thus, it is highly unlikely that women will participate 
in a market as sellers but instead it is more common for them to participate as buyers. 
Cunningham et al. (2008) also found that gender plays a role in intensity of market 
participation. They found that men are likely to sell more grain early in the season when 
prices are still high, while women prefer to store more output for household self-sufficiency.  
 
2.3.3 Product characteristics 
 
Literature shows that product characteristics such as output prices play a role in market 
participation. The finding by Alene et al. (2008) and Komarek (2010) showed that output 
prices have positive impact on market participation by maize and banana farmers in Kenya 
and Uganda, respectively. They argue that output price is an incentive for sellers to supply 
more in the market. According to van Zyl and Coetzee (1990) farm gate prices are viewed as 
an incentive to smallholders’ participation in agricultural markets. Key et al. (2000) predicted 
that a one percent increase in farm gate price increased the probability that a household 
would participate in agricultural markets by 0.77%. Madikizela and Groenewald (1998) 
suggested that farmers would always try to determine where they could get the best price for 
a given crop in order to sell their products. Enete and Igbokwe (2009) found that price had an 
important influence on the level of farmers’ market participation in cassava markets which is 
supported by economic theory that price induces increased supply. Omiti et al. (2009) also 
asserted that better output price was a key incentive for increased sales in the market. 
 
2.3.4 Household assets  
 
Household asset holdings have been recognized as key determinants of market participation 
in many empirical studies (Nyoro et al., 1999; Cadot et al., 2006; Boughton et al., 2007) in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This is because assets determine the quantity of output produced and 
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have a strong association with smallholder market entry opportunities, helping farmers 
overcome market entry barriers and thus increasing market access. Private household assets, 
especially land, but also livestock, labor and equipment, are strongly positively associated 
with crop market participation. Previous studies (Asfaw et al., 2012; Goetz, 1992) show that 
households need a minimum asset threshold in order to escape from poverty and participate 
in the market. Lack of assets may result in the exclusion of producers from new and 
remunerative market opportunities. Assets enhance the capacity of smallholder farmers to 
access, and take advantage of market opportunities. Barrett (2007), studying market 
participation in staple grains in sub-Saharan Africa, found that barriers to participation in 
markets by smallholders were mainly land, livestock, capital and improved technologies like 
farm equipment needed to generate a surplus that influenced market participation. 
 
A study by Heierli and Gass (2001) showed that assets empower the rural poor by increasing 
their incomes and makes a household less vulnerable to shocks and the extent of vulnerability 
determines household market participation. The larger the size of arable land a household 
uses, the higher the production levels are likely to be, and the higher the probability of market 
participation. Farmers owning more livestock will participate more in markets, because 
livestock ownership tends to serve as a security for risk of market failure on the one hand, 
and contributing to productive assets on the other hand. They argue that ownership of 
productive assets (e.g. cattle) can pave the way for a family to participate in economic 
activities (Heierli and Gass, 2001). Ownership of livestock was a major source of income and 
an insurance substitute (Binswanger and Mclntire, 1987). According to Binswanger and 
McIntire (1987) and Kalinda et al. (2000), livestock ownership is a proxy for wealth and 
provides a risk diversification benefit. Apart from increasing the labour efficiency of the 
household, draught power could be rented and could generate income that was reported to 
correlate positively with market participation. Pravakar et al. (2010) on the other hand found 
that households with larger land holdings per adult member sold larger volumes of their 
produce as compared to those with smaller land holdings. The authors further found that 
households with larger livestock endowments produced and sold more crop produce. They 
explained that it was because the households used manures from the livestock to enhance 
crop yields. 
 
Randela et al. (2008) studied factors that influence market participation in Mpumalanga, 
South Africa. They found that ownership of cultivation equipment is associated with timely 
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planting that can lead to higher production; hence, households with relatively higher 
production levels have a higher probability of market participation. Gebremedhin et al. 
(2009) found that the size of cultivable land, household labour supply and physical capital to 
be important factors in inducing smallholder market participation. Farmers with bigger 
cultivable land were found to participate more because of their ability to produce bigger 
volumes that ensured marketed surpluses. Enete and Igbokwe (2009) found that the 
probability of market participation declined with declining farm size for sellers of cassava but 
increased with farm sizes for buyers though not significant in either case. Jayne et al. (2010) 
stated that most smallholders do not own land and lack other resources to produce a surplus. 
 
Many studies (Boughton et al., 2007; Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000) have found relationships 
between household ownership of transportation assets such as cart, bicycle and motorized 
vehicle, and market participation. The reason is that households that owned these physical 
assets had lower transportation, communication and information costs and subsequently 
fewer obstacles to entering the market. Boughton et al. (2007) analyzed market participation 
by rural households in Mozambique using an asset-based approach. They revealed that 
household ownership of means of transport such as bicycle or motorized vehicle increases 
market participation and sales volumes conditional on participation. Households with own 
transport are likely to transport their produce on time to the market, thus higher level of 
participation. Moreover, the availability of transportation facilities helps reduce long market 
distance constraint, offering greater depth in marketing choices.  
 
Heltberg and Tarp (2002) estimate reduced form equations for market participation and value 
of food crops (as a group), cash crops (as a group), and total value of crops sales, using data 
from a 1996-97 Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) in Mozambique. They found 
that farm size per household worker and animal traction increases food grains market 
participation and intensity of participation among smallholder farmers. Explaining variation 
in the value of sales for food crops or cash crops was much less conclusive, and the authors 
recognize that aggregation of sales into food or cash crop groups may mask underlying causal 
mechanisms related to individual crop decisions. 
 
Benfica et al. (2006) found that participation in market is driven by factor endowments, asset 
ownership and alternative income opportunities.  Access to liquid assets, such as non-farm 
income may lead to risk reduction in household decision making and, with it, increased 
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propensity to undertake higher risk activities, notably selling crops or producing for the 
market. Masuku et al. (2001), in their study to identify factors influencing the decision 
whether or not to sell maize by smallholder fanners in Swaziland, found that the decision 
whether or not to sell maize was influenced by income from off-farm activities. Alene et al. 
(2008) also noted that non-farm income contributes to more marketed output if the non-farm 
income is invested in farm technology and other farm improvements. Otherwise, marketed 
farm output drops if non-farm income triggers off-farm diversification. Binswanger and 
McIntire (1987) found that income transfers from relatives reduced risk-aversion behaviour 
because it insured against adversity. Therefore, families with employed members had more 
financial resources and were more likely to participate in agricultural markets. Hlongwane et 
al. (2014) analyzing the factors affecting the market participation of maize farmers in 
Limpopo province in South Africa, found that credit has a positive impact on market 
participation.  
 
2.3.5 Social capital  
 
Social capital refers to personal social networks that encourage market participation; such as 
farmer organizations/associations, farmer groups, cooperatives and extension groups (Sharp 
and Smith, 2003). It is through these networks that trust is developed, which, in turn, 
encourages cooperation and regular exchanges. Also, information and production resources 
can be transmitted through these networks, thus link farmers with markets, and encourage 
market participation (Jari and Fraser, 2009). It is through networks that information and other 
resources can be transmitted, and the existence of trust facilitates co-operative behaviour 
based around these networks (Sharp and Smith, 2003).   
 
Various studies have highlighted the importance of social capital in market participation by 
smallholder producers in developing countries (Christy, 2001; Darr, 2005; Hellin et al., 2007; 
Holloway et al., 1999; Key et al., 2000; Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001; Matungul et al., 2001; 
Poulton et al., 1998). Farmers associations were widely believed to be one of the mechanisms 
for improving smallholder access to agricultural markets (Christy, 2001); facilitating the 
collection of farmers’ outputs and purchasing and distributing inputs in a liberalised market 
(Poulton et al., 1998; Matungul et al., 2001); reducing information, product collection and 
marketing costs (Key et al., 2000); and facilitating quality control, packaging and storage of 
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the products (Matungul et al., 2001). Kherallah and Kirsten (2001) argue that overcoming the 
problem of high transaction costs requires that smallholder producers rely on external rather 
than internal economies of scale through collective action. Hellin et al. (2007) and Darr 
(2005) suggest that farmer association facilitates easier access to commodity markets, 
technical skills and market information.  
 
Holloway et al. (1999) suggests participatory, farmer-led producer organizations that handle 
output marketing, usually after some form of bulking to address the problem of market 
access. Rural producer organizations are the various forms of organizations that perform 
production and marketing for members (Stockbridge et al., 2003). Rural producer 
organizations enable farmers to have improved access to market for their products at a fairer 
price (Holloway et al, 1999; 2000). They help members by aggregating the volume of 
produce over the number of producers, finding a trader interested in buying, negotiating the 
price and quality specifications, assembling the product for the delivery date and quantity 
agreed, collecting payment, paying farmers and retaining a small margin for the organization 
to cover its expenses (Grootaert, 1997; Collier, 1998).  
 
Collective action in the form of farmer groups or cooperative associations also increase the 
market supply participation of households as they improve market access and lower fixed 
transaction costs by providing information (Fischer and Qaim, 2012). Products of various 
households can be marketed together, reducing transportation costs. Market discovery costs 
are reduced because this fixed cost is shared or distributed among all participating 
households. Stockbridge et al. (2003) revealed that there is evidence that farmer groups offer 
one way for smallholder farmers to participate in the market more effectively. Acting 
collectively, smallholder farmers may be in a better position to reduce transaction costs of 
accessing inputs and output, obtain market information, secure access to new technologies 
and tap into high value markets allowing them to compete with large farmers and 
agribusiness.  
 
Participation in an agricultural scheme such as farmers’ groups, extension groups and contact 
with extension systems also influences smallholder participation in agricultural markets 
(Masuku et al., 2001). Government involvement in the provision of public goods related to 
extension and research stimulate smallholder cultivation and market participation (Delgado, 
1999). Extension service is a vital factor in enlightening the farmers about proper marketing 
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of their produce and disseminating accurate and latest market information. The next section 
presents empirical evidence on the factors influencing market channel choice by smallholder 
farmers in developing countries. 
 
2.4 Determinants of market channel choice by smallholder farmers in developing 
countries 
 
Several studies have been carried out to identify factors influencing farmers’ choice of 
marketing channel in developing countries. These studies have identified factors related to 
transaction costs, farm household characteristics, product characteristics, access to assets, 
trust and social capital such as farmer group/association affect farmers’ market channel 
choice. 
 
2.4.1 Transaction costs 
 
The influence of transaction costs on market channel choice by smallholder farmers in sub-
Saharan Africa is well documented. Masuku et al. (2001), in their study to identify factors 
influencing the choice of marketing channel by maize smallholder farmers in Swaziland, 
found that transaction costs such as distance to market and transport costs have impact on 
market channel choice, as the longer the distance the higher the transport cost and the less 
likely for the farmer to sell through formal channel. That is, the formal marketing chain is 
associated with high transportation costs. However, farmers would opt for such a chain since 
prices are generally stable unlike in the informal chain.  
 
Musemwa et al. (2007) regard transaction costs as barriers to the efficient participation of 
producers in different markets. Thus, farmers will not use a particular channel when the value 
of using that channel is outweighed by the cost of using it. Ogunleye and Oladeji (2007) 
analyzed the factors that influence the choice of market channel by cocoa farmers in Nigeria. 
They found that, the factors associated with the choice of channels are the time of payment, 
mode of payment, price of product and transportation cost. These shows that transaction costs 




Chirwa (2009) analyzed the determinants of marketing channels among smallholder maize 
farmers in Malawi. He revealed that distance to day markets was positively associated with 
the choice of private traders while distance to the tarmac road hinders the choice of private 
traders. According to Chitika (2009), information costs proxy by quality inspection had a 
positive influence on informal milk marketing while payment delay, a proxy for negotiation 
costs had a negative influence on informal milk marketing in Malawi. A recent study in South 
Africa on strategies to unlock markets access to smallholders showed that factors such as 
poor infrastructure, lack of market transport, lack of market information, insufficient 
expertise on and use of grades and standards have led to inefficient use of different market 
channels (Jari and Fraser, 2009).  
 
Panda et al. (2012) studied the factors influencing marketing channel choices of vegetable 
farmers in India. They found that access to market information has a positive impact on both 
formal and informal market choices. They also found that there was a positive relationship 
between formal market channel choice and road infrastructure. Mathye et al. (2000) analysed 
the choice of marketing channels for smallholder farmers producing bananas and mangoes in 
some areas of the Northern Province in South Africa. They found that transaction costs such 
as transport costs and searching for markets tend to influence market channel choice. 
According to Gong et al. (2006) there are significant relationships between economic and 
social variables and marketing channel selection for cattle distribution in China. He argued 
that transaction cost has a significant impact on marketing channel selection.  
 
Woldie and Nuppenau (2009) studied the market channel choice decision in the Ethiopian 
banana markets. They found that transaction costs in the form of information costs, 
negotiation costs as well as monitoring and enforcement costs have significant impact on 
market channel choice by banana smallholder farmers. Rao and Qaim (2011) show that 
infrastructure cum transaction costs, for example in road access, are important factors 
influencing the choice of marketing channel by smallholder farmers in Kenya. 
 
2.4.2 Household characteristics 
 
In addition to transaction costs, household characteristics such as age, education and gender 
could influence a household’s market channel choice by smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan 
27 
 
Africa.  For example, Chirwa (2009) and Anteneh et al. (2011), points out that level of 
education of household head have significant influence on market channel choice by 
smallholder farmers in Malawi and Ethiopia, respectively. Chirwa (2009) analyzed the 
determinants of marketing channels among smallholder maize farmers in Malawi; he 
revealed that education was positively associated with the choice of private traders. Anteneh 
et al. (2011) found that education level of household head have impact on market outlet 
choice by smallholder coffee farmers in Ethiopia. According to Zivenge and Karavina (2012) 
farmers who have more education tend to be good negotiators and are risk averse. They can 
gather and understand production and marketing information so that they can adjust their 
production and marketing systems according to the different market demands.  
 
Shiimi et al. (2012) analyzed the determinants of marketing channels among cattle farmers in 
Namibia. They revealed that age was positively associated with the decision to sell or not to 
sell through formal market channel. According to them, as age increases, cattle producers 
lose interest in negotiating with buyers in the informal market as it takes time to secure a 
buyer in the informal market. Girma and Abebaw (2012) in their study on the determinants of 
livestock farmers’ choice of marketing channels in Ethiopia found that education and gender 
of household head determined the choice of market channels. According to them, as 
education level increases, livestock farmers choose the final consumers as their market 
destination in the nearby local markets compared to traders. Educations of household head 
increase the ability of farmers to gather and analyse relevant market information for their 
products and choose the market for better price. They also found that gender of the farmer 
was an important determinant of market channel choice to choose between the consumers 
(farm gate buyers) and market traders. The result shows that male household heads tend to 
prefer market traders over consumers compared to female household heads. Literature shows 
that many societies in the rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa do not allow women to associate 
equally with their male counterparts (Blackden, 1993; Ongile, 1999; Nyakudya et al., 2006). 
This hinders women participation further downstream in the supply chain, and reduces 





2.4.3 Product characteristics 
 
Product characteristics such as output price and perishability of products have an influence on 
the choice of marketing channel. A higher price provides an incentive to the selling point. 
Martey et al. (2012) found that output price determined the choice of market channels by 
smallholder farmers in Ghana. They revealed that output price determined the choice of rural 
market relative to urban market. Perishable goods, such as, vegetables, milk, fruits etc. can 
employ shorter channels to minimize the risk of damage. Non-perishable goods such as 
cereals, beans can be stored for quite a long time when properly treated in terms of moisture 
content and storage conditions, and can employ longer channels with many intermediaries 
(Pride and Ferrell, 2010).  
 
2.4.4 Household assets 
 
Anteneh et al. (2011) found out that factors such as farm size, proportion of off-farm income 
to total income, and credit access affected market channel choice among smallholder coffee 
farmers in Ethiopia. Masuku et al. (2001), in their study to identify factors influencing the 
choice of marketing channel by maize smallholder farmers in Swaziland, found that farm size 
has  positive effect on the decision to sell maize through formal channel. This implies that the 
size of the farm increases the market risk pushing farmers to look for a secured market for 
their produce. Panda et al. (2012) in their study on the factors influencing marketing channel 
choices of vegetable farmers in India, found that there was a positive relationship between 
formal market channel and transport ownership. This is because the farmers’ own vehicles 
allow them freely without relying on others to participate in formal markets, which are 
marketing centres located far off.  
 
Alemu et al. (2012) analyzed the determinants of farmers’ participation in contracts or 
cooperatives channel in Ethiopia, indicated that the wealth of the household has positive 
contribution to contracts channel. Farmers with relatively higher wealth or assets may have a 
lower degree of risk aversion, and with less risk aversion, may be more willing to adopt new 
market channel opportunities. They also find that an increase in land size increases the 
probability of contract. As the size of the land increases, they start to retreat from contracting 
once they built their capacity to cope with all the barriers they face due to their wealth.  
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Woldie and Nuppenau (2009) studied the market channel choice decision in the Ethiopian 
banana markets. They found that farm size allocated to banana has significant impact on the 
proportion of banana sold to wholesale traders. This is due to the fact that large farm sizes 
mean more bargaining power to farmers in dealing with wholesale traders.  Zivenge and 
Karavina (2012) in their study on factors influencing market channel access by horticulture 
farmers in Chinamora District in Zimbabwe also show that farm size has positive effect on 
the decision to sell through formal channel. Neven et al. (2009) and Rao and Qaim (2011) in 
their studies in Kenya, found that the larger the farm size, the greater the probability of 
participation in the local supermarket channel in Kenya. They also found that farmers with 
limited access to transportation and credit are less likely to participate in supermarket 
channel.  
 
2.4.5 Social capital  
 
There is increasing evidence from both research and practice that one way for smallholder 
farmers to overcome market failures and maintain their market position is through organizing 
into producer groups or associations (Markelova et al., 2009).  The importance of farmer 
groups or associations is that they help farmers to negotiate or bargain as a group rather than 
as individuals. Stringfellow et al. (1997) and Stockbridge et al. (2003) argue that smallholder 
associations are important for developing negotiation skills, power and political 
representation which are critical for smallholder farmers to participate in the improvement of 
their institutional environment. Information availability also increases, as once a member of 
the group gets hold of information quickly pass it on to others and it is used for marketing 
decisions. Farmer groups/association also gives high bargaining power to suppliers of a 
commodity. This prevents exploitation by traders and other agents in the supply chain. 
Bienabe et al. (2004) also confirmed that farmer groups in terms of collective action better 
positions smallholder farmers to reduce transaction costs for their market exchanges, obtain 
necessary market information, secure access to new technologies, and tap into high-value 
markets, allowing them to compete more effectively with large farmers and agribusinesses. 
 
According to Narayan and Pritchett (1999) and Grootaert (1999), rural producer associations 
can facilitate low cost access to information, thereby stimulating technology adoption and 
enhancing contract enforcement. Rural producer associations lower the transaction costs of 
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marketing produce by eliminating some of the intermediaries and also enable farmers to 
capture the economies of scale of joint marketing. Jari and Fraser (2009) pointed out that an 
increase in social capital such as producer association results in households shifting from 
non-participation to formal and informal market participation. This suggests there is a higher 
probability of shifting to formal and informal marketing with an increase in social capital. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that social networks are important in produce marketing, 
regardless of the choice of market being used. Their results also shown that farmers’ group 
participation have significant influence for both formal and informal market choices. Thus, 
group participation encourages market penetration among smallholder farmers who find it 
difficult individually to gain market access. 
 
2.4.6 Trust  
 
Trust is an important factor in shaping the effective and efficient supply chain of crop 
produce. Trust may be defined as a set of expectations that managers of firms adopt about the 
future behavior of their exchange partners (Rademakers, 2000). The presence of trust can 
reduce the specification and monitoring of contracts (Hill, 1990), thus resulting in reduction 
of transaction cost. Trust may also lead to enhanced revenues for alliance partner firms’ 
resources (Barney and Hansen, 1994; Dyer, 1997; Hansen et al., 2002). Trust has been 
theorized to reduce opportunistic behaviour, and hence mitigates transaction costs in business 
practice. For example trust, is much more important, especially in the African context where 
collective action is more prominent. It follows, thus, that interventions which enhance trust 
among members in a group, including laws of engagement and operational democracy, are 
likely to contribute to successful collective action. Whenever trust is present, farmers can 
lower their guard and economize on transaction costs.  
 
Trust minimizes search costs, and facilitates the enforcement of contracts (Woldie and 
Nuppenau, 2009). Therefore trust enables farmers to place and take orders with less risk and 
less conflict, provide exchange credit, and offer warranty. Trust also encourages farmers and 
buyers to make relationship-specific investments, which in turn enhances productivity in the 
exchange relationship without fear of opportunism (Dyer, 1997). Previous studies 
(Tsourgiannis et al., 2008; Woldie and Nuppenau, 2009) found that trust have a significant 
influence on marketing channel selection. According to them, farmers’ degree of trust 
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towards buyers is an important variable affecting transaction costs, since higher levels of trust 
reduce the perception of risk and hence transaction costs in an exchange relationship. The 
next section reviews theoretical literature on welfare impacts of market participation and 
channel choice in smallholder farming. 
 
2.5 Theoretical consideration of the welfare impacts in smallholder farming 
2.5.1 Welfare impacts of market participation  
 
The welfare of an agricultural household can be defined as the utility derived by the 
household given its income and the prices it faces. It is generally accepted that marketing 
decisions can be analyzed within the utility maximization framework. According to Norris 
and Batie (1987), the decision of a farmer (or economic agent) whether or not to participate 
in markets are generally assumed to be derived from the maximization of expected profit or 
utility theories. Smallholder farmers will make their decisions by choosing the alternative that 
maximizes their perceived utility (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 1994). An alternative view of 
utility-based market participation is that farm households make a decision to participate in 
particular markets when the utility derived from returns earned from participating in one 
market, is greater than that derived from returns realized due to allocating resources to an 
alternative enterprise (Baid-Forson et al., 1997).  
 
However, the features that lead to utility maximization, and induce market participation, such 
as the welfare gains that result from choosing market-oriented production and exchange, 
emerge not just from welfare effects of trade (according to comparative advantage), but also 
even more from the opportunities that emerge from dynamic technological change effects 
associated with increased flow of ideas due to regular trade-based interactions. In this 
framework, incentives to trade result from many different aspects. That is, just ‘‘getting 
prices right” is unlikely to induce market participation; rather, farm households must also 
have access to productive technologies and adequate private and public goods in order to 
produce a marketable surplus (Barrett, 2008). 
 
According to Pryanishnikov and Katarina (2003), households seek to maximize utility 
through the consumption of various agricultural commodities, for which it may produce some 
to consume, or trade in order to obtain those it cannot produce. Therefore farm households 
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may engage in a supplier side type of market participation, by selling of surplus that remains 
after consumption. But also, they may choose to participate on the demand side, in which 
case they would largely purchase commodities that they cannot produce.  
 
Barret (2008) used what he called a stylized model, in which different consumption 
requirements are accounted for and restricted within a set, constituting the various food 
commodities which farmers produce themselves. That is, farm households seek to maximize 
utility by consuming a combination of commodities that yield the most utility, and each 
farmer is taken to be both a consumer and a producer of some of the commodities. Producers 
are sellers and/or buyers of the commodities they produce, and supply side participation only 
occurs when net sales are greater than one. Lapar et al. (2003) took up this approach to 
investigate market participation and supply decisions. The decision rule was to participate 
when the utility derived from returns realized from investing in one enterprise was greater 
than the utility derived from returns realized from investing in an alternative enterprise, using 
the same resources. 
 
Most studies on market participation employed the theoretical models, where the household, 
as both producer and consumer, decides upon market participation as a means to maximize 
utility (for example Barret, 2008; Heltberg and Tarp, 2002; Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000). 
According to them, various trade related costs will work to distort prices on the market, and, 
consequently, some farmers will opt not to participate. This is a key mechanism of market 
participation in developing countries. It is in the light of these costs, together with assets, 
skills and endowments that households decide upon the perceived profitability of entering the 
market. According to Barrett (2008) there are two main arguments for why market 
participation of farm households is so important to improving household welfare in rural 
areas; it allows farmers to focus on producing the goods at which they are skilled (i.e., have a 
comparative advantage); and to trade their surplus for other goods and services they desire 
but for which they do not have a comparative advantage in producing. Improvements of 
market participation by smallholder farmers not only help to meet future food demand, but 
also improve food security and nutrition in rural and urban areas. In addition, it increases 
opportunities for linkages with the rural non-farm economy, as smallholders are likely to use 
most of their additional income to purchase locally produced goods and services 
(Wickramasighe and Weinberger, 2013). 
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Omamo (1998) in his study on the effect of transaction costs in market participation, he 
revealed that increased incomes, urbanisation and population growth is expected to lead in 
increasing demand of goods and services in the developing world, which can in turn improve 
incomes of smallholder farmers. Furthermore, as households’ disposable income increases, so 
does demand for variety in goods and services, thereby increasing demand-side market 
participation, which further increased the demand for cash and thus supply-side market 
participation. The standard process of rural transformation therefore involves households’ 
transition from a model of subsistence, in which most inputs are provided for and most 
outputs consumed internally, to a market engagement mode, with inputs and products 
increasingly purchased and sold off the farm (Timmer, 1988; Staatz, 1994). 
 
The theory of market participation has developed many different perspectives, including 
asset-based approaches and agricultural developmental theory approaches. Boughton et al. 
(2007) viewed market participation as both a cause and a consequence of economic 
development. Markets offer households the opportunity to specialize according to 
comparative advantage and thereby enjoy welfare gains from trade. Recognition of the 
potential of markets as engines of economic development and structural transformation gave 
rise to a market-led paradigm of agricultural development during the 1980’s (Reardon and 
Timmer, 2006) in which market liberalization policy agendas were widely promoted in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) and other low-income regions. According to Omiti et al. (2009), as the 
market share of agricultural output increases, input utilization decisions and output 
combinations are progressively guided by profit maximization objectives. This process leads 
to the systematic substitution of non-traded inputs with purchased inputs, the gradual decline 
of integrated farming systems, and the emergence of specialized high-value farm enterprises.  
 
Enhancing market participation of smallholder farmers is considered as an important way to 
reduce poverty in developing countries (World Bank, 2008). Therefore, greater market access 
for smallholders can be a route for them to raise farm productivity, incomes and escape 
poverty. If smallholder producers increase their participation in staple food crop markets by 
selling more through increases in productivity and market efficiencies, cash incomes will 
increase. Productivity and increased incomes lead to reinvestment and release of other 
resources from food crop production. These resources can move into higher value production, 
be it agriculture, manufacturing, or services. Thus, growth in agriculture directly reduces 
34 
 
poverty and food insecurity by augmenting farm incomes through increased production and 
marketing of agricultural produce (Barrett, 2008; Jayne, 2010).  
 
Market participation has motivated the farmers to move from subsistence farming to 
commercial farming (Makhura, 2001). Commercial farming increases farm’s output, hence 
enabling the farmer to earn more income. Jari and Fraser (2009) noted that smallholder 
farmers’ market participation is very vital for sustaining economic growth, food security and 
poverty alleviation. Most farmers who participated in the market tend to be food secure 
because the income they derives from the sale of their output has enabled them to purchase 
the staple food. Altman et al. (2009) also noted that, access to input and output markets can 
be important contributors to food security. It is widely acknowledged that the involvement of 
small farmers into markets can contribute to higher productivity and income growth, which in 
turn can enhance food security, poverty reduction efforts, and overall economic growth 
(Barrett, 2008; Bernard and Spielman, 2009). In summary, marketing plays a crucial role in 
meeting the overall goal of food security, poverty alleviation and sustainable agriculture, 
especially among smallholder farmers in developing countries (Jari and Fraser, 2009). 
 
Markets are necessary to boost productivity and availability. Improved access to agricultural 
input markets—such as seed and fertilizer—is crucial for productivity growth. Moreover, 
farmers will only increase production if they have access to viable markets for their 
agricultural outputs (IFPRI, 2002). Markets also play a crucial role in achieving food security 
by increasing access to food. In regions like sub-Saharan Africa, where 70% of the 
population relies on agriculture for their livelihood, and 80% of all the farms are less than 2 
hectares in size, poor smallholder farmers can turn their surpluses into income only if they 
have access to markets. Increased incomes, in turn, increase food security and help to 
alleviate poverty (IFPRI, 2002). The next sub-section presents theoretical literature on the 
welfare impacts of market channel choice in smallholder farming. 
 
2.5.2 Welfare impacts of market channel choice  
 
A stronger growth in agriculture would lead to higher income for farmers, generate more 
employment opportunities and reduce poverty. However, this requires an adequate presence 
of channels to buy their produce and ensure competitive price (Ritson, 1997). Marketing 
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channel choices have a great impact on the farm household decisions and welfare outcome. 
Most importantly, marketing channels play a significant role as a major source of rural 
income and in facilitating social interaction, general communication and information about 
the market and technology. The development of the marketing channels is, consequently, of 
paramount importance in agriculture and affects farms in regard to several issues, namely: 
i) crop mix: market conditions inform farmers on the products in demand and 
prompt him to decide what, when and how much to produce 
ii) farm income: agriculture, as the farm’s chief economic activity, is the main source 
of income for the farm 
iii) food security: production of agricultural products for consumption and for the 
market affects farm food availability and household consumption and nutrition 
iv) farm resource allocation: market channel news have, inevitably, impact on 
changes in use of the farm factors of production land, labour and capital 
v) farm sustainability: marketing channels have ultimately effects on the use of the 
farm natural resources, and, hence, on sustainability. 
 
Farmers’ market channel choice could be perceived as one of the available income strategies, 
whereby a farmer will choose a given channel if the utility obtained from it exceeds that of 
the alternatives. The decision to participate in a particular marketing channel is based on the 
maximization of an underlying utility function, and a farmer selects the marketing channel 
that maximizes his/her utility (McFadden, 1986). Thus, a farmer is likely to choose the option 
that gives a higher utility among the alternatives (Pryanishnikov and Katarina, 2003). 
According to Rao and Qaim (2011), household income is determined by various 
socioeconomic factors. For farm households, income is usually influenced by returns from 
agricultural production, which depend on asset ownership and capacity to produce and 
market efficiently. Hence, participation in certain market channels may directly influence 
household income. Narayanan (2012) applied the utility theory to assess the welfare impacts 
of participation in contract farming schemes in southern India. He noted that marketing 
channels offer different prices and sales services, thus are very important on smallholders 
welfare gains. 
 
Improved market access plays an important role in channel choice and improving rural 
incomes of smallholder farmers. The choice of different channels is vital to reduce 
transaction costs and avoid market risks of rational decision-making behaviour (Swinnen, 
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2007). The marketing channels are an important aspect of agricultural marketing affecting the 
prices paid by consumers and shares of them received by the producer. The market channel 
choice and the price that smallholders receive for their agricultural products have great 
implications for household welfare and poverty alleviation. Increased profitability for farmers 
from marketing decisions may lead them to change their production, investment in productive 
assets, new agricultural technologies and improve household welfare (Jensen, 2010). 
According to Osborne (2005) imperfect competition among traders in grain markets inflates 
their profits and drives down prices paid to farmers. If imperfect competition in rural markets 
is widespread, then competition policy may be an important tool of government to improve 
price transmission and the appeal of market participation for smallholders. One response to 
imperfect competition in the marketing channel is to organize farmers so as to gain 
bargaining power so as to extract better terms of trade from downstream purchasers. The 
empirical evidence of the welfare impacts of market participation and channel choice by 
smallholder farmers in developing countries is discussed in the next section.  
 
2.6 Empirical evidence of welfare impacts of market participation and channel choice 
2.6.1 Welfare impacts of market participation 
 
Several studies on the impact of market participation by smallholder farmers have been done 
in the agricultural sector of developing countries. Empirical results indicates that 
commercialization of smallholder farmers has the potential to enhance incomes and welfare 
outcomes and take smallholder farmers out of poverty if constraining factors such as lack of 
capital, high transaction costs, lack of infrastructure, lack of information and lack of 
education could be eliminated (Lerman, 2004). Study by von Braun and Kennedy (1994) 
revealed that market participation plays a significant role in increasing incomes, and in most 
cases, these increased incomes have led to increased food consumption. According to 
Gebreselassie and Sharp (2007), smallholder farmers with high degree of market 
engagements have better potential of enjoying better standards of welfare. Similarly Sharp et 
al. (2007) noted that enhancing the degree of commercialization of smallholder farmers can 
have more impact on reducing poverty than promoting few large ventures.  
 
Asfaw et al. (2012) study smallholder market participation and rural poverty in Tanzania, and 
found that there is a statistically significant impact of maize and pigeonpea market 
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participation in improving household welfare and poverty reduction in Tanzania. Similarly, 
Asfaw et al. (2012) examines the impact of pigeonpea market participation in Kenya. Results 
show that, market participants have significantly higher food security status than non-
participants.  
 
Heltberg and Tarp (2002) examine agricultural supply response and poverty in Mozambique, 
and they found that the probability of participation in food markets increases with household 
expenditure. In other hand, lack of sufficient assets, like land and livestock is emphasized as a 
constraint on household welfare. Assets like livestock may reduce the risk of food insecurity 
since it can be sold in order to buy food (Boughton et al., 2007). A study on the effects of 
smallholder commercialization on rural Kenyan food production and welfare in South 
Nyanza District, found that farmers participating in the sugarcane scheme enjoyed 
significantly higher agricultural incomes than their neighbours who did not participate 
(Kennedy and Cogill, 1987).   
 
Pender and Dawit (2007), and Escobal and Toreto (2006) revealed that market participation 
plays a significant role in increasing household incomes, and in most cases, these increased 
incomes have led to increased food consumption. Bozzoli and Brück (2009) analyses the 
market participation of farm households in the post-war environment in Northern 
Mozambique and finds that market participation has positive welfare effects. Other studies on 
the welfare effects of market participation (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Maertens et al., 
2011) have shown that market participation significantly increases smallholder household 
income for French beans and on tomato in Senegal.  
 
Market participation as commercialization of smallholder agriculture is often viewed as an 
opportunity for economic growth and development for less-developed countries whose 
economies depend on agriculture to a large extent (von Braun and Kennedy, 1994; Pingali, 
2007). A study by Pingali and Rosegrant (1995) in some developing countries found that 
commercialisation of agriculture benefits the poor by offering direct income benefits. These 
changes result from a combination of increased productivity and increased cash sales. 
Similarly, Sharp et al. (2007) and Fafchamps (2004) noted that enhancing the degree of 
commercialization of the smallholders can have more impact on food security and reducing 
poverty than promotion of few large ventures.  According to Barrett (2008), 
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commercialization of output from small-scale farming is closely linked to higher 
productivity, greater specialization, and higher income.  
 
Furthermore, in a world of efficient markets, commercialization leads to the separation of 
household production decisions from consumption decisions, supporting food diversity and 
overall stability. At the macro level, commercialization increases food security (Fafchamps, 
2004). Samuel and Sharp (2007) pointed out that agricultural commercialization is a bridge 
through which smallholder farmers are able to achieve welfare goals. They also note that 
greater engagement in output markets would result in higher agricultural productivity which 
can facilitate the achievement of the welfare goals of smallholder farmers. The next sub-
section discusses empirical evidence of the welfare impacts of market channel choice by 
smallholder farmers in developing countries.  
 
2.6.2 Welfare impacts of market channel choice  
 
In terms of studies on impact of market channel choice on household welfare; Saigenji and 
Manfred (2009) have evaluated the impact of contract farming participation on income by 
applying Propensity Score Matching in north western Vietnam. They found that there is a 
significant effect of contract participation on income. Bernard et al. (2008) examined the 
impact of co-operatives on smallholder commercialization of cereals, using detailed 
household data from rural Ethiopia. They found that cooperatives channel obtain higher 
prices for their members, and is associated with a significant increase in the overall share of 
cereal production sold by their members.  
 
Warning and Key (2002) determined the impact of contract farming for peanut growers in 
Senegal. They found that contract participation had an impact on farmers’ income, compared 
to those who did not participate. Similarly, Miyata et al. (2009) examined the impact of 
contract participation on household income of apple and green onion farmers in China, and 
found that contract market participation has a significant income to farmers in both apple and 
green onion. In the study of channel choice, Katchova (2008) applied propensity score 
matching to correct farmer’s selling to contractor (contract farming) depending on whether 
the contracted group has alternative marketing choice or not. He revealed the absence of price 
distortion in six different agricultural commodity markets of contract farming where there 
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were no marketing options. Ruben et al. (2009) investigated the impact of fair trade 
involvement on farmers’ income and the overall welfare indicators of banana farmers and 
found a significant impact on income.  
 
A study by Little (1994) in sub-Saharan Africa, reveals that contract farming increased 
incomes from a moderate (30-40%) to a high (50-60%) proportion of participants. Other 
studies show similar results (von Braun, 1995; Glover, 1987). Minot (1986) finds that farmers 
generally benefit from contract farming because it provides them with inputs on credit, 
technical assistance, and (often) a guaranteed price, allowing them to produce a higher-value 
commodity than would otherwise be possible. In almost all the African case studies 
conducted by von Braun (1995) on contract farming, total per capita income was found, 
ceteris paribus, to be higher among the participants. 
 
Minten et al. (2009) used representative household survey data and informant interviews to 
examine the income and perceived benefits for smallholders producing vegetables under 
supermarket supply contracts in Madagascar. They found that income from contract crops 
represented on average 50% of household income and that smallholders participating in 
supply contracts perceived higher income stability than non-participating farmers. 
 
Several studies showed that participation in supermarket channels can cause significant 
income gains (Reardon and Berdegué, 2002; Hernández et al., 2007; Rao and Qaim, 2011). 
Higher incomes improve household welfare, which may result in poverty reduction. Rao and 
Qaim (2011) analysed the impacts of supermarket channel participation in Kenya, and found 
that supermarket participation is associated with a 48% gain in average household income, 
which also contributes to poverty reduction.  
 
Other studies provide more direct evidence in the form of income or gross margin 
comparisons. For example, Birthal et al. (2005) compare the gross margins of vegetable 
contract farmers with independent farmers producing the same commodities. The gross 
margin for contract vegetable growers was almost double that of independent farmers, largely 
because contract growers had lower production and marketing costs. Although they do not 
use regression analysis to control for other factors, they show that contract farmers had higher 





In this chapter some of the key concepts of the study, namely smallholder farmers, market 
participation, marketing channel and transaction costs are defined. A review of some 
empirical literature on determinants of market participation and channel choice by 
smallholder farmers in developing countries are also presented. This chapter also review 
some theoretical and empirical literature on welfare impacts of market participation and 
channel choice. The literature has shown that in general, commercialization of smallholder 
agriculture remains one of the major challenges in most of the developing countries, 
specifically sub-Saharan Africa. Several studies show that transaction costs have significant 
negative effect on market participation and market channel choice by smallholder farmers. 
Majority of these literatures also identifies other factors affecting market participation and 
channel choice such as household assets, household characteristics, social capital and trust. It 
should be noted that household characteristics as well as access to assets are important in 
market participation decisions because not only do they determine the nature and structure of 
the market at producer level but they also impact on the occurrence of transaction costs 
incurred by the household. The chapter also concludes that market participation and channel 
choice have a significant impact on household welfare. Empirical evidence shows that there 
is a statistically significant impact of smallholders’ market participation in improving 
household welfare and poverty reduction in developing countries. Similarly, enhancing the 
degree of commercialization of the smallholders can have more impact on reducing poverty 
in developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa. The following chapters (three to five) 
comprise empirical methods and research results presented in accordance with the tree 
specific objectives of the study. The next chapter discusses the factors that influence market 




CHAPTER 3. THE DETERMINANTS OF SMALLHOLDER FARMERS’ 





This chapter presents and discusses empirical findings on the determinants of smallholder 
farmers’ participation in maize and pigeonpea markets. The remainder of the chapter is 
structured as follows. The next section presents the conceptual framework of market 
participation, followed by econometric estimation in section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents data 
and description of variables, followed by a presentation of results and discussions in section 
3.5. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter with a summary of the findings. 
 
3.2 Conceptual framework 
 
The theoretical model that guides the empirical analysis rests on the agricultural household 
model framework that incorporates transaction costs, in line with Key et al. (2000). To 
incorporate transaction costs into an agricultural household model framework, market 
participation is conveniently specified as a choice variable. In addition to deciding how much 
of each good (i) to consume (ci), produce (qi) and use as input (xi), the household also decides 
how much of each good (i) to sell (mi). When the household sells the goods it produces, mi 
assumes a positive sign. However, when the household purchases such goods, mi assumes a 
negative sign. Supposing there were no transaction costs, the household’s problem would be 
to maximise the utility function (3.1), subject to conditions (3.2) to (3.5): 











the cash constraint, (3.2) 
 0 iiiii cmAxq  the resource balance (where i =1,..., N ), (3.3) 
  0);,( qzxqG  the production technology, and (3.4) 
   0,, iii xqc  the non-negativity condition, (3.5) 
                                                 
2 This chapter gave rise to the following publication: Mmbando, F.E., E.Z. Wale, and L.J.S. Baiyegunhi. (in 




where mip  = the market price of good i; 
Ai = the endowment in good i; 
T = exogenous transfers and other incomes; 
zu and zq = exogenous shifters in utility and production, respectively; and 
G represents the production technology.  
 
The cash constraint (3.2) states that expenditures on all purchases must not exceed revenues 
from all sales and transfers. The resource balance (3.3) states that, for each of the N goods, 
the amount consumed, used as input and sold is equal to what is produced and bought, plus 
the quantity of the goods that the household owns. The production technology (3.4) relates 
the inputs (e.g. land, labour) to the outputs. 
PTCs raise the price paid by a buyer and lower the price received by a seller. These costs may 
include transport and marketing costs (Key et al., 2000). However, FTCs are invariant to the 
quantity transacted. Hence, they are generally unobservable, though factors stz  and 
b
tz  with 
coefficients si and
b
i , respectively, can explain these costs. When both the FTCs and PTCs 
are incorporated into the cash constraint, Equation 3.2 is rewritten as Equation 3.6, where the 
household pays the fixed cost sfit  if it sells good i and pays 
b

































i   (3.6) 
To solve the household problem, a Lagrange multiplier expression can be derived and first 
order conditions for the consumption goods obtained from Equation 3.1 to 3.6. The decision 













          if mi = 0 for self-sufficient households.  
The econometric estimation used to study the determinants of market participation and 





3.3 Econometric estimation 
 
The econometric specification of the preceding model consists of market participation 
decision equations and maize/pigeonpea supply equations, estimated separately. The focus of 
the analysis is on the selling decision. Equation 3.6 shows that market participation depends 
on both FTCs and PTCs, while the supply decision, conditional on market participation, only 
depends on PTCs. 
 
For empirical analysis, mostly focusing on selling households, a linear expression is assumed 
for the supply functions and the PTCs, as follows: 
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where zt = exogenous characteristics that affect transaction costs when selling; 
zq = production shifters; 
zc = consumption shifters; 




t  ,  = coefficients of zt  and zq , respectively. 








  (3.7) 
where qs* is the latent supply if a household is a seller, and it is observed when it is higher 











, then the household is participating in the market as a seller.  
Equation 3.8 therefore allows for the identification of parameters βi , using the probit 
analysis. 
The factors that affect a smallholder farmer’s decision to participate in maize/pigeonpea 







)1(Pr  (3.8) 
The estimation of coefficients sq
s
tm  ,,  shown in Equation 7 caters for the aspect of the 
intensity of participation of smallholder farmers. 












1)(  (3.9) 
The continual decision made by smallholder farmers with regards to the intensity of 
participation is captured by the factors that affect the amount of commodity traded (mi). We 












  (3.10) 
where mi = quantities of maize/pigeonpea sold; 
the z’s = the factors capturing the transaction costs incurred in the buying and selling of the 
commodity; 
K = other costs; and 
L = other factors. 
 
An econometric form is adopted as shown in Equation 3.11. The estimates (βi) for the vector 
of variables capturing the factors which determine mi and include transaction-related factors 












where mi = the intensity of market participation (the log value of maize/pigeonpea sales);  
Xi = independent variables that affect maize/pigeonpea sales and include those capturing 
transaction costs for the j observations; 
  = coefficient estimates of the independent variables; and 
ju1   = the error term for the regression equation. 
The dependent variable for observation (i), is observed only if the selection expression is 
0)( 2  ii uz  ,   which implies mi > 0   (3.12) 
where iz  = the independent variables which determine whether a household was engaged in 




  = the coefficient estimates of the independent variables of zi; and 
iu2  = the error term for the selection equation. 
 
For both Expressions 3.11 and 3.12, 
),0(1 Nu   
)1,0(2 Nu   
),( 21 uucorr  
where  = the correlation coefficient for the error terms u1 and u2. 
 
When 0 , standard regression techniques such as OLS would yield biased estimates when 
applied to Equation 3.11, since they do not take into account the process that generates the 
observed maize/pigeonpea sales of households. A Heckman-Lee two-step type process has 
therefore been applied to correct the possibility of bias due to sample selection (Lee and 
Wang, 2003; Maddala, 1983). The model is estimated by using an extension of the Heckman 
two-step procedure. The first step involves the estimation of the relationship between 
Equations 3.8 and 3.12, by using a probit model. The result provides an estimate of 
probability of market participation. This estimate is then used to calculate the inverse Mills 
ratio ( ), which is then added to the market supply function in Equation 3.11. This process 
yields the following Equation 3.13, which can be estimated by OLS, free of selection bias 
(Greene, 2003): 













  and   = the density and  distribution functions, respectively; and 
  = the associated parameter to be estimated. 
 
Marginal effects 
According to Huang et al. (1991), there are four different responses of marketing behaviour 
to changes in explanatory variables in selectivity models. These are: (i) the change in the 
probability of market participation as derived from the selection equation; (ii) the change in 
desired marketed quantities (for the full sample) that can be derived directly from the 
estimated parameters in the quantity equation; (iii) the conditional marginal effects (i.e. the 
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change in actual quantities conditionally transacted on market participation), using 
information only for those already in the market; and (iv) the unconditional marginal effects 
(i.e. the total change in quantities unconditionally transacted on market participation).  
The change in the probability in market participation per unit change in the ith explanatory 










   (3.14) 
The change in desired (or potential) quantities transacted is simply the coefficient associated 
with the variable in the output marketed supply equation. The parameter   thus represents 
the marginal effects on potential maize/pigeonpea supply. 
The unconditional marginal effect, which is of particular interest for this study, captures the 
joint impact of a variable on the changes in the rate of market participation and the quantities 
transacted. As shown in Huang et al. (1991), the unconditional marginal effects on actual 
quantities transacted (Qt) per unit change in the ith variable (Xki) can be calculated as 








  (3.15) 
               ycondxbselpsel kiki  )(  
Where )( and )( = the standard normal distribution and density functions, respectively; 
and  
ki  and ki  = the estimated parameters for variable (Xki) in the quantity and selection 
equation of the model, respectively.  
The first part of Equation 3.15 represents the change in quantity in response to a change in Xki  
( ki ), weighted by the probability of being in the market (psel in Stata language); and the 
second part represents the change in the probability of being on the market )]([ xbselki , 
weighted by the expected value traded if on the market (ycond in Stata terminology). All 
continuous variables have been transformed into natural logarithm and hence, double log 
forms of maize and pigeonpea supply equations were estimated. These estimations facilitated 
the analysis and interpretation of the marginal effects on quantities transacted in terms of 
unit-free elasticities, especially with respect to responses to output prices (Hoffmann and 




3.4 Data collection  
 
The data used in this study were collected from a household survey of 700 households 
conducted in two maize-legume-based farming systems, in the northern and eastern zones of 
Tanzania. The survey was part of a “Sustainable Intensification of Maize and Legume in East 
and Southern Africa (SIMLESA)” program that assesses the maize-legume cropping systems 
in Tanzania. The survey was conducted by the Selian Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) 
in collaboration with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) 
between October and December 2010. A multi-stage sampling procedure was used to select 
wards and villages from each district, and households from each village. In the first stage, 
four districts from two zones were purposively selected based on their maize-legume 
production potential: Karatu and Mbulu, from the northern zone; and Mvomero and Kilosa, 
from the eastern zone (see Appendix 3.1 for a map). Each of the two zones was assigned an 
equal number of sample households. The households within a zone were distributed within 
the two respective districts according to district household size (proportionate sampling). In 
the second stage, a proportionate random sampling, were used to select 5–13 wards in each 
district, 1–4 villages in each ward, and 2–30 farm households in each village. A total of 700 
farm households in four districts were surveyed using a structured questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was administrated through trained enumerators. Data were collected on a wide 
range of factors including household composition and characteristics, land and non-land farm 
assets, household membership in different rural institutions, indicators of access to 
infrastructure and transaction costs. The questionnaires also captured household crop 
production and marketing, marketing channels, household income sources and food and non-
food consumption expenditure. The questionnaires used in this study are presented in 
Appendix 3.2. The following section discusses the variables used in the empirical model.  
 
3.5 Definition of variables  
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in the participation equation is equal to one if the household sold 
maize/pigeonpea during 2008/09 cropping season, or equal to zero otherwise. The dependent 
variable in the supply equation is the natural log of the value of maize/pigeonpea sold in 




The explanatory variables hypothesized to explain maize and pigeonpea market participation 
and level of participation were identified based on the theoretical framework and on past 
empirical work on market participation. The explanatory variables were classified into six 
categories: household characteristics; output price; private assets; public assets and services; 
transaction costs-related variables; and location-specific variables. The explanatory variables 
are discussed below and summarized in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1. Description of variables used to analyse the determinants of market 
participation and intensity of participation  
Variable name Description 
Dependent variables 
 MKTP Market participation (=1 if household sold maize/pigeonpea in 
the reference period, 0 otherwise) 
SALES Natural log of the value of maize/pigeonpea sold in the reference 
period 
Household characteristics  
AGE Age of the household head (years) 
GENDER Gender of the head (1= male, 0 otherwise) 
EDUC Education of the head (years) 
LABOR Household labor force (AEU) 
Output price  
PRICE Mean village price (TSh)a-lagged 
Private assets  
FSIZE Farm size per capita (ha) 
TLU Livestock herd size (TLU)b 
PAI Productive assets Index (PC score) 
Public assets and services  
EXT Extension contact (days/year) 
FASS Member in farmer association ⁄ group (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 
CREDIT Credit access (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 
Transaction costs variables  
DIST Distance to nearest market (km) 
TRANS Ownership of transport assets (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 
COMM Access to communication assets (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 
Location dummies  
KARATU Household is located in Karatu district (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 
MBULU Household is located in Mbulu district (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 
MVOM Household is located in Mvomero district (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 
KILOSA Household is located in Kilosa district (1=yes; 0 otherwise) 
Notes: aThe exchange rate at the time of the survey was about 1US$ = 1,500 TSh. 




The household characteristics are constructed by four variables, that are, the age (AGE), 
gender (GENDER) and education (EDUC) of the household head, and household labour 
force (LABOR) (in Adult Equivalent Units)3. Age is expected to have positive association 
with participation in agricultural market since older farmers may be more experienced in 
marketing management and tend to have stronger networks and more credibility, thus facing 
lower transaction costs (Bahta and Bauer, 2012). Male-headed households have access to 
productive assets such as land, labour and capital which increases their production 
capabilities and hence, a positive relationship is expected with market participation. 
Advancement in education increases ability to obtain and process market information 
(Makhura, 2001) and thus, a positive relationship with market participation. The household 
labour force was included as a proxy for labour supply for production and for transporting 




Output prices are expected to have a positive influence on market participation and marketed 
surplus, as hypothesised by Key et al. (2000) and Alene et al. (2008). Price variation is 
potentially endogenous, as a price depends on the place and time of sale, and is thus observed 
only for those farmers who actually sold maize and pigeonpea during the period of the 
survey. To mitigate the potential endogeneity problem, lagged and average village-level 
maize and pigeonpea prices are used in the analysis (Alene et al., 2008; Asfaw et al., 2012). 
 
Public assets and services: 
Contact with extension officers (EXT), membership in farmer association/group (FASS) and 
access to credit (CREDIT) are included to capture the effect of public assets and services. 
Contact with extension officers and membership of farmer association provide technical 
assistance and information on improved technologies and marketing (Bahta and Bauer, 
2012). It is expected that the more visits the extension service provider pays to the farmers, 
the more likely the farmer would sell his/her produce and at the same time increase sales. 
                                                 
3 Labour force in Adult Equivalent Units (AEU) per household was estimated using recommended levels of 
energy intake by transforming each family member into a fraction of an AEU based on age group and sex and 
those values are then summed to compute the total Adult Equivalent Units for the particular household. The 
1973 FAO/ WHO-recommended calorie requirements were used as the basis for the transformation. See 
Schofield (1985) for details. 
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According to Poulton et al. (2006) farmer groups empower farmers to bargain and negotiate 
for better trading terms. Farmer groups are also important platforms for information exchange 
among farmers, especially in places with weak physical infrastructure.   Access to credit is 
production-enhancing assets, which facilitate productivity. A positive relationship between 
these three variables and market participation is, therefore expected. 
 
Private assets: 
Farm size per capita (FSIZE), livestock ownership (TLU) and index of productive assets 
(PAI)4 are included in the model to capture the effect of household private assets. These 
variables are critical in production that enables households to produce a surplus for the 
market (Alene et al., 2008). A positive relationship is expected between these three variables 
and market participation. 
 
Transaction costs variables: 
Following Alene et al. (2008), transaction costs are captured through three proxy variables: 
distance to nearest market (DIST), access to communication assets (COMM) e.g. radio, cell-
phone, TV; and ownership of transport assets (TRANS) e.g. bicycle, motorcycle and cart. 
Distance to market is a proxy for PTCs, and included to the analysis to capture the extent of 
isolation of farming households and level of access to marketing infrastructure. The variable 
is associated with the per-unit costs of accessing markets (Key et al., 2000) and, hence, 
expected to have a negative relationship with market participation. Access to communication 
assets and ownership of transport assets are proxies for FTCs. The variables reduce the costs 
associated with communication and are, therefore, expected to positively influence market 
participation (Key et al., 2000). In this study access to communication assets and ownership 
of transport assets capture the FTCs associated with information access, are the exclusion 
restriction variables. These two variables are used to identify the Heckman model, such that 
they enter the selection regression but not the underlying regression (Heckman, 1979).  
 
  
                                                 
4 In order to reduce the high number of explanatory variables and remedy multicollinearity, an index of 
productive assets was developed using PCA. Key assets included are plough, cart, oxen, sprayer, 
spade/shovel/rake, axe, water pump and wheelbarrow. The first principal component (PC1) was used in 
constructing the index for sample households for both maize and pigeonpea producers because it explained 





 The unobserved location-specific effects were controlled using district dummy variables. 
The variables included in the model to capture differences in the general economic and social 
conditions of the different locations, refer to infrastructure, remoteness, resource endowment, 
production potential and farming conditions across districts. The relationships revealed by the 
results are to be explained by the specific attributes of each of the location. The dummy for 
Karatu district (KARATU) was used as a reference and was left out of the model to avoid the 
dummy variable trap. The next section presents empirical results and discussions.  
 
3.6 Empirical results and discussions 
3.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Summary statistics for all variables included in the regressions, as well as the significance 
level of tests of difference between means for each variable for market participants (sellers) 
and non-participants (non-sellers) are presented in Table 3.2. About 56% and 75% of maize 
and pigeonpea households participated in the market as sellers.  The differences in age of the 
household head between maize sellers and non-sellers were statistically significant at the 10% 
level. On average, more male-headed households participated in markets as sellers for both 
maize and pigeonpea, and they also more educated than non-participants. It is also found that 
maize and pigeonpea sellers have a larger labour force and farm size than non-sellers. Maize 
and pigeonpea sellers had a significantly larger farm size per capita than non-sellers.  
 
The differences in livestock unit between maize sellers and non-sellers were statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The index of productive assets was significantly higher for 
pigeonpea sellers as compared to non-sellers. The share of households having a membership 
of farmer association and access to credit was significantly higher for maize and pigeonpea 
sellers than non-sellers. In general, a higher percentage of maize and pigeonpea non-sellers 
were located farther away from the nearest market than sellers were. Not surprisingly, maize 


















AGE 46.90 45.00 * 49.65 46.69  
GENDER 0.81 0.91 *** 0.81 0.91 * 
EDUC 4.52 5.28 *** 4.78 5.20  
LABOR 4.34 4.49  3.62 4.78 *** 
PRICE 260.53 267.92 ** 639.62 761.15 *** 
FSIZE 1.76 2.54 *** 1.51 1.94 ** 
TLU 2.29 2.00 * 2.38 2.19  
PAI -0.01 0.01  -0.20 0.07 * 
EXT 2.24 2.73  1.71 2.31  
FASS 0.20 0.30 ** 0.16 0.32 ** 
CREDIT 0.05 0.10 ** 0.06 0.09  
DIST 6.40 4.71 *** 6.84 4.92 * 
TRANS 0.38 0.67 *** 0.24 0.39 ** 
COMM 0.27 0.45 *** 0.22 0.36 ** 
KARATU 0.23 0.21  0.32 0.47 ** 
MBULU 0.35 0.22 *** 0.02 0.01  
MVOM 0.20 0.19  0.33 0.18 ** 
KILOSA 0.22 0.38 *** 0.33 0.34  
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes:   MTa = Test of difference between means of sellers and non-sellers: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.  
                      
 
 
Over 67% of maize sellers and 39% of pigeonpea sellers had their own transport assets for 
regular access to nearby towns. Similarly, over 45% of maize sellers and 36% of pigeonpea 
sellers had access to communication assets. The next sub-section presents the empirical 
results and discussion of the factors influencing market participation decisions by maize and 
pigeonpea smallholder farmers.  
 
3.6.2 Determinants of market participation decision 
 
Prior to estimating the selection model, the model was checked for possible multicollinearity 
problems by using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and correlation matrix. The VIF was 
less than the critical value of 10 (Gujarati and Porter, 2009), for both maize and pigeonpea, 
confirming that multicollinearity was not a problem. The correlation coefficient results show 
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that these coefficients are globally less than 0.5 for both maize and pigeonpea samples, 
indicating weak correlations. These correlations suggest that the variables are sufficiently 
independent to be modelled together without multicollinearity concerns.  
 
The coefficient estimates as well as the marginal effects of the probit model are presented in 
Table 3.3. The model fits the data well, whereby about 71% and 77% of the participation 
outcomes in maize and pigeonpea, respectively, are correctly predicted. The Wald test of the 
hypothesis that all regression coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the 1% 
significance level in both maize and pigeonpea. This test result shows that, jointly, the 
independent variables included in the probit regression model explain the variations in a 
household’s probability to sell maize and pigeonpea. The result further suggests that male-
headed households are more likely to participate in maize markets than female-headed 
households. The reason is probably because female-headed households are resource-
constrained, lacking access to productive assets (land, labour and capital) which limits their 
production capabilities.  
 
The education level had a significantly positive impact on the probability of maize market 
participation, but an insignificant impact on pigeonpea market participation. From this result, 
it is clear that advancement in education increases the ability to obtain and process market 
information. This finding is in contrast with Ouma et al. (2010) who found that education 
levels had a significantly negative impact on banana market participation in Rwanda and 
Burundi.  
 
Labour force in adult equivalent units had a significantly positive effect on pigeonpea market 
participation, but an insignificant impact on maize market participation. Households with 
more labour supply had about a 5% higher probability of pigeonpea market participation. 
Considering the labour demand of crop production, labour can have an impact on the amount 
of pigeonpea produced in a household, and this can also affect market participation. Bahta 
and Bauer (2012) found a similar result in their study in South Africa. Output prices had a 
significantly positive effect on market participation for both maize and pigeonpea. This 
finding has also been observed in maize markets by Alene et al. (2008) and in banana 
markets by Komarek (2010).  
54 
 













































































































KILOSA  0.401** 
(2.61) 








Number of observations 663  253  
Wald 2 (17) 121.38***  49.33***  
Pseudo R2 0.160  0.175  
Log pseudo-likelihood -381.777  -115.936  
Outcomes correctly predicted         71%  77%  
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010) 
Notes: Robust z- statistics in parentheses  
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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Unlike pigeonpea market participation, farm size per capita had a significantly positive effect 
on market participation for maize. The larger the farm size, the more it allowed the household 
to have a surplus production above the subsistence needs and surplus to sell. This result is 
consistent with Azam et al. (2012) who found that Cambodian farmers with larger land per 
worker are more likely to participate in markets.  
 
The coefficient for the membership of farmer association had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on maize market participation. Belonging to a farmer association increased 
the probability of maize market participation by 9%. As expected, farmer associations can be 
good platforms for exchanging information, enabling farmers to link to buyers at a lower cost 
and thereby lowering the FTCs of market participation.  
 
The coefficient of distance to nearest market is statistically significant and negatively related 
to market participation for both maize and pigeonpea farmers. Farmers located far from 
markets are less likely to participate in markets, probably because of the restricted market 
access costs. This result conforms to findings by Ouma et al. (2010) in Rwanda and Burundi, 
where the probability of banana market participation decreases for farmers located far away 
from markets. As expected, ownership of a transport asset has a statistically significant 
positive effect on market participation for both maize and pigeonpea. This finding implies 
that households with access to transport are 25% and 11% more likely to participate in maize 
and pigeonpea markets, respectively. Heltber and Tarp (2002), Boughton et al. (2007) and 
Alene et al. (2008) also found that household ownership of transport asset increases market 
participation. Similarly, ownership of communication assets increases the probability of 
market participation for maize by 15%, suggesting that better access to information is likely 
to result in increased agricultural output and improved market participation.  
 
With regard to the location of households, the coefficient for the variable referring to the 
households in Mbulu district is statistically significant and negatively related to maize market 
participation as compared to Karatu District (reference district), reducing the likelihood of 
households’ market participation by 12%. Mbulu district is characterised by poor 
infrastructure and relative remoteness as compared to Karatu district, which is characterised 
by relatively good physical infrastructure (implying low transaction costs). Conversely, 
households in Kilosa district are more likely to participate in the maize market compared to 
those in Karatu district, possibly because of greater access to neighbouring markets such as 
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Kibaigwa maize market. A household located in Kilosa raises the probability of maize market 
participation by 15%. Although there is no statistically significant variation in pigeonpea 
market participation across the districts, the results of this study show that farmers in Mbulu, 
Mvomero and Kilosa Districts have lower pigeonpea market participation than farmers in the 
Karatu District. The empirical results and discussion of the factors influencing intensity of 
market participation by maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers are presented in the next 
sub-section.  
 
3.6.3 Determinants of the intensity of market participation 
  
The coefficient estimates for the second-stage Heckman selection estimation of the intensity 
of market participation are presented in Table 3.4. The model was tested for 
heteroscedasticity by using the Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test. The result indicated no 
heteroscedasticity, since the calculated 2 value for both maize (0.48) and pigeonpea (0.81) 
was smaller than the tabulated 2 value (3.841) at the 5% significance level and one degree of 
freedom. Because the double-log specification is used, the coefficients in Table 3.4 are 
elasticities conditional on participation. The coefficient of inverse Mills ratio λ, is 
significantly different from zero for both the maize (p < 0.1) and pigeonpea (p < 0.05) market 
supply equations, indicating that sample selection bias would have resulted if the maize and 
pigeonpea supply equations had been estimated without consideration of the market 
participation decision.  
 
The results show that the coefficients for mean village price are statistically significant and 
have a positive impact on marketed supply for pigeonpea, while the price is insignificant for 
maize. This finding means that for pigeonpea, marketed supply increases with price once 
participation decisions are made. The conditional price elasticity of marketable supply for 
pigeonpea and maize are 1.5% and 0.4%, respectively, showing that pigeonpea is more 
responsive to price changes compared to maize; and a 1% increase in pigeonpea prices 
increases pigeonpea supply by 1.5% among sellers. The high conditional elasticity of 
pigeonpea suggests that the pigeonpea price is an effective policy instrument to increase 





Table 3.4. Factors influencing the intensity of maize and pigeonpea sales 
Variable Maize Pigeonpea 














































































































































Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity 

2 (1) 0.48  0.81  
Prob>2 0.4893  0.3684  
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes:  Robust standard error in parentheses.   
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
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The coefficient of labour force in adult equivalent units is statistically significant and has a 
positive impact on marketed supply for pigeonpea, but not for maize. Since the agricultural 
activities are labour intensive, households with a larger labour force can cultivate larger areas 
of land and produce more surpluses to market. The coefficient of farm size per capita is 
statistically significant and is positively associated with marketed supply for maize, but not 
for pigeonpea, indicating that relatively well-endowed farmers (with larger farm size per 
capita) produce more surpluses to the market. Similar results were also reported in Kenya and 
Mozambique by Alene et al. (2008) and Boughton et al. (2007), respectively. 
 
The coefficient for index of productive assets is statistically significant and has a positive 
effect on marketed supply for maize, but not for pigeonpea, suggesting that productive assets 
facilitate productivity that, in turn, increase marketed surplus. The coefficient for membership 
of farmer association/group was positive and significant for the pigeonpea marketed supply, a 
result that conforms to expectations that membership of farmer association/group provides 
relevant information for increased returns to crop production and marketed supply. Farmer 
association/group can improve market access, lower transaction costs and increase the profits 
of smallholder farmers by offsetting diseconomies of scale (Hill et al., 2008; World Bank, 
2008). 
 
Distance to nearest market had a negative and significant influence on sales volume for 
maize, but an insignificant influence for pigeonpea. This finding means that there is a decline 
in volume of maize sold, while there is an increase in distance to reach the market. The 
results show that the supply of maize by farmers located one kilometre further from the 
nearest market is reduced by 19%, compared with those living closer to these markets. Ouma 
et al. (2010) found that transacted quantities of farmers located far from the market in 
Rwanda and Burundi is reduced by 17%. 
 
In explaining maize marketed supply, the coefficients for geographical location of households 
are significant. The results reveal that maize supply is significantly lower for farmers in the 
Mbulu, Mvomero and Kilosa Districts compared to the reference district, Karatu. Similarly, 
pigeonpea supply is significantly lower for farmers in the Kilosa District as compared to 
Karatu District. Karatu District is characterised by high potential and relatively good physical 




The unconditional marginal effects calculated at the mean are presented in Table 3.5, 
separately reporting the effect on unconditional marketed supply that is due to change in 
participation and in marketed supply. Because of the double-log specification of the model, 
the marginal effects essentially represent elasticities. For maize, the largest marginal effect 
emerges from ownership of communication assets and transport assets, with elasticities of 
supply of 0.42 and 0.36, respectively, and over 60% being due to the effect on marketed 
supply. As in the case of critical in maize production, farm size per capita and productive 
assets index have the third- and fourth-largest total elasticities of supply of 0.26 and 0.19, 
respectively. The marginal effect of gender and education level of household heads increases 
maize supply by 10% and 2.6%, respectively, with all the effects displayed in terms of 
increased market participation. This finding suggests a potential of improved human capital 
and an increased targeting of women, in order to increase market participation.  
 
Table 3.5. Unconditional marginal effects (Heckman sample selection model) 
Variable Total expected change 
in sales (%) 
Marginal impact via 
participation (%) 
Marginal impact 
via intensity (%) 
Maize 
   GENDER 0.099 0.099 NS 
EDUC 0.026 0.026 NS 
PRICE 0.001 0.001 NS 
FSIZE 0.262 0.007 0.255 
FASS 0.069 0.069 NS 
PAI 0.194 0.020 0.174 
COMM 0.42 0.152 0.268 
TRANS 0.363 0.120 0.243 
DIST -0.013 -0.001 -0.012 
Pigeonpea 
   PRICE  1.287 0.001 1.286 
LABOR  0.535 0.167 0.368 
FASS 0.866 NS 0.866 
CREDIT 0.394 NS 0.394 
TRANS 0.243 0.060 0.183 
DIST -0.014 -0.014 NS 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes: Only significant total elasticities and decompositions are reported. 
 Marginal effects are not reported for district dummies. 
 NS = not significant. 
60 
 
Membership of farmer association, coming about through increased participation, increases 
maize supply by 7%. Distance to nearest market reduces supply by 1.3%, with all the effects 
being in terms of reduced marketed supply. For pigeonpea, the largest effects on 
commercialisation come from price, with an elasticity of 1.3, and almost all of the entire 
impact deriving through increased marketed supply. Membership of farmer association has 
the second-largest total elasticities of pigeonpea supply of 0.87, with all of the impact 
deriving through increased marketed supply. As in the case of critical inputs in pigeonpea 
production, labour force in adult equivalent units has elasticities of supply of 0.54, and this 
comes about through both increased participation (31%) and increased supply (68%). Access 
to credit increases supply by 39%, with all the effects displayed in terms of increased 
marketed supply. Ownership of transport assets has elasticities of pigeonpea supply of 0.24. 
Distance to nearest market reduces supply by 1.4%, with all the effects displayed in terms of 




In this chapter, the factors that influence smallholder farmers’ participation in maize and 
pigeonpea markets were determined by estimating a probit model in step 1 of Heckman’s 
procedure. The probit model was also used to estimate the inverse Mills ratio, which was 
incorporated into the second step of the procedure to estimate the market supply equation. 
The result reveals that distance to nearest market, mean village prices, farm size, labour force, 
membership of farmer associations and geographic locations of household have significant 
effects on both market participation and intensity of participation. Distance to nearest market 
influences participation and marketed supply negatively, whereas other factors influence 
participation and marketed supply positively. These results highlight the importance of 
proportional transaction cost, output price, private and public assets, and locations in 
determining market participation and marketed surplus. Furthermore, gender, education of 
the household head, access to communication assets and ownership of transport assets have 
significantly positive effects on market participation decision. The results suggest that 
policies aimed at improving rural road infrastructure, market information systems, 
smallholder asset accumulation, human capital and promotion of farmer association could 
reduce transaction costs and enhance market participation and marketed supply by 
smallholder farmers. Having identified the determinants of market participation, the next 
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chapter presents the empirical results and discussion on the factors influencing the choice of 




CHAPTER 4. THE CHOICE OF MARKETING CHANNEL BY MAIZE 
AND PIGEONPEA SMALLHOLDER FARMERS: EVIDENCE FROM 




This chapter presents and discusses empirical findings on the factors that influence 
smallholder farmers’ choice of marketing channel with a particular focus on maize and 
pigeonpea. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the data and 
methodology, which constitutes the data collection and sampling methods, conceptual and 
empirical models and definition of variables. Section 4.3 presents the empirical results and 
discussion, while section 4.4 concludes the chapter with a summary of the results. 
 
4.2 Conceptual framework 
 
A producer’s choice of market channel can be conceptualized using a Random Utility Model 
(RUM). The focus is to model a smallholder farmer’s market decision making process based 
on utility maximization theory. The model assumes that the decision to participate in a 
particular marketing channel is based on the maximization of an underlying utility function, 
and a farmer selects his/her market channels based on his/her expected utility (McFadden, 
1986). A farmer’s decision  to participate or not in  a given market channel is made by 
evaluating gains in expected utility, taking into account the related investments, benefits and 
costs. If this expected utility is positive and higher – as compared to alternative options –this 
market will be selected by a farmer.  
 
Following Balsevich et al. (2006), let farmer i  observe  )3(N   market channels; say traders, 
wholesalers or brokers. The farmer’s utility from participating in market channel j  is 
represented by ijU . The farmer makes a marginal benefit-marginal cost calculation based on 
                                                 
5 This chapter gave rise to the following publication: Mmbando, F.E., E.Z. Wale, L.J.S. Baiyegunhi, and 
M.A.G. Darroch. The choice of marketing channel by maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers: Evidence from 




the utilities achieved by selling to a market channel or to another. The utility ijU  for each 
individual farmer choosing a particular alternative is specified as a linear function of the 
vector of channel-specific parameters  )( j   and the attributes of that alternative )( ijX  and a 
stochastic error component )( ije : 
ijijkjkji eXU   )(        Nj                                                               (4.1) 
 
The utilities (the difference between benefit and cost) cannot be observed directly but the 
choice made by the farmer reveals which one provides the greater utility (Greene, 2003).  
 
The farmer will choose to market his/her crops through a specific channel if the expected 
utility gained by selling through this channel is greater than all the other channels. The 
probability of choosing an alternative is equal to the probability that the utility of that 
particular alternative is greater than or equal to the utilities of all other alternatives in the 
choice set. The household selects market channel kj   if   
   
jkUU kjikji   )()(                                                                                (4.2) 
 
where  ijU   denotes a random utility associated with the market channel kj  , and  ijkj X  
is an index function denoting the producer’s average utility associated with this alternative. 
The second term ije  denotes a random error which is specific to a producer’s utility 
preference. The empirical model used to study the factors influencing marketing channel 
choice by smallholder farmers is presented in the following section.   
 
4.3 Multinomial logit model  
 
Given that sampled farmers in the study areas have more than two alternative channel 
choices, the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model was applied to estimate factors affecting their 
choice of marketing channel. The model is widely used in studies involving multiple choices 
that define the dependent variable (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). The independent variables can 
be either dichotomous (i.e., binary) or continuous (i.e., interval or ratio in scale). Like binary 
logistic regression, multinomial logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation to 




Following Greene (2003), assuming that the probability that the      farmer chooses the     of 
3 channels is      , the probability that a smallholder farmer chooses alternative j  can be 
explained by a MNL as  

















          for j=1,2,3                                                    (4.4) 
where  ix  is a vector of contextual socio-economic characteristics of the  
thi  farmer,  
           j  is a vector of regression parameter estimates associated with alternative j  , and 
          3 is the number of market channels in the choice set. 
 
The coefficients of explanatory variables on the omitted or base category are assumed to be 
zero. The probability that a base category will be chosen is calculated as   
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          for m>1                                          (4.6) 
 
By differentiating equation (4.4) with respect to the covariates, the marginal effects of the 
individual characteristics on the probabilities can be estimated as:  















                                        (4.7) 
where jP  is the probability of the farmer choosing market channel j  , and  
j  is a vector of regression parameter estimates associated with alternative j  (Greene, 
2003). 
 
The main explicit assumption of MNL is that the variables do not have to be multivariate 
normally distributed. The MNL can, therefore, be estimated using continuous, dichotomous 
and ordinal explanatory variables (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). This is a much less restrictive 
assumption than the multinomial probit that assumes that the specified variables are all 
65 
 
normally distributed. The MNL results are also relatively easy to interpret compared to the 
multinomial probit model. The next section presents the data collection procedure. 
Although the MNL is relatively easy to estimate and interpret, its major disadvantage is the 
inherent assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Amemiya, 1985). 
This assumption requires that the inclusion or exclusion of any category (e.g., use of brokers) 
does not affect the relative risks associated with the regressors in the remaining categories 
(use of traders and wholesalers). The Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984) was 
performed to check whether or not the IIA assumption was violated in this study. The process 
involves estimating a full model that includes all j categories and a restricted model where 
one category is eliminated. A statistically significant difference between the two models’ 
estimates would indicate a violation of the IIA assumption. The Hausman test showed that 
the null hypothesis of independence for both maize and pigeonpea could not be rejected. All 
tests (see Appendix 4.1) concluded that the IIA could not be rejected by the data, suggesting 
that the use of MNL was appropriate. 
 
4.4 Data collection  
 
The analysis conducted in this chapter used the same dataset used in chapter three.  However, 
given the aim of understanding the choice of marketing channels made by maize and 
pigeonpea farmers, the dataset in this chapter analyses only those sampled households that 
participated in the market. Out of the total 700 sample households, only a sub-sample of 562 
selling transactions made by 372 households that participated in the market were included in 
the final analysis. The next section presents the definition of variables used in the empirical 
model.  
 
4.5 Definition of the variables  
 
Dependent variable 
In this study, there are four channels through which farmers sold their maize and pigeonpea 
during 2008/09 cropping season, namely: (i) consumers; (ii) brokers; (iii) rural traders; and  





Channel I: Producerconsumer; 
Channel II: Producer broker rural traderwholesalerretailerconsumer 
Channel III: Producerrural traderwholesale retailerconsumer 
Channel IV: producerwholesalerretailerconsumer 
 
Pigeonpea 
Channel I: Producerconsumer; 
Channel II: Producerbroker rural traderwholesaler/exporter foreign markets 
Channel III: Producerrural traderwholesaler/exporterforeign markets 
Channel IV: Producerwholesaler/exporterforeign markets 
 
Analysis indicated that 54% and 66% of farmers sold their maize and pigeonpea through 
brokers at the farm gate, respectively. About 30% and 21% of farmers sold their maize and 
pigeonpea through traders at the market, whereas 13% and 12%, respectively, were sold 
through wholesalers at the market. Only 3% and 1% of farmers sold their maize and 
pigeonpea through consumers at the farm gate, respectively. Considering the above 
observations, three marketing channels were found prominent for both maize and pigeonpea, 
and these were brokers, rural traders and wholesalers. Therefore, farmers have three major 
channels to sell maize/pigeonpea, and the alternatives j = 1, 2, 3 represent sales to brokers, 
rural traders or wholesalers. The estimated MNL predicts the relative probability that a 
producer would choose one of the three categories based on the nature of the explanatory 
variables. For this analysis, the marketing channel broker is used as the comparison, base or 
reference category because this channel was chosen by most of the farmers to trade their 
maize and pigeonpea. The MNL was estimated using Stata (StataCorp, 2009) software.  
 
The empirical MNL for factors affecting the choice of marketing channel in the four areas 













110......  = the parameters to be estimated, 
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Pij is the probability of marketing channel  j  being chosen by farmer i , and 
1j  for sales to brokers, 2j  for sales to rural traders, and  3j  for sales to wholesalers. 
 
The explanatory variables and their expected relationship with dependent variable are 
described in Table 4.1. A positive sign for estimated coefficients indicates a higher likelihood 
of choosing the alternative channel over the base category as that explanatory variable 
increases.  
 
Household characteristics:  
Age of household head (AGE): Older farmers are more likely to sell through closer markets 
(Amaya and Alwayng, 2011). However, when older farmers own cell phones, they are more 
likely to go to farther markets. Thus, AGE (in years) is expected to increase the likelihood of 
using brokers.  
 
Education of household head (EDUC): The level of formal education attained is used as a 
proxy for the farmer’s ability to acquire, process/synthesize and effectively use information 
gathered from different sources (Strauss et al., 1991). The household head’s years of formal 
education, is expected to increase the likelihood of selling to more complex markets (i.e. 
using alternatives to brokers). 
 
Farming experience (EXPER): More experienced farmers may be better connected with 
traders (i.e. have developed social capital) and may have more marketing experience. 
According to Renos et al. (2003), experience also reflects the ability to better negotiate. 
Therefore, the number of years of farming experience of household head is expected to 
increase the likelihood of using traders or wholesalers relative to brokers. 
 
Social capital: 
Membership of a farmers association (FORG):  Household membership in a farmer 
association or group may increase access to information critical to production and marketing 
decisions (Olwande and Mathenge, 2012). Membership in a farmer association or group can 
also contribute towards reduced transaction costs and strengthen farmers’ bargaining power. 
Therefore membership in a farmer association or group is expected to increase the likelihood 
of using wholesalers relative to brokers, and was set as a dummy variable (1 if the farmer was 
a member and 0 otherwise). 
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Table 4.1. Description of the explanatory variables and expected signs 
a 1=very poor, 2=poor, 3=average, 4=good, 5=very good 




Institutional factors:  
Access to extension services (EXT): Agricultural extension services are expected to improve 
access to production and marketing information and technical skills of smallholders. 
Extension services are also expected to facilitate smallholder linkages with input and output 
markets (Gebremedhin et al., 2009). Therefore, access to extension services may thus be 
associated with higher market participation and the likelihood of choosing wholesalers 
relative to brokers. EXT was captured as a dummy variable (1 if the farmer has access to 
extension services and 0 otherwise). 
 
Access to credit (CREDIT): Farmers who have access to credit may produce more output and 
hence be able to sell in bulk. Therefore, increased marketable surplus expected to increase the 
likelihood of using wholesaler relative to brokers. Access to credit was set as a dummy 
variable (1 if the farmer accessed credit and 0 otherwise). 
 
  
Variable  Description Expected sign 
AGE Age of household head  (years) - 
EDUC Education of household head (years) + 
EXPER Farming experience of the household head (years) + 
EXT Farmers have access to extension (1=yes; 0 otherwise) + 
CREDIT Farmers have access to credit (1=yes; 0 otherwise) + 
FORG Membership in farmers’ association/group (1=yes; 0 otherwise) +/- 
MKINF 
 
Farmer uses market price information before decision to sell 
(1=yes; 0 otherwise) 
+ 
DISTMK Distance to the main market in km - 
RDQ Quality of road to the main market (1-5) a   + 
TRUST Farmers’ level of perceived trust in buyers (1-6) b   + 




Wealth index (WINDEX): Farmers with relatively higher wealth may have a lower degree of 
risk aversion, and with less risk aversion, may be more willing to adopt new market channel 
opportunities (Alemu et al., 2012). In order to reduce the high number of explanatory 
variables and remedy multicollinearity, the study developed a wealth index (WINDEX) for 
asset ownership using PCA. Key assets included total farm size, total livestock units, 
ownership of mobile phones, radio, bicycle, television sets or ox-plough, and house with iron 
sheet roof or brick wall. The first principal component (PC1) was used in constructing 
WINDEX for sample households for both maize and pigeonpea producers because it 
explained about 27.14% and 30.05% of the total variance in the nine indicators for maize and 
pigeonpea households, respectively (Appendix 4.2). All of the estimated coefficients 
(eigenvectors) had positive signs, implying that as the size of the estimated coefficients 
increases, the WINDEX of the ith household also increases. Therefore, the higher the 
WINDEX increases the likelihood of selling to wholesalers relative to brokers, because 
wealthy farmers are more capable to transport their produce to more distant markets instead 
of selling to brokers at the farm gate. 
 
Transaction cost factors: 
Price knowledge (MKINF): Prior to selling to various markets, farmers spend time and 
resources on finding relevant markets and price information. Broader information on prices at 
different market channels can improve farmers’ bargaining position, reducing search costs 
and creating an opportunity to choose the best options (Zanello et al., 2012). In this study, the 
MKINF indicates whether farmers used market price information before they decided to sell 
their maize and pigeonpea and is set as dummy variable (1 if the farmer used price 
information and 0 otherwise). MKINF is expected to increase the likelihood of using 
wholesalers or traders relative to brokers. 
 
Distance to main market (DISTMK): This variable was measured by kilometres from the 
production area to the market. Farmers located farther from the market are expected to face 
high search costs. The further the production area is from the market, the less likely would 
the farmer be to participate in that market since it implies higher transportation charges and 
less access to market information (Omamo, 1998). Therefore, it was hypothesized that the 




Quality of road to the main market (RDQ): Transportation cost increases with poorer road 
conditions to market, and so farmers will prefer to sell at nearby market. The RDQ variable 
was set as a continuous variable ranging from 1 to 5 (low to high). The availability of good 
road to the main market is expected to increase the likelihood of using wholesalers or traders 
relative to brokers. 
 
Trustworthiness of buyers (TRUST): Farmers’ degree of trust towards buyers is an important 
variable affecting transaction costs, since higher levels of trust reduce the perception of risk 
and hence transaction costs in an exchange relationship (Woldie and Nuppenau, 2009). This 
variable should positively influence farmers’ channel choice, and included as a continuous 
variable ranging from 1 to 6 (low to high) to reflect farmers’ perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of buyers. The next section presents the empirical results and discussions.  
 
 
4.6 Empirical results and discussions 
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
4.6.1.1 Maize statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics of the maize producing households presented in Table 4.2 indicate that 
most of these households (210 of 372 or 56.5%) used the brokers market channel. Nearly 
30.1% sold to traders and the rest (13.4%) sold to rural wholesalers. On average, the head of 
household is about 45 years old with five years of formal education. The education level 
distinguishes between those who succeed in selling to more complex markets, and those who 
do not. The producers selling to wholesalers have, on average, about two more years of 
formal schooling than those selling their maize to traders and brokers. Farmers that sell to 
wholesalers had relatively more farming experience (22.4 years), implying that they may 
have more ability to negotiate. Most of the households (66.0%) are not a member of a 
farmers’ association. On average, about 31% and 20.0% of sample households have access to 





Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the MNL for maize  
 
Variable 









Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev 
AGE 45.22 13.04 45.78 14.92 44.73 13.20 45.02 13.36 
EDUC 5.12 2.78 7.14 1.01 4.69 2.89 5.15 2.79 
EXPER 21.48 12.23 22.44 10.53 20.46 10.33 21.03 10.96 
FORG 0.56 0.50 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.34 0.47 
EXT 0.54 0.50 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.31 0.46 
CREDIT 0.19 0.39 0.52 0.50 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.40 
WINDEX 0.35 1.65 0.53 1.34 -0.23 1.54 0.05 1.58 
MKINF 0.55 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.24 0.43 0.35 0.48 
DISTMK 16.60 9.19 17.05 9.25 18.02 7.02 17.46 8.05 
RDQ 3.12 0.94 3.76 0.77 2.87 1.02 3.06 1.01 
TRUST 4.03 0.84 4.74 0.44 3.90 1.03 4.05 0.96 





Farmers that sell to wholesalers are wealthier (WINDEX of 0.53) than those who supplied to 
traders (WINDEX of 0.35) and brokers (WINDEX of -0.23). This implies that farmers who 
supplied to wholesalers have access to more assets than traders and brokers. Ex-ante 
information on price in the market in which farmers are selling varies from 55.0% (for 
suppliers to traders) to 40.0% and 24.0% for those using wholesalers and brokers. Distance to 
main market is longer for farmers using brokers (18.0 km) as compared to farmers supplying 
to traders (16.6 km) and wholesalers (17.1 km). The overall road quality mean score for 
maize farmers was 3.1 and the mean score for farmers’ trustworthiness of buyers was 4.1. 
Farmers seem to have more trust in wholesalers than in traders and brokers. 
 
4.6.1.2 Pigeonpea statistics 
 
Table 4.3 provides some basic descriptive statistics of pigeonpea sample households in the 
study area. Most pigeonpea growing households (126 of 190 or 66.3%) used the brokers’ 
market channel. Nearly 21.6% sold to traders and the rest (12.1%) sold to wholesalers. On 
average, the head of household is about 47.1 years old with five years of formal education. 
Farmers that sell to brokers have more farming experience (19.6 years) compared with those 
that sell in other channels, implying that they may have more ability to negotiate.  
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Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the MNL for pigeonpea  
 
Variable 









Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev 
AGE 47.24 14.13 46.48 17.06 47.17 13.30 47.10 13.90 
EDUC 5.17 2.79 6.22 3.03 4.79 3.18 5.04 3.10 
EXPER 18.56 12.61 15.26 9.23 19.55 12.24 18.82 12.02 
FORG 0.76 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.49 
EXT 0.17 0.38 0.39 0.50 0.10 0.29 0.15 0.36 
CREDIT 0.32 0.47 0.39 0.50 0.10 0.29 0.18 0.38 
WINDEX 0.12 1.61 1.97 1.97 -0.22 1.57 0.12 1.77 
MKINF 0.76 0.43 0.39 0.50 0.37 0.49 0.46 0.50 
DISTMK 18.15 8.52 10.57 6.15 20.46 8.96 18.76 9.11 
RDQ 2.73 0.90 3.09 0.79 2.94 1.08 2.91 1.01 
TRUST 4.10 1.00 4.48 0.51 3.85 0.96 3.98 0.94 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
 
 
Most of the farmers who supplied to traders (76.0%) participate in a farmers’ 
association/group compared to farmers supplied to brokers (29.0%) and wholesalers (22.0%). 
On average, about 15.0% and 18.0% of sample pigeonpea households have access to 
extension services and credit, respectively. Farmers that sell to wholesalers are relatively 
wealthier (WINDEX of 1.9) than those who supplied to traders and brokers. About 76.0% of 
farmers who supplied to traders used market price information before they decided to sell 
their produce, as compared to those using wholesalers (39.0%) and brokers (37.0%). Distance 
to main market was higher for broker users (20.5 km) than for traders (18.2 km) and 
wholesalers (10.6 km). The mean score for farmers’ perceived trustworthiness of buyers was 
3.9, and those who supplied to wholesalers trust buyers more as compared to those who 
supplied to traders and brokers. Descriptive statistics show that distance to main market was 
higher for maize growers (17.5 km) as compared to pigeonpea growers (18.8 km). About 
38% of pigeonpea growers have membership in farmer association/group as compared to 
34% of maize growers. Result also showed that pigeonpea producers (wealth index of 0.12) 
are wealthier than maize producers (wealth index of 0.05). In both maize and pigeonpea 
producers, most of the transactions occurred in a situation where seller positively trusted the 
buyer. Econometric results are presented in the next sub-section.  
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4.6.2 Econometric results  
 
The empirical MNL models were corrected for possible multicollinearity problems after 
testing for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and correlation matrix. 
The VIF was less than 10, for both maize and pigeonpea, confirming that multicollinearity 
was not a problem (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). In addition, correlation matrix show that these 
coefficients are globally less than 0.37 for both maize and pigeonpea samples, indicating 
weak correlations, which suggest that the variables are sufficiently independent to be 
modeled together without multicollinearity concerns. 
 
4.6.2.1 Maize MNL results 
 
The estimated results from the MNL for maize channel choice are presented in Table 4.4. The 
estimated Deviance 2 of 457.60 with 720 degrees of freedom (df) show statistical 
significance at well above the 5% level, suggesting that the MNL adequately fits the data. 
The estimated Likelihood ratio test (2 of 252.13 with 22 df; p=0.000) is statistically 
significant at well below the 5% level, implying that the full MNL improves the data fit and 
hence outperforms, the null model. The overall classification accuracy of the model is 
relatively good at 75%, with broker channel users classified very well (85.70%) and users of 
traders and wholesalers classified well (61.60% and 60.00%, respectively).  
 
Estimated coefficients and marginal effects all have the a priori expected signs and show that 
EDUC, FORG, EXT, CREDIT, MKINF, RDQ and TRUST all influence market channel 
choices made by maize growers, but have different impacts depending on the market channel. 
Education level of household head (EDUC) positively increased the likelihood that maize 
producers will sell to wholesalers relative to brokers. The probability of a household head 
using wholesalers relative to brokers increases by 1.6% (p<0.01) for every additional year of 
education of the household head. Study reported by Hobbs (1997) found the same impact of 
education level on channel choice.  
Farmer membership of a farmer association/group (FORG) significantly (p<0.01) and 
positively increased the likelihood that a maize producer will sell to traders relative to 
brokers. Being a member of a farmer’s association/group increases the likelihood that a maize 
farmer will sell to traders by about 37%.  
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Table 4.4. Estimated coefficients and marginal effects of the variables in the MNL 





Traders vs Brokers contrast 
ln(P3/P1) 


























































































































No. of observation 372 
 
 
Log likelihood -229.5251 
 
 
Pseudo R2 0.3532  
 
 
Deviance 2 (720) = 457.60 (significance level =1.00) 
Likelihood ratio test 2 (22) = 252.13 (significant level =0.00)  
Classification accuracy (correctly predicted):  
Brokers = 85.70%; traders = 61.60%; wholesalers = 60.00%; overall model = 75.00% 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes: Base category is brokers (P1) 
P2 and P3 represent the probability that a household selects traders and wholesalers channels, respectively. 
a Definitions for variables are given in Table 4.1. 
bdy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 Standard errors are in parentheses. 





Access to extension service (EXT) significantly increased the likelihood that a maize 
producer will sell to traders relative to brokers. Access to extension services increases the 
probability of selling maize to traders relative to brokers by 37.7% (p<0.01). Access to 
extension services is expected to increase the ability of farmers to acquire relevant market 
price information and related production information which, in turn, increases a farmer’s 
ability to choose the distant market channel. Alemu et al. (2012) also reported that access to 
extension services significantly increased the probability that a small-scale farmer in Ethiopia 
will choose the contract market relative to the spot market. 
 
Access to credit (CREDIT) significantly increased the likelihood that a maize producer will 
sell to wholesalers relative to brokers and increased the probability that a farmer will sell to 
wholesalers relative to brokers by 10.2% (p<0.01). The price knowledge proxy MKINF also 
significantly increased the likelihood that a maize producer will sell to traders relative to 
brokers, increasing the probability by 32.2% (p<0.01). 
 
Quality of road to main market (RDQ) again significantly influenced the probability of 
choosing wholesalers relative to brokers, with improved quality of road to main market 
increasing the probability of selling to wholesalers by 2.3% (p<0.01).  Jari and Fraser (2009) 
reported that the availability of good road infrastructure significantly increased the likelihood 
of households marketing their produce through informal channels in South Africa.  
Perceived trust in buyers (TRUST) also significantly increased the probability of choosing 
wholesalers relative to brokers. Households who perceived higher trust in the buyer 
relationship are more likely to sell to wholesalers relative to brokers. This implies that there is 
a 3.5% (p<0.01) increase in the probability of selling maize to wholesalers for these 
households. Higher levels of trust reduce screening costs and the risk of default in the 
business relationship. 
 
4.6.2.2 Pigeonpea MNL results 
 
The results of the MNL estimated for pigeonpea market channel choice are presented in 
Table 4.5. The goodness-of-fit of the model is quite good. The estimated Deviance 2 of 
193.79 with 356 df, shows statistical significance at well above the 5% level, suggesting that 
the MNL adequately fits the data and that the data are consistent with the MNL assumptions. 
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The estimated Likelihood ratio test (2 of 132.59 with 22 df; p=0.000) is statistically 
significant at well below the 5% level, implying that the full MNL outperforms the null 
model. The overall classification accuracy is again relatively good at 80.0%, with users of 
brokers classified very well (91.3%), and users of wholesalers and traders less well classified 
(60.9% and 56.1%, respectively). Estimated coefficients and marginal effects all have the 
expected a priori signs. Membership in farmer association/group (FORG), EXT, CREDIT, 
WINDEX, MKINF, DISTMK and TRUST all influence market channel choices made by 
pigeonpea producers, but have different impacts depending on the market channel.  
 
FORG significantly increased the likelihood that a pigeonpea producer will sell to traders 
relative to brokers, and increased the probability that a pigeonpea farmer will sell to traders 
relative to brokers by 37.7% (p<0.01). Access to extension services (EXT) significantly 
influenced the likelihood that a pigeonpea farmer will sell to a wholesaler channel relative to 
brokers. Such access increases the probability of selling pigeonpea to wholesalers relative to 
brokers by an estimated 10.2% (p<0.01). Access to credit (CREDIT) also increased the 
likelihood that a pigeonpea producer will sell to wholesalers relative to brokers by some 6.8% 
(p<0.05). 
 
The wealth index (WINDEX) has significantly increase the probability of selling to 
wholesalers relative to brokers by about 1.5% (p<0.01) per unit increase in the index. In 
contrast with maize market channel choice, WINDEX did not significantly influence farmers’ 
choice of market channel for maize producers. Wealthy farmers are more capable of owning 
vehicles that can be used to transport their produce to more distant markets instead of selling 
to brokers at the farm gate. This finding is consistent with Fafchamps and Vargas-Hill (2005), 
who all established a positive relationship between wealth and market choice. According to 
them, wealthier farmers are less likely to sell at the farm gate as quantity sold increases, and 




Table 4.5. Estimated coefficients and marginal effects of the variables in the MNL 





Traders vs Brokers contrast 
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No. of observation 190 
 
 
Log likelihood -96.8939 
 
 
Pseudo R2 0.4063 
 
 
Deviance 2 (356) = 193.79 (significance level =1.00) 
Likelihood ratio test 2 (22) = 132.59 (significance level =0.00) 
Classification accuracy (correctly predicted):  
broker = 91.30%; traders = 56.10%; wholesalers = 60.90%; overall model = 80.00% 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes: Base category is brokers (P1) 
P2 and P3 represent the probability that a household selects traders and wholesaler channels, respectively. 
a Definitions for variables are given in Table 1. 
bdy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





Price knowledge (MKINF) significantly increased the likelihood that a pigeonpea producer 
will sell to traders relative to brokers, and results suggest that price information knowledge 
increased the probability that a farmer will sell to traders by about 28.9% (p<0.01). 
Intuitively, households with no access to price information are less likely to travel to market 
to sell their produce to traders; they are more likely to sell to brokers at farm gate. 
  
Distance to market (DISTMK) significantly reduced the likelihood that a pigeonpea producer 
will sell to wholesalers rather than to brokers. A one kilometre increase in distance to market 
increases the probability that the farmer will sell to brokers by about 0.4% (p<0.01). Farmers 
who are located farther away from markets face higher transaction costs and so may opt for 
brokers at farm-gate, in their villages or in nearby villages, rather than selling to wholesalers 
in more distant market that increase transaction costs. This result is consistent with Alemu et 
al. (2012) who found that Ethiopian farmers located far from markets faced higher 
transaction costs, and so opted for cooperatives.  
 
Finally, TRUST significantly increased the likelihood that a pigeonpea producer will sell to 
traders and wholesalers relative to brokers. A unit increase in TRUST scores generates a 
6.2% (p<0.1) and 1.8% (p<0.1) increase in the probability of selling to traders and 
wholesalers, respectively.  Similar to the MNL for maize market channel choice, higher 




This chapter studied the factors that influence smallholder farmers’ choice of marketing 
channels by maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers in Tanzania, using multinomial logit 
model. The results indicate that transaction costs (such as distance to market, quality of road 
to market, price knowledge, trust in working relationships with buyers), and household 
wealth, membership of farmer association/group, access to extension services and access to 
credit significantly influence the choice of marketing channels. This suggests that policies 
aimed at reducing transaction costs such as increased investment in rural infrastructure, 
improved market information systems and farm households’ access to assets appear to be an 
important intervention area that can affect choice of profitable channels. Promoting farmers’ 
groups/associations such as producer and marketing groups could facilitate smallholders’ 
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technology and information transfer, bargaining power and trust between farmers and buyers. 
The next chapter examines the impacts of market participation and channel choice on 




CHAPTER 5. WELFARE IMPACTS OF MARKET PARTICIPATION 
AND CHANNEL CHOICE BY MAIZE AND PIGEONPEA 




This chapter presents and discusses empirical findings on the impacts of market participation, 
and channel choice on household welfare by maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers. The 
rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the welfare impacts of market 
participation, which constitutes the conceptual framework, econometric techniques, data, 
sampling technique and description of variables, and empirical results and discussion. Section 
5.3 presents the welfare impacts of market channel choice, which comprises the conceptual 
framework, econometric estimation, data and description of variables and empirical results 
and discussion. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter with a summary of the results. 
 
5.2 Welfare impacts of market participation 
5.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
The extent to which smallholder market participation contributes to household welfare can be 
modeled in a random utility framework (Lubungu, 2013; Baltas and Doyle, 2001). The model 
assumes that an individual will choose to participate in maize and pigeonpea markets based 
on utility maximization. Thus, the objective of the decision marker is to maximize utility and 
an individual will always choose the alternative for which utility is maximal (Baltas and 
Doyle, 2001).  Suppose total utility as a function of household consumption expenditure per 
capita, the utility function can be expressed as;  
 
jijijiji ezYU  ')(                                                                                               (5.1) 
 
                                                 
6 This chapter gave rise to the following publications: Mmbando, F.E., E.Z. Wale, and L.J.S. Baiyegunhi. 
Welfare impacts of smallholder farmers’ participation in maize and pigeonpea markets in Tanzania. Revised and 
resubmitted to Food Security. 
Mmbando, F.E., E.Z. Wale, and L.J.S. Baiyegunhi. Welfare impacts of market channel choice by smallholder 
farmers in Tanzania: A multinomial endogenous treatment approach. Submitted to the International Food and 
Agribusiness Management Review. 
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where Uij   is the farmer’s utility from participating or not in market, Yji is the household 
consumption expenditure per capita, zi are observed factors that affect total utility,   and   
are the coefficient estimates, eji is a random component capturing the unobserved factors, i 
denotes an individual while j is an index (1, 0) representing the decision whether to 
participate or not, respectively. Individuals compare utilities associated with each decision, in 
this case participation (U1i) and non-participation (U2i) in maize/pigeonpea markets, before 
the choice is made. Let V be the difference in the utilities of the participation and non-
participation decisions,  
 
jijiiiiii ezYYUUV  ')( 2121                                                                        (5.2) 
 
where Y1i and Y2i are household consumption expenditure per capita associated with 
participation and non-participation in maize/pigeonpea markets, respectively; U1i is the 
farmers utility from participation; U2i is the farmers utility from non-participation. The 
difference in utilities is, however, not observed and only the decision that the individual takes 
is observed such that;  
 
      
        
           
                                                                                                 (5.3) 
 
The individual is assumed to select the alternative that provides the greatest utility. The utility 
derived from participation will motivate the individual to participate in maize/pigeonpea 
markets only if it is greater than that derived from the other alternative, non-participation. 
Therefore, the gain from participation can be expressed as follows;  
 
)( 21 ii YYEATE                                                                                                       (5.4) 
 
where Y1i  is the expected consumption expenditure per capita if household i participates in 
maize/pigeonpea markets and Y2i is the expected consumption expenditure per capita of 
household  i  if it chooses not to participate. Equation 4 estimates the expected value of the 
difference (impact) between consumption expenditure per capita attained by households 
participating in maize/pigeonpea markets and that which they would have attained had they 
not participated (Ravallion, 2006). The difference in consumption expenditure per capita is 
referred to average treatment effect (ATE).  However, a bias will arise if there are systematic 
differences between participants and non-participants that affect the household’s decision of 
whether to participate or not (Dehejia and Webha, 2002).  
82 
 
This bias (b) is given by: )0|()1|( 22  iiii DYEDYEb                                      (5.5) 
 
where, Y1i  is the expected consumption expenditure per capita if household i participates in 
markets, D is dummy for market participation (=1 if a household participates and 0 
otherwise). In the impact evaluation literature, b is termed as selection bias. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) suggest that standardized bias can be large if the absolute estimate is larger than 
20. This bias could be corrected if )1|( 2 ii DYE   were known. Unfortunately, participants’ 
household consumption expenditure per capita had they not participated cannot be observed. 
The next sub-section discusses the impact econometric challenges and estimation techniques. 
 
5.2.2 Econometric estimation challenges and techniques 
 
5.2.2.1 Econometric estimation challenges 
 
 
Estimation of the impact of market participation on household welfare outcome based on 
non-experimental observations is a major methodological challenge because of two specific 
related problems, namely, the selection bias problem, and the problem of missing data for the 
counterfactual (Wooldridge, 2003). Selection bias is related to the problem of identifying the 
appropriate counterfactual—the benchmark against which to compare the impact of market 
participation between participants and non-participants. In either case, the sample of market 
participants is not assigned randomly. Then, the direct comparison of consumption 
expenditure per capita between participants and non-participants may be biased. There is a 
problem of missing data because it is not possible to measure the impact on the same 
individuals as at each moment in time each individual is either under the intervention being 
evaluated or not and thus he or she cannot be in both. This implies that we cannot observe the 
outcome variable of interest for the targeted individuals had they not participated at the same 
time. Outcomes are only observed in one state (participation or non-participation); the 
counterfactual is unobservable. Unobservable characteristics of farmers and their farms may 
affect both the participation decision and the welfare outcome, resulting in inconsistent 
estimates of the effect of market participation on household welfare. Farmers who 
participated may have systematically different characteristics from the farmers who did not 
participate, and they may have decided to participate based on information they have (Smale 
et al., 2012). Thus, possible self-selection occur if unobserved factors influence both the error 
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term of the participation equation and the error term of the outcome equation, thus resulting 
the correlation of the error terms. The implication of this is that the use of standard regression 
techniques (ordinary least square (OLS)) to estimate the parameters of the equation would 
result in biased and inconsistent estimates. 
 
Some authors have employed the Heckman two-step method or similar approaches to address 
selection bias. However, the two-step procedures are completely dependent on the strong 
assumption that unobserved variables are normally distributed. Another way of controlling 
for selection bias is to employ instrumental variable approach (IV). A limitation of IV 
regression assumes that welfare function would differ only by constant term (i.e., 
unobservable factors) between the participating and non-participating households; it is also 
difficult in finding and identifying instruments in the estimation. According to Heckman et 
al. (1997), it is likely that the differences between participants and non-participant may be 
more systematic even after conditioning on unobservable or observable factors. Moreover, 
both OLS and IV procedures tend to impose a linear functional form assumption implying 
that the coefficients on the control variables are similar for participants and non-participants.  
 
Unlike the parametric methods mentioned above, propensity score-matching (PSM) requires 
no assumption about the functional form in specifying the relationship between outcomes and 
predictors of outcome. However, PSM assumed that the welfare function differ only by 
observable factors. The implication of this is that when welfare function differs by 
unobservable factors, then the result of the PSM may give biased estimates. In view of this 
development, switching regression model takes into account the limitation of IV regression 
and PSM by taking into account both observable and unobservable factors. Therefore, this 
study uses both PSM and endogenous switching regression to address the above econometric 
challenges in evaluating the welfare effects of maize and pigeonpea market participation and 
to ensure robustness of findings. For the welfare effects of level of market participation, a 
Tobit selection equation was used in the first stage to estimate the level of market 
participation, and the predicted level of market participation variable was used in the second 





5.2.2.2 Econometric techniques 
 
a) Propensity score matching technique (PSM) 
 
As noted above, in the absence of experimental data, the propensity score-matching model 
(PSM) can be employed to account for sample selection bias (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). To 
create the conditions of a randomized experiment, the PSM employs the un-confoundedness 
assumption also known as conditional independence assumption (CIA), which implies that 
once covariates X is controlled for, market participation is random and uncorrelated with the 
outcome variables. The PSM can be expressed as, 
 
                                                                                                    (5.6) 
 
where Di =(0,1) is the dummy for market participation  and X is the vector of household 
characteristics. The conditional distribution of X, given the propensity score p(X), is similar in 
both groups of market participants and non-participants. 
 
After estimating the propensity scores, the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) can 
then be estimated as 
                    
                            
                                                                                   (5.7) 
 
where     is the expected consumption expenditure per capita if household i participates in 
markets;     is the expected consumption expenditure per capita of household  i  if it chooses 
not to participate; Di =(0,1) is the dummy for market participation  and X is the vector of 
household characteristics.  
 
Several matching methods have been developed to match participants with non-participants 
of similar propensity scores. Asymptotically, all matching methods should yield the same 
results. However, in practice, there are tradeoffs in terms of bias and efficiency with each 
method (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In this study, the two most frequently used matching 
methods, namely, the nearest neighbour matching (NNM) and kernel based matching (KBM) 
methods were used to match treated and control units and to check if the results are robust 
with respect to different matching methods, which gain more precision in estimates. Unlike 
the NNM algorithm that ensures only a few observations from the comparison group are used 
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to construct the counterfactual outcome of a treated individual, KBM is a non-parametric 
matching estimator that uses weighted averages of all individuals in the control group to 
construct the counterfactual outcome. KBM is therefore associated with lower variance 
because more information is used (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). 
 
It is important to note that the main purpose of the propensity score estimation is to balance 
the observed distribution of covariates across the groups of participants and non-participants. 
The balancing test is normally required after matching to ascertain whether the differences in 
covariates in the two groups in the matched sample have been eliminated, in which case the 
matched comparison group can be considered as a plausible counterfactual (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). Although several versions of balancing tests exist in the literature, the most 
widely used is the standardized mean difference between treatment and control sample 
suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), whereby the quality of matches is assessed by 
comparing the situation before and after matching to check if there remain any differences 
after conditioning on the propensity score. They recommend that a standardized difference of 
greater than 20% should be considered too large and thus an indicator of failure of the 
matching process. Additionally, Sianesi (2004) propose a comparison of the pseudo R2 and 
the P-values of the likelihood ratio tests obtained from the logit analysis before and after 
matching the samples. After matching, there should be no systematic differences in the 
distribution of covariates between the groups. As a result, the pseudo R2 should be lower and 
the joint significance of covariates should be rejected (or the P-values of the likelihood ratio 
should be insignificant).  
 
b) Endogenous switching regression model of household welfare 
 
Endogenous switching regression model that accounts for both endogeneity and sample 
selection was used following Maddala and Nelson (1975) and Di Falco et al. (2011). The 
model uses a probit model in the first stage to determine the relationship between market 
participation and a number of household and farm characteristics. In the second stage, 
separate regression equations are used to model consumption expenditure per capita 
conditional on a specified criterion function. To clarify the method, consider a situation 
where a farmer could participate to market or not. Let     be a latent variable capturing the 
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                                                                (5.8)         
 
where     is the unobservable or latent variable for market participation;    is its observable 
counterpart (i.e. the dependent variable market participation equals 1, if the farmer has sold 
any quantity of specific crop produced in the market, and zero otherwise);     is a vector of 
observed farm and non-farm characteristics determining market participation;   is the 
coefficient estimates and    is random disturbances associated with the market participation.  
 
The two welfare regression equations where farmers face the regimes of participation or not 
to participate to the market are defined as follows: 
 
                                                                                                    (5.9a) 
                                                                                                    (5.9b) 
 
where,     is household consumption expenditure per capita in regimes 1 and 2,     is a vector 
of exogenous variables of household i, expected to influence consumption expenditure;     is 
the coefficient vector; D is dummy for market participation, and   , the residuals.  
 
The error terms are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution with zero mean and non-
singular covariance matrix specified as  
 
                  
   
      
    
     
    
 
                                                                           (5.10) 
 
where,      is the variance of the error term in the selection equation;      and      are the 
variances of the error terms in the welfare outcome functions;        is the covariance of    
and     ; and        is the covariance of    and      . Since      and      are not observed 
simultaneously, the covariance between      and       is not defined (Maddala, 1983). An 
important implication of the error structure is that because the error term of the selection 
equation    is correlated with the error terms of the welfare outcome functions,     and    , 
the expected values of       and       conditional on the sample selection are non-zero and are 
defined as:  
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where  (.) is the standard normal probability density function,  (.) the standard normal 
cumulative density function, and     
      
      
   and,      
      
        
 . If the estimated 
covariances      and       are statistically significant, then the decision to participate and the 
welfare outcome variables are correlated; that is we find evidence of endogenous switching 
and reject the null hypothesis of absence of sample selectivity bias (Lokshin and Sajaia, 
2004).  
 
A more efficient method of estimating endogenous switching regression models is full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML) method. The FIML method simultaneously 
estimates the probit criterion or selection equation and the regression equations to yield 
consistent standard errors. Given the assumption of trivariate normal distribution for the error 
terms, the logarithmic likelihood function for the system of equations (5.8) and (5.9a & 5.9b) 
can be given as: 
 
        
 
   
     
   
   
                  
                      
   
   
                                                               (5.11) 
 
where     
              
     
 
                 denoting the correlation coefficient between the 
error term     of the selection equation (5.8) and the error term      of equation (5.9a) and 
(5.9b), respectively. The FIML estimates of the parameters of the endogenous switching 
regression model obtained using the movestay command in Stata (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). 
 
Conditional expectations, treatment and heterogeneity effects  
Following Di Falco et al. (2011), the endogenous switching regression model can be used to 
compare the expected consumption expenditure outcome of households that participated (a) 
with respect to households that did not participate (b), and to investigate the expected 
consumption expenditure outcome in the counterfactual hypothetical cases (c) that the 
participated households did not participate, and (d) that the non-participant households 
participated. The conditional expectations for our outcome variables in the four cases are 




                                                                                                       (5.12a) 
                                                                                                       (5.12b) 
                                                                                                       (5.12c) 
                                                                                                       (5.12d) 
 
Cases (a) and (b) along the diagonal of Table 5.1 represent the actual expectations observed 
in the sample. Cases (c) and (d) represent the counterfactual expected outcomes. In addition, 
following Heckman et al. (2001), the effect of market participation on consumption 
expenditure outcome of the households that actually participated in the market is calculated 
as the difference between (a) and (c),   
 
                                                               (5.13)     
 
Similarly, the effect of the treatment on the untreated (TU) for households that actually did 
not participate in the market is calculated as the difference between (d) and (b),   
 
                                                               (5.14)        
 
The effect of base heterogeneity” for the group of farm households that decided to participate 
is defined as the difference between (a) and (d), 
 
                                                               (5.15)     
 
Similarly, for the group of farm households that decided not to participate, “the effect of base 
heterogeneity” is the difference between (c) and (b)  
 
                                                               (5.16)  
 
Finally, the difference between TT and TU can be estimated. This effect called “transitional 
heterogeneity” (TH), estimates whether the effect of market participation is larger or smaller 
for households that participated in the market or for the household that did not participate in 






Table 5.1. Conditional expectations, treatment and heterogeneity effects 
Sub-samples Decision stage Treatment 
Effects To participate Not to participate 
Households that participated (a)             (c)             TT 
Households that did not participated (d)             (b)             TU 
Heterogeneity effects BH1 BH2 TH 
Notes: (a) and (b) represent observed expected consumption expenditures outcome; (c) and (d) represent 
counterfactual expected consumption expenditures outcome.  
Di  = 1 if households participated in the market; Di = 0 if farm households did not participate 
Y1i = consumption expenditures outcome if households participated  
Y2i = consumption expenditures outcome if households did not participate  
TT = the effect of the treatment (i.e. market participation) on the treated ( i.e. households that participated) 
TU = the effect of the treatment (i.e. market participation) on the untreated ( i.e. households that did not participate) 
BH = the effect of base heterogeneity for households that participated (i = 1), and did not participate (i = 2) 
TH = (TT-TU), i.e. transitional heterogeneity  
 
 
Alongside typical farm, household, and contextual characteristics, it is hypothesize that 
institutional support through NGO market linkage programs influences farmers’ market 
participation. Therefore, farmers’ participation in the NGO market linkage programs was 
included as an additional explanatory variable—defined as a dummy. Yet, participation in 
those programs might potentially be endogenous, which would lead to a bias in the 
coefficient estimate. Endogeneity of the NGO market linkage programs dummy was tested by 
employing a two-stage approach as detailed in Wooldridge (2003). In the first stage, a probit 
regression with the NGO market linkage programs dummy as dependent variable was run, 
using membership in a farmer group as an instrument. As NGO prefers to work with farmer 
groups, group membership is correlated with the NGO market linkage programs dummy7. In 
the second stage, a probit with market participation as dependent variable, including 
predicted residuals from the first-stage probit as an additional explanatory variable was run. 
The t-statistics for the coefficient of this residual term provides a valid test for the null 
hypothesis that the NGO market linkage programs variable is exogenous (Wooldridge, 2003). 
The test fails to reject the null hypothesis (Appendix 5.1 for detail). 
 
                                                 
7 The correlation coefficient between group membership and NGO market linkage programs is  = 0.515 (p = 
0.000), for maize; and  = 0. 0.379 (p = 0.000), for pigeonpea; while between group membership and market 
participation it is   = 0.045 (p = 0.250), for maize; and   = 0.095 (p = 0.131), for pigeonpea. 
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For the model to be identified it is important to use as exclusion restrictions, thus as selection 
instruments, not only those automatically generated by the nonlinearity of the selection model 
of market participation but also other variables that directly affect the selection variable but 
not the outcome variable. In this study, the variables related to the information sources (e.g., 
extension services and mobile phone) were used as selection instruments. Farmers access to 
market information via extension services and mobile phone increases market participation. 
Secondly, it is assumed that farmers access to market information via extension services and 
mobile phone affects the welfare outcome indicators only through market participation (i.e., 
the mere access to market information without participating to markets it does not affect the 
welfare outcome indicators of a farmer). The validity of the selection instruments was tested 
following Di Falco et al. (2011). If a variable is a valid selection instrument, it will affect the 
market participation decision but it will not affect the consumption expenditure per capita 
among farm households that did not participate. The test of the validity of instruments 
(Appendix 5.2) show that the identification variables in both maize and pigeonpea 
specifications are jointly statistically significant determinants of the decision of whether or 
not to participate in market (χ2 = 125.59, p= 0.00, for maize; and χ2 = 49.19; p = 0.00, for 
pigeonpea) but not the consumption expenditure per capita by households that did not 
participate: (F-stat. = 1.29, p = 0.215, for maize; and F-stat. = 1.61, p = 0.110, for 
pigeonpea). The results are quite robust, and the sets of instruments are successful at enabling 
identification. 
 
c) Impact of level of market participation on household welfare 
 
Level of market participation can potentially be endogenous variable in the model for 
consumption expenditure/household welfare. To solve endogeneity problems a two-stage 
approach was used, which involves the use of predicted values of the potentially endogenous 
variables as instrumental variables in the estimation of the truly endogenous variables (Kassie 
et al., 2014; Wooldridge 2003). In this study, a Tobit model for the level of market 
participation was specified in the first stage, and use the predicted value of the level of 
market participation obtained from this model in the second stage, welfare function. 
Multicollinearity was checked using a simple correlation coefficient matrix and Variation 
Inflation Factor (VIF), and found no evidence of serious multicollinearity problem as 
correlation matrix and VIF results show less than 0.5 and less than 10, respectively. The next 
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sub-section presents the data collection procedure and description of variables used in the 
analysis. 
 
5.2.3 Data collection and description of the variables 
  




The consumption expenditure adjusted by the number of adult equivalents (hereafter referred 
to as consumption expenditure per capita) was used as a proxy for household welfare 
indicator. The consumption expenditure data was collected for the preceding year covering a 
period of 12 months. This was collected using purchased items and the amount spent during 
each month and then aggregated to the annual level. The standard per capita consumption 
indicator of household welfare is based on food (household’s own consumption of home 
produced food + purchased food + aid or gift food) and non-food expenditure adjusted to 
adult equivalent.  
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in the PSM and switching regression was binary market participation 
equals 1, if the farmer has sold any quantity of maize/pigeonpea produced in the market, and 
zero otherwise. For the level of market participation model, the dependent variable was the 
proportion of maize/pigeonpea sold, ranging between 0 and 100 percent. 
 
Independent variables 
The explanatory variables included to the estimations are summarized in Table 5.2. The 
explanatory variables include various proxies for household characteristics (such as age, 
gender, level of education, and labor force in AEU. Household labour force was included to 
capture labour supply for production and for transporting crops to the nearest market. Farm 
size, value of farm assets, and access to off-farm income are included to capture the effect of 
household wealth. These variables are critical in production that enables households to 
produce surplus for the market (Alene et al., 2008). Transaction costs are captured through 
three proxy variables: distance to nearest market is a proxy for proportional transaction costs, 
and sources of information (such as extension services and mobile phone) are proxies for 
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fixed transaction cost. Farmers’ participation in the NGO market linkage programs/trainings 
is included as a proxy for institutional support. The unobserved location-specific effects were 
controlled using district dummy variables. These variables were included in the model to 
capture differences in the household welfare conditions that might have arisen due to 
infrastructure, remoteness, resource endowment, production potential and farming conditions 
across districts. The dummy for Karatu district was made as a reference and was left out of 
the model to avoid the dummy variable trap. The next sub-section presents the empirical 
results and discussions. 
 
5.2.4 The empirical results and discussions  
5.2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Summary statistics and statistical significance tests on equality of means for continuous 
variables and equality of proportions for binary variables for market participants and non-
participants are presented in Table 5.2. In this study, market participants are farmers who sold 
any quantity of maize/pigeonpea in the market during 2008/09 cropping season, and non-
participants are those who did not sale. About 56% and 75% of sampled households 
participated in maize and pigeonpea market, respectively. There are significant differences 
between participants and non-participants with respect to the average consumption 
expenditure per capita for both maize and pigeonpea.  
 
Market participants are consuming more expenditure per capita by about 3% and 14% 
compared to nonparticipants for both maize and pigeonpea, respectively. The proportion of 
maize and pigeonpea sold was 32% and 51%, respectively. On average, a higher proportion 
of market participants are male-headed households and they also have more farm size for 
both maize and pigeonpea. There are statistically significant differences in education level of 
household head; maize market participants are better educated than their non-participating 
counterparts. Educated households may have more access to information and be able to 
participate in the market. There are also statistically significant differences between 
participants and non-participants with respect to value of farm assets for both maize and 
pigeonpea. On average, a higher proportion of maize (23%) and pigeonpea (31%) market 
participants participated in the NGO market linkage programs/trainings. This shows the role 
of institutional support in smallholder market participation.  
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Table 5.2. Summary statistics of variables used to analyse welfare impacts of market 






















per capita (’000Tsh)  381.45 368.52 ** 430.47 371.82 *** 
Proportion of crop sold 











Age of the household head 
(years) 45.00 46.90 * 46.69 49.65  
Gender of the head (1= 
male) 0.91 0.81 *** 0.91 0.81 * 
Education of the head 
(years) 5.28 4.52 *** 5.20 4.78  
Labor force (AEU) 4.49 4.34  4.78 3.62 *** 





Farm size per capita (ha) 2.54 1.76 *** 1.94 1.51 *** 
Value of farm asset per 
capita (’000TSh)b 456.61 286.89 *** 566.19 439.76 *** 






NGO market linkage 
programs (1= yes) 0.23 0.14 *** 0.31 0.16 ** 





Distance to market (km) 4.71 6.40 *** 4.92 6.84 * 





Extension service (1=yes) 0.43 0.34 
*** 0.31 0.18 *** 






Karatu (1= yes) - reference 0.21 0.23  0.40 0.31 ** 
Mbulu (1= yes) 0.22 0.35 *** 0.10 0.11  
Kilosa (1= yes) 0.38 0.22 *** 0.32 0.28  
Mvomero (1= yes) 0.19 0.20  0.18 0.31 ** 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes: MTa = Test of difference between means of participants and non-participants: *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
bThe exchange rate at the time of the survey was about 1US$ = 1,500 TSh. 
 
 
Nonparticipants are located far from output markets compared to participants for both maize 
and pigeonpea. The summary statistics show that the main source of information is mobile 
phone for both maize and pigeonpea. About 47% and 42% of maize and pigeonpea market 
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participants indicate obtaining market information via mobile phones compared to 43% and 
31% who indicate their market information source to be extension services, respectively. 
 
5.2.4.2 Propensity score matching estimation results 
 
Prior to non-parametrically estimating the market participation impact, the propensity scores 
for treatment variable were estimated using a logit model. After estimating the propensity 
scores for the participant and non-participant groups the quality of the matching process was 
checked. Matching is impossible when there is no sufficient overlap between the treated and 
control groups (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Figure 5.1 gives the histograms of the 
estimated propensity scores for participants and non-participants for both maize and 
pigeonpea markets.  
 
(i) Maize market participation 
 
 (ii) Pigeonpea market participation 
Figure 5.1. Propensity score distribution and common support for propensity score estimation 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes: ‘‘Treated: on support’’ indicates the observations in the market participation group that have a suitable 
comparison. ‘‘Treated: off support’’ indicates the observations in the market participation group that do not 
have a suitable comparison. 
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score




A visual inspection of the density distributions of the estimated propensity scores for the two 
groups indicates that the common support condition is satisfied, as there is substantial overlap 
in the distribution of the propensity scores of both participant and non-participant groups, for 
both maize and pigeonpea. The bottom half of the graph shows the propensity scores 
distribution for the non-participants and the upper half refers to the participants. The densities 
of the scores are on the y-axis. 
 
As noted earlier, it is important to assess matching quality by checking the balance of 
distribution of relevant variables in the treated and the control groups. Table 5.3 below 
presents the results from covariate balancing tests before and after matching. The 
standardized mean difference for overall covariates used in the propensity score is reduced to 
about 6% and 4% after matching for both maize and pigeonpea, respectively. This 
substantially reduces total bias of 77% and 80% through matching for both maize and 
pigeonpea, respectively. The p-values of the likelihood ratio tests indicate that the joint 
significance of covariates was always rejected after matching, whereas it was never rejected 
before matching. The pseudo-R2 also dropped significantly after matching. The low pseudo-
R2, low mean standardized bias, high total bias reduction, and the insignificant p-values of 
the likelihood ratio test support the hypothesis that both groups have the same distribution in 
covariates x after matching.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggested that a remaining 
standardized bias of 20% would be advisable. These results suggest that the proposed 
specification of the propensity score is fairly successful in terms of balancing the distribution 
of covariates between the two groups. We therefore used these results to evaluate the effect of 
market participation among groups of households having similar observed characteristics. 
This allowed us to compare observed outcomes for participants with those of a comparison 
group sharing a common support. 
 


































24.87 5.54 77.74 






18.33  3.64  80.14 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
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Table 5.4 reports the estimates of the average impact estimated by nearest neighbor matching 
(NNM) and Kernel-based matching (KBM) methods. Both matching methods were used in-
order to check the robustness of the results. The results show that maize and pigeonpea 
market participation increases the proportion of consumption expenditure in the range of 
19.2-20.4% and 28.3-29.4% on average, respectively. This result is consistent with the 
previous findings indicating a positive relationship between market participation and higher 
levels of farm household welfare using PSM. Asfaw et al. (2012) in their study in the 
northern part of Tanzania showed that maize and pigeonpea market participation increases 
the proportion of consumption expenditure by 25% and 32% on average, respectively. 
Lubungu (2013) show that participation in cattle markets in Zambia raises per capita 
household income by about 52-64% on average. This show the role of market participation in 
improving the rural household welfare, whereby the resulting increase in farm income from 
market participation may facilitate the purchase of more farm inputs to intensify production 
and improve food security and poverty reduction among smallholder farmers. 
 
Table 5.4. The impact of market participation on consumption expenditure per capita 
using PSM methods 
Outcome variable Matching 
algorithm 






Log consumption expenditure per capita    
Maize NNM 12.533 12.329 0.204 (2.89)*** 
 KBM 12.522 12.329 0.192 (2.84) *** 
Pigeonpea NNM 12.518 12.235 0.283 (2.41) *** 
 KBM 12.489 12.194 0.294 (2.91) *** 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes: *** denote significance at 1% level. 
The number in brackets show bootstrapped t-value with 100 replication samples. 
NNM = single nearest neighbor matching with replacement and common support. 
KBM = kernel based matching with band width 0.06 and common support. 
 
5.2.4.3 Endogenous switching regression estimation results  
 
The coefficient estimates from the second stage of endogenous switching regression model 
(the consumption expenditure equation) for both maize and pigeonpea are presented in Table 
5.5. The first and second column presents the consumption expenditure functions for farm 
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households that did and did not participate in the market for the respective crop. The last 
rows give the estimates of the coefficients of correlation between the random errors in the 
system of equations. The estimated coefficient of correlation between the market 
participation equations and the consumption expenditure functions (ρj) are negative and 
significantly different from zero, for both maize and pigeonpea. This suggests that both 
observed and unobserved factors influence the decision to participate in market and welfare 
outcomes given the participation decision. The significance of the coefficient of correlation 
between the participation equation and the consumption expenditure of participants indicates 
that self-selection occurred in the maize and pigeonpea market participation decision. The 
result allows estimation with endogenous switching to control for the predicted probability of 
market participation in order to correct for a possible selection effect associated with 
unobserved factors that might simultaneously affect the participation and outcome decision. 
The results indicate that the differences in the consumption expenditure equation coefficients 
between the farm households that participated and that did not participate in the maize and 
pigeonpea market, illustrate the presence of heterogeneity in the sample. The consumption 
expenditure function of farm households that participated in the maize and pigeonpea markets 
are significantly different (at the 1% level) from the consumption expenditure function of the 
farm household that did not participate.  
 
Value of farm assets has a positive and significant influence on household consumption 
expenditure for both participants and non-participants households, in both maize and 
pigeonpea, but the effects are much bigger among participants. For maize, the elasticity 
coefficient reveals that a 1% increase in value of farm assets per AEU increases consumption 
expenditure per capita by 0.19% for market participants as compared to 0.11% for non-
participants. Similarly, for pigeonpea, a 1% increase in value of farm assets per AEU 
increases consumption expenditure per capita by 0.15% for market participants as compared 
to 0.07% for non-participants. The results demonstrate the critical role of assets holding in 





Table 5.5. Endogenous switching regression parameter estimates for household welfare 
Variables FIML endogenous switching regression 
Maize Pigeonpea 
Participation = 1 
(Participants) 




Participation = 0 
(Non-participants) 


































































Karatu - reference     
















































Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 Dependent variable: log consumption expenditure per capita. 
 
 
Age of the household head is significantly associated with an increase in the consumption 
expenditure per capita for pigeonpea market participants and non-participants.  Caglayan and 
Astar (2012) also find that age of the household head raises the consumption expenditure in 
Turkey. Education significantly affects the consumption expenditure of the farm households 
that participated in the maize market and those that did not participate in the pigeonpea 
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market. The result is consistent with the findings of Ogundari and Aromolaran (2013) in 
Nigeria, who found that an extra year of primary, secondary, tertiary, and postgraduate 
education of household head increases household consumption expenditure per capita by 
about 2.5%, 0.27%, 4.24%, and 0.19%, respectively. 
 
Farm size is significantly associated with an increase in the consumption expenditure per 
capita of the farm households that participated in the maize market and decrease in the 
consumption expenditure per capita of the farm households that did not participated in 
pigeonpea market. Similar results were also reported by Bozzoli and Brück (2009) in 
Mozambique, who found that a 10% increase in farm size leads to an almost 7% increase in 
household income per capita. This suggests that the increase in farm size may be associated 
with high maize and pigeonpea production and marketable surplus, hence improved 
household welfare.  
 
Moreover, access to off-farm income activities raises consumption expenditure per capita of 
the households that did not participate, in both maize and pigeonpea. Distance to market has a 
negative impact on consumption expenditure of the farm households that participated in the 
maize market and those that did not participate in the pigeonpea market. With regards to 
location-specific variables, and in comparison to households located in Karatu district, the 
households located in Mbulu district district had significantly less consumption expenditure 
per capita for households that participated in the maize market and increase in the 
consumption expenditure per capita for households that did not participated in maize market. 
The households in Kilosa district are significantly associated with an increase in the 
consumption expenditure per capita of the farm households that participated in the maize and 
pigeonpea market and non-maize market participants.  
 
Table 5.6 presents the expected household welfare outcome (i.e. consumption expenditure per 
capita) under actual and counterfactual conditions for maize and pigeonpea. The predicted 
consumption expenditure per capita from endogenous switching regression model was used 
to determine the mean consumption expenditure gap between participants and if they had not 
participated. The results indicate that the mean value of consumption expenditure per capita 
for maize and pigeonpea market participants is statistically higher than had they not been 
participants, which is consistent with the result from propensity score matching. The results 
show that maize and pigeonpea market participation increases consumption expenditure per 
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capita by about 23% and 26%, respectively. For non-participants, the mean consumption 
expenditure per capita would have been increased by 14% had they participated in maize 
market and by 23% had they participated in pigeonpea market.  It is also important to note 
that pigeonpea, which is a cash crop has higher impact than maize which is staple crop. Study 
by Asfaw et al. (2012) indicated that under actual and counterfactual conditions, maize and 
pigeonpea market participation increases consumption expenditure per capita by about 20% 
and 27%, respectively. These results imply that maize and pigeonpea market participation 
increased household welfare measured in terms of consumption expenditure per capita. The 
transitional heterogeneity effect of consumption expenditure in both maize and pigeonpea is 
positive implying that the effect is bigger for the farm household that did participate with 
respect to one that did not participate. 
 
Table 5.6. Average expected log consumption expenditure per capita; treatment and 
heterogeneity effects 
Sub-samples Decision stage Treatment effects  
To participate Not to participate 
(i) Maize    
Households that participated (a) 12.460 (c) 12.232 TT = 0.228 (6.25)*** 
Households that didn’t participate (d) 12.625 (b) 12.487 TU = 0.138 (4.54) *** 
Heterogeneity effects BH1 = -0.165 BH2 = -0.055 TH = 0.090 
(ii) Pigeonpea    
Households that participated (a) 12.561 (c) 12.304 TT = 0.257 (2.02) *** 
Households that didn’t participate (d) 12.478 (b) 12.244 TU = 0.234 (3.91) *** 
Heterogeneity effects BH1 = 0.083 BH2 = 0.06 TH = 0.023 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  





5.2.4.4 The welfare impacts of market participation level  
  
Table 5.7 presents the estimated parameters for determinants of household welfare. The 
results indicated that level of market participation, education, farm size, value of assets and 
geographical location are all statistically significant in influencing household welfare. The 
coefficient of the level of market participation was positive and significant for consumption 
expenditure per capita for both maize and pigeonpea. This implies that increase in the level of 
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market participation increases consumption expenditure per capita of maize and pigeonpea 
smallholder farmers. The positive effect of level of market participation on per capita 
consumption expenditure is also consistent with Awotide et al. (2013) in Nigeria. This 
suggests that improving smallholder farmers’ capacity to produce marketable surplus is a key 
mechanism for improving market participation and household welfare. 
 
Table 5.7. The determinants of household welfare: Ordinary least squares 
Variable Maize Pigeonpea 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Level of market participation 0.005** 0.002 0.003** 0.001 
Age  0.002 0.002 0.006* 0.003 
Gender  -0.018 0.088 0.075 0.138 
Education 0.033*** 0.010 0.018 0.013 
Labour  -0.001 0.015 0.040* 0.022 
Farm size per AEU  0.043*** 0.011 -0.039 0.024 
Log value of farm assets per AEU 0.161*** 0.019 0.077*** 0.025 
Distance to market -0.002 0.005 -0.008 0.006 
Access to off-farm income 0.063 0.076 -0.051 0.158 
Karatu - reference     
Mbulu  -0.155* 0.089 1.079** 0.405 
Mvomero 0.265** 0.093 0.124 0.120 
Kilosa 0.325*** 0.084 0.237** 0.102 
Constant 10.137*** 0.275 10.906*** 0.401 
Number of observations 663  253  
F(12,650)/(12,240) 15.52***  4.97***  
R-squared 0.223  0.207  
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
Dependent variable: log consumption expenditure per capita. 
 
 
5.2.4.5 Heterogeneous impacts 
 
To capture the heterogeneity of impact in different categories of farmers, the differential 
impact of market participation by categorizing households based on farm size, education 
level and level of participation was also examined. Table 5.8 shows that the gain in 
consumption expenditure is higher for households with smaller farm sizes for maize market 
participation.  This is in contrast to Asfaw et al. (2012), who found that gain in consumption 
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expenditure per capita of maize market participation is highest on the highest farm size. For 
education, the gain of consumption expenditure is highest on highest educational level 
quintiles (3 and 4) for both maize and pigeonpea market participation. Asfaw et al. (2012) 
also found that gain in consumption expenditure per capita is highest for educated household 
head for both maize and pigeonpea market participation. 
 
Table 5.8. Heterogeneous impact of market participation by farm size, education and 












Stratified by farm size 
1 166 0.076 (5.00) *** 64 0.014 (0.43) 
2 168 0.063 (5.01)*** 63 0.024 (0.52) 
3 166 0.052 (3.04) *** 65 0.013 (0.46) 
4 163 0.035 (1.35)  61 0.049 (1.77) * 
Stratified by education status 
1 166 0.041 (2.68) ** 64 0.031 ( 0.66) 
2 168 0.044 (3.62) *** 63 0.052 ( 0.55) 
3 166 0.061 (3.37) *** 65 0.104 (1.82) * 
4 163 0.047 (2.91) ** 61 0.201 (2.26) ** 
Stratified by level of market participation 
1 166 0.002 (1.10) 64 0.006 (3.04) *** 
2 168 0.003 (2.38)** 63 0.007 (5.75) *** 
3 166 0.005 (2.72)** 65 0.007 (3.84)*** 
4 163 0.007 (5.22)*** 61 0.011 (5.30) *** 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The number in brackets shows 




Similarly, per-capita consumption also increased with the level of market participation for 
both maize and pigeonpea market participation. This reflects the importance of marketable 
surplus in market participation and welfare outcome. These results suggest that more 
educated farmers and the poor might benefit more from market participation, and that 
providing farmers with basic education might enhance productivity and hence household 
food security and welfare. Also improving household capacity to produce marketable surplus 
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could increase market participation, food security and welfare. The next section presents the 
welfare impacts of market channel choice, which comprises the conceptual framework, 
econometric estimation, data and description of variables and empirical results and 
discussions. 
 
5.3 Welfare impacts of market channel choice 
5.3.1 The conceptual framework 
 
The conceptual framework used in this study adopts the sustainable livelihood approach. This 
framework (Figure 5.2) includes the following components: assets endowments, the context 
(policies, programs and institutions), markets, household livelihood strategies, and outcomes 
(measures of household welfare). For farm households, consumption expenditure is usually 
influenced by returns from agricultural production, which depend on asset ownership and 
capacity to produce and access a profitable market (Rao and Qaim, 2011).   
 
Asset endowments such as human, natural, physical and financial assets shape livelihood 
strategies (Ellis, 2000). Household decisions regarding asset use also determine outcomes 
such as household income, consumption and food security (Barrett et al., 2005). Given asset 
endowments, households make decisions regarding which crop(s) to grow, market 
participation and market channel choice. These decisions have a direct impact on the level of 
farm income and household welfare. Hence, smallholder farmers’ participation in sustainable 
and reliable market channels is one of the important strategies to improve farm household 
income and welfare (Fafchamps, 2004). 
 
Government policies, programs and institutions shape the behavior of economic agents and 
present the context. The context in which households operate helps determine the welfare-
generating potential of assets. Government policies also affect asset endowments, market 
access and market channel choice by smallholder farmers. For instance, policies that improve 
rural infrastructure can result in market access, market channel choice and reduce transaction 
costs by smallholder farmers that can have significant implications for household income 
transaction (Asmah, 2011).  Institutions  such as producer organizations play a big role in 
farmers’ market access and market channel choice by transmitting information, mediating 
transactions, reducing transaction costs, improving the efficiency of agricultural marketing 
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through bargaining with customers, providing inputs and technical assistance (World Bank, 
2008; Bijman and Wollni, 2008).  
 
Figure 5.2. Linking market channel choice and household welfare outcomes  
Source: Adapted from Nkala et al. (2011). 
 
 
The econometric estimation strategy used to study the effect of market channel choice on 
household welfare is presented in the following sub-section. 
 
5.3.2 The econometric estimation strategy 
 
In choosing marketing channels by smallholder farmers there may be self-selection, implying 
that farmers choose their marketing channel based on their own perception of benefits they 
get out of each marketing channel. Therefore in assessing the impact of marketing channel 
choice on per capita consumption expenditure at the farmer-level, unobserved characteristics 
may play an important role, especially self-selection often gives rise to endogeneity 
problems. The empirical strategy adopted to correct selection bias and to provide consistent 
estimates of welfare impacts of market channels involves the joint estimation of the 
endogenous multinomial treatment (i.e. channel choice) and an outcome equation (i.e. 
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consumption expenditure per capita), following the methodology proposed by Deb and 
Trivedi (2006a, 2006b).  
 
Specifically, the choice of marketing channel follows a mixed multinomial distribution was 
considered, which means that, the probability of observing farmer i in channel j (i.e. sij = si1, 
si2...siJ) can be described as 
 



















                                                              (5.17) 
 
Here, the likelihood of being assigned to channel sj depends on pre-determined characteristics 
zi (mainly socio-economic characteristics of the  thi  farmer) and latent factors lij with their 
respective factor loadings (δ), which represent the unobserved individual heterogeneity 
affecting the utility of selling in a given channel. 
 




lsxlxsyE   '),,|(                                                                (5.18) 
 
which is considered to be a linear function of a vector of control variables xi with the 
associated parameters β and  , a set of dummies denoting channel choice relative to the 
control group (s= brokers channel) and the latent factors lij, capturing the unobserved factors 
determining channel choice that also affect the final outcome. The associated factor loadings 
λj can be interpreted as selection terms, which reflect the correlation between the 
unobservable determinants of channel choice (relative to the base category) and welfare 
outcome. Assuming that the latent factors follow a standard normal distribution, the 
estimation of this joint model for channel choice and welfare outcome can be carried out 
using maximum simulated likelihood based on Halton Sequences, using the STATA routine 
“mtreatreg”. 
 
Given the nonlinear functional form of the multinomial equation, the parameters of this joint 
model for channel choice and welfare impacts can, in principle, be identified even if the 
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variables that appear in the two equations are identical, i.e. xi = zi (Deb and Trivedi, 2006a). 
The next sub-section presents the data collection procedure and description of variables used 
in the analysis. 
 
5.3.3 Data collection and description of the variables 
 
The analysis for this section relied on the same dataset of 562 selling transactions, made by 
372 households that participated in the market used in chapter four.  
 
Outcome variable 
The consumption expenditure adjusted by the number of adult equivalents (hereafter referred 
to as consumption expenditure per capita) was used as a proxy for household welfare 
indicator. The consumption expenditure data was collected for the preceding year covering a 
period of 12 months. This was collected using purchased items and the amount spent during 
each month and then aggregated to the annual level. The standard per capita consumption 
indicator of household welfare is based on food (household’s own consumption of home 
produced food + purchased food + aid or gift food) and non-food expenditure adjusted to 
adult equivalent.  
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in the selection equation of the endogenous multinomial logit 
treatment regression was market channels through which farmers sold their maize and 
pigeonpea during 2008/09 cropping season, namely: brokers, rural traders and wholesalers. 
For this analysis, brokers channel was made as a reference because this channel was chosen 
by most of the farmers to trade their maize and pigeonpea and was left out of the model to 
avoid the dummy variable trap (please refer to chapter four, section 4.5 for details). 
 
Independent variables  
The independent variables included to the estimations are summarized in Table 5.9. These 
include the household socio-economic characteristics and location characteristics. 
 
Household socio-economic characteristics  
The household socio-economic characteristics control variables used were age, gender, 
education, value of farm assets, access to off-farm and remittances. Age is expected to impact 
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positively on household welfare based on increased potential for higher income generation, 
better risk management skills through life experiences, improved asset endowment and 
enhanced portfolio of livelihood strategies (Caglayan and Astar, 2012). Male-headed 
households are expected to maintain higher levels of welfare than female-headed households. 
Social and cultural norms that may limit females’ access to critical farm resources (land, 
labor, and cash) could hinder the capacity of female-headed households to maintain welfare 
levels comparable with male-headed households (Ellis, 2000). As household heads are the 
main income earners in the household, education level of the household heads should be a 
critical factor in determining household welfare (Knight et al., 2011). Households with more 
education may have greater access to non-farm income and thus positively correlated with 
consumption per capita.  
 
The wealth status of household was controlled using value of farm assets and access to other 
sources of income such as off-farm and remittances. These are assumed to positively affect 
household welfare. Wealthier farmers with more farm assets and access to alternative sources 
of income such as off-farm and remittances are more likely to experience high expenditures 
(Chambers and Foster, 1983). Access to remittances has a significant impact on poverty 
reduction by increasing income, smoothing consumption and easing capital constraints of the 
poor (Jongwanich, 2007).  
 
Location characteristics 
The unobserved location-specific effects were controlled using distance to nearest market and 
district dummy variables. These variables were included in the model to capture differences 
in the household welfare conditions that might have arisen due to infrastructure, remoteness, 
production potential and resource endowment across districts. The dummy for Karatu district 
was made as a reference and was left out of the model to avoid the dummy variable trap. In 
addition, the same set of household socio-economic characteristics and location 
characteristics was included in the selection equation and the welfare outcome equation. The 





5.3.4 The empirical results and discussions 
5.3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 5.9 shows descriptive statistics of maize and pigeonpea sample households. For maize 
sample households, on average, the head of household is about 45 years old with five years of 
formal education. The producers selling to wholesalers have, on average, about two more 
years of formal schooling than those selling their maize to traders and brokers. On average, a 
higher proportion of sample households are male-headed households. The average value of 
farm assets was about 456,610 TSh.  
 
Table 5.9. Definitions and summary statistics of the variables used in the endogenous 
multinomial treatment model  
 
Variable 
Maize  Pigeonpea 
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Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Note: aThe exchange rate at the time of the survey was about 1 US$ = 1,500 TSh. 




Farmers that sell to wholesalers had relatively high value of farm assets (TSh. 674,210) than 
those who supplied to traders (TSh. 664,040) and brokers (TSh. 309,050). On average, about 
15% and 12% of sample households have access to off-farm income and remittances, 
respectively. The average distance to nearest market was about 4.7 km. Distance to nearest 
market is longer for farmers selling to brokers (6.8 km) as compared to farmers supplying to 
traders (4.3 km) and wholesalers (4.5 km). For pigeonpea sample households, on average, the 
head of household is about 47 years old with five years of formal education. On average, a 
higher proportion of sample households are male-headed households. The average value of 
farm assets was about 566,190 TSh. Farmers that sell to traders had relatively high value of 
farm assets than those who supplied to wholesalers and brokers. On average, about 22% and 
14% of sample pigeonpea households have access to off-farm income and remittances, 
respectively. The average distance to nearest market was about 5.3 km, whereby farmers 
selling to brokers are located far from markets compared to farmers supplying to traders and 
wholesalers. 
 
5.3.4.2 Marketed volumes and average price by marketing channel and timing of sale 
 
Table 5.10 presents maize and pigeonpea marketed volumes and average price by marketing 
channel and timing of sale.  Analysis show that 57% and 65% of maize and pigeonpea grain 
are sold immediately after harvest (i.e. 1-3 months after harvest), respectively, while the 
remaining volumes are sold 4-5 months after harvest. For maize, brokers accounted for 44% 
of the volume traded while rural traders accounted for 36% of the traded volume. Rural 
wholesalers accounted for 16% of the volume and consumers (i.e. farmers who are deficit 
producers) accounted for less than 5% of the volume of maize purchased from farmers. For 
pigeonpea, brokers accounted for 65% of the volume traded while rural traders accounted for 
22% of the traded volume. Rural wholesalers and consumers accounted for 12% and 1% of 
the traded volume, respectively. This shows that brokers and rural traders jointly control 
more than 80% of the maize and pigeonpea traded volumes. Considering that brokers are 
operating in often remote rural villages, and buy at farm-gate does not seem to be attractive 
for farmers to travel long distances for grain marketing. On average brokers offer the lowest 
price of the available channels for both maize and pigeonpea. 
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Table 5.10. Marketed volumes and average price by marketing channel and timing of 
sale  
Buyer Share (%) Average price 
(TSh/kg)a 
Std. dev. of 
price Sellers Volume 
Maize     
Sale immediately after harvest     
Consumers 1.23 0.73 205.34 34.35 
Brokers 33.06 25.38 203.42  39.03 
Rural traders 15.78  20.85 208.09 43.66 
Rural wholesalers 7.53  9.57 209.25     38.36 
Sale 4–5 months after harvest     
Consumers 2.04 3.61 323.68 49.32 
Brokers 21.00 19.03 322.58  103.01 
Rural traders 13.98 14.81 329.57 78.48 
Rural wholesalers 5.38 6.11  342.72  54.66 
Pigeonpea     
Sale immediately after harvest     
Consumers 1.01 1.21 735.27 287.45 
Brokers 43.90  39.62  733.09 253.40 
Rural traders 10.37 16.18 761.82 237.19 
Rural wholesalers 6.21  9.06 779.51 291.98 
Sale 4–5 months after harvest     
Consumers - - - - 
Brokers 22.11 25.10 746.47 210.33 
Rural traders 10.63 5.86  776.65 238.18 
Rural wholesalers 5.79 2.97 796.78 210.85 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Note: aThe exchange rate at the time of the survey was about 1 US$ = 1,500 TSh. 
 
 
Timing of marketing has impact on output price received by farmers. The price spread 
between the timing of sale showed that farmers who sell their maize and pigeonpea 4-5 
months after harvest they got higher prices than those who sell their entire produce 
immediately after harvest. Accordingly maize prices were quite low immediately after 
harvest (1-3 months), but higher during the intervening periods when local supply is limited. 
For example, farmers who are able to sell their maize 4–5 months after harvest received about 
TSh 119/kg, TSh 122/kg and TSh 134/kg more than those that sell immediately after harvest 
through brokers, rural traders and wholesalers, respectively. Similarly, farmers who are able 
to sell their pigeonpea 4–5 months after harvest receive an average of TSh 13/kg, TSh 15/kg 
and TSh 17/kg more than those that sell immediately after harvest through brokers, rural 
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traders and wholesalers, respectively. Therefore, farmers can benefit from higher prices by 
storing grain for some months after harvest. This however needs some sort of production and 
marketing groups that could exploit seasonal price differentials through temporal arbitrage 
involving bulking and storage.  
 
5.3.4.3 The econometric results   
 
The selectivity-corrected impact of market channel choice on consumption expenditure per 
capita resulting from the joint estimation of equations (5.17) and (5.18) for both maize and 
pigeonpea households are presented in Table 5.11. The test for exogeneity of the selection 
equation indicates that selection is not exogenous for both maize and pigeonpea, and hence 
that it is appropriate to use a two-stage estimation framework. The coefficient on the latent 
factor, lambda for traders and wholesalers channels are significantly negative for maize, 
suggesting that farmers who are more likely to choose traders and wholesalers channels 
relative to brokers channel, on the basis of their unobserved characteristics, have less 
consumption expenditure per capita. For pigeonpea, lambda coefficient is significantly 
positive in the case of traders channel suggesting that farmers who are more likely to choose 
traders channel relative to brokers channel, on the basis of their unobserved characteristics 
have more consumption expenditure per capita. 
 
The results indicate that, after controlling for selection on unobservable characteristics, there 
is a significant positive impact on consumption expenditure per capita of supplying to rural 
traders and wholesalers channels (as compared to the brokers channel) for both maize and 
pigeonpea. This implies that supplying to rural traders and wholesalers channel increases per 
capita consumption expenditure of smallholder farmers relative to brokers channel for both 
maize and pigeonpea farm households. This confirms the role of formal channels in 
improving the welfare of smallholder farmer as compared to informal channels such as 
brokers. These findings are in line with other studies that have analyzed welfare effects of 
market channel choice in agrifood supply chain (e.g. Vandeplas et al., 2011; Rao and Qaim, 
2011; Falkowski et al., 2008; Miyata et al., 2009). Vandeplas et al. (2011) found that farmers 
that supply to informal channels are less efficient and earn less profit per dairy animal than 
farmers supplying the cooperative and the multinational sector. Rao and Qaim (2011) found 
that participation in supermarket channels is associated with a 48% gain in average household 
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income, which also contributes to poverty reduction in rural Kenya. Although the rural 
traders and wholesalers channel demonstrated that they have significant impact on 
smallholder farmers’ welfare but also associated with transaction costs that can hinder 
majority of smallholder farmers to sale through this channel (Sitko and Jayne, 2014). Yet, the 
majority of smallholder farmers are unable to produce sufficient quantities to make it 
attractive to arrange their own transport to these more distant buyers. Interventions that 
reduce transaction costs and enhance capacity of smallholder farmers to produce surplus 
production could improve income and welfare of rural households. 
 
Table 5.11. The impact of market channel choice on consumption expenditure per-
capita 
Variable Maize Pigeonpea 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Market channel choice     
Traders channel 0.338** 0.137 0.346* 0.199 
Wholesalers channel 0.230* 0.131 0.268** 0.137 
Household socio-economic 
characteristics     
log(age)  -0.102 0.134 0.193 0.200 
Gender  0.120 0.141 -0.103 0.087 
log(education)  0.087 0.098 0.405** 0.143 
log(value of farm assets) 0.229*** 0.028 0.125** 0.063 
Access to off-farm 0.120 0.173 0.085 0.136 
Access to remittances 0.231 0.205 0.012* 0.007 
Location characteristics     
log(distance to nearest market) 0.035 0.070 -0.001 0.120 
Karatu district - reference     
Mbulu district  -0.103* 0.056 0.020 0.187 
Kilosa district  0.165 0.113 0.037 0.121 
Mvomero district  0.044 0.133 -0.146** 0.060 
Constant 9.818*** 0.676 11.333*** 0.951 
Number of observations 305  148  
lnsigma -0.834** 0.342 -0.848 0.357 
Lambdatraders -0.364*** 0.122 0.507*** 0.161 
Lambdawholesalers  -0.441** 0.166 0.120 0.100 
LR-test exogeneity of selection equation 4.240  52.661  
P-value LR-test 0.000  0.000  
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes: Base category is brokers channel. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
The dependent variable is log consumption expenditure per capita. 
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Among the control variables, education, value of farm assets, remittances and location 
dummies variables are found to have statistically significant positive influence in per capita 
consumption expenditure. Value of farm assets was significant and positively related to per 
capita consumption expenditure for both maize and pigeonpea households. Remittances have 
a positive impact on per capita expenditure for pigeonpea households. In terms of 
geographical locations and in comparison to households located in Karatu district, the results 
show that households located in Mbulu and Mvomero districts had significantly less per 
capita consumption expenditure for maize and pigeonpea, respectively. This implies that 
maize households in Mbulu and pigeonpea households in Mvomero tend to be consumption 




This chapter analyzed the impacts of maize and pigeonpea market participation, and channel 
choice on household welfare measured by consumption expenditure per capita. Propensity 
score matching and endogenous switching regression techniques were employed to estimate 
the welfare impact of market participation for binary treatment, while linear regression was 
employed to analyze the welfare impact of level of market participation. The results from 
both the propensity score matching and switching regression were consistent and indicated 
that maize and pigeonpea market participation has a significant positive impact on 
consumption expenditure per capita. The results also indicated that the level of market 
participation for both maize and pigeonpea has a significant positive impact on consumption 
expenditure per capita. These confirm the role of market participation and level of 
participation in improving rural household welfare. This chapter further indicated that market 
channel choice have significant positive impact on household welfare, which are in line with 
other studies that have analyzed welfare effects of market channel choice in agrifood supply 
chain. The estimation results further show that supplying to rural traders and wholesalers 
channels has a significant positive effect on consumption expenditure per capita for both 
maize and pigeonpea households relative to brokers. This implies that rural traders and 
wholesalers channels (i.e. formal channel) are beneficial to smallholder farmers if they can 
access them as compared to brokers (i.e. informal channel). Policies aimed at improving 
market access such as improved rural infrastructure for reducing the transaction costs, and 
household capacity to produce marketable surplus stand out as critical to improve household 
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market participation and welfare. This study also suggests that policies and programs that 
support inclusion of smallholder farmers in more profitable markets could improve household 
welfare and reduce poverty among rural households. The next chapter presents the 
conclusions drawn from all the empirical findings, the key policy recommendations and areas 




CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Re-capping the purpose of the study 
 
Considering that agriculture remains a major sector in the attainment of economic growth for 
most sub-Saharan Africa economies including Tanzania, commercialization of the sector 
requires improving the ability of smallholder farmers to participate in markets to improve 
their incomes and create wealth. Thus, markets and improved market access play an 
important role in improving rural incomes of smallholder farmers. However, participation of 
smallholder farmers in markets in most sub-Saharan African countries remains low due to a 
range of constraints, such as high transaction costs. Transaction costs due to distance to 
market, poor infrastructure, and lack of market information make access to markets difficult 
and market participation less profitable. They also result in under-use of profitable market 
channels by smallholder farmers. Overcoming these constraints requires an understanding of 
the factors influencing smallholder famers’ market participation and profitable channel 
choice. In sub-Saharan Africa, there is a high potential for smallholders to derive livelihoods 
from market-oriented agriculture. It is widely acknowledged that the involvement of small 
farmers in mainstream markets can contribute to higher productivity and income growth, 
which, in turn, can enhance food security, poverty reduction efforts, and overall economic 
growth.  
 
Following agricultural market liberalization, smallholder farmers have alternative market 
channels for selling their agricultural produce. These market channels offer different prices 
and sales services, which determine farmers’ choices of the more profitable channel and 
impact on household income and welfare outcome. Considering the role of market 
participation and channel choice in improving rural incomes of smallholder farmers, there is a 
need to unpack the factors that influence them and the welfare impacts therein. However, 
very few studies have empirically investigated the factors influencing market participation 
and welfare impacts by smallholder farmers in Tanzania. Furthermore, no empirical study so 
far has been done on the factors influencing the choice of marketing channel and welfare 




This study was, therefore, an attempt to address these knowledge gaps and to draw relevant 
policy implications to improve smallholder market participation and rural household welfare. 
Specifically, the study pursued the following objectives: (i) identify the factors that influence 
farmers’ decision to participate and intensity of their participation in maize and pigeonpea 
markets; (ii) examine the factors affecting the choice of market channels by smallholder 
farmers; and (iii) assess the impact of market participation and channel choice on household 
welfare. 
 
Various conceptual and empirical models were employed to address the objectives. The 
Heckman procedure was employed in chapter three to analyze the factors that influence 
household decisions to participate in maize and pigeonpea markets and the intensity of 
participation. Multinomial logit model was employed in chapter four to analyze the factors 
influencing the choice of market channels identified in the study (brokers, rural traders and 
wholesalers). In chapter five, propensity score matching and endogenous switching 
regression techniques were employed to estimate the welfare impact of market participation 
for binary treatment, while linear regression was used to analyze the welfare impact of the 
level of market participation by maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers, measured by per 
capita consumption expenditure. Linear regression was adopted after solving the endogeneity 
problem between consumption expenditure per capita and level of market participation, 
which involves the use of predicted values of the potentially endogenous variables as 
instrumental variables in the estimation of the truly endogenous variables. Multinomial 
endogenous treatment framework was also applied in chapter five to analyze the welfare 
impact of market channel choice.  This involves the joint estimation of the endogenous 
multinomial treatment (i.e. channel choice) and welfare outcome equation (i.e. consumption 
expenditure per capita), while correcting for the selection bias. 
 
The purpose of this last chapter is to provide the conclusions drawn from the key findings of 
the study, make policy recommendation and suggest areas for further research. The sections 








Based on the empirical findings in chapter three, the significance of farm size implies that 
land is a critical production asset, having a direct effect on the production of a marketable 
surplus, therefore, the larger the farm size, the more it allows the household to have 
marketable surplus to sell. Furthermore, mean village prices were found as an incentive for 
farmers to sell. Estimated price elasticity for pigeonpea was found to be higher compared to 
maize, suggesting that pigeonpea prices were found to provide significant incentives for 
increased sales volume for smallholder farmers. It can be concluded that households with 
more labour supply have higher probability of market participation and marketed surplus. 
Considering the labour demand for crop production, this can affect the amount of maize and 
pigeonpea produced in the household which can also affect marketed surplus. 
 
The results revealed that farmers located far from markets are less likely to participate in 
markets probably because of the high transaction costs involved in accessing markets. The 
results suggest that access to means of transport lowers the transaction costs, thereby 
enhancing market participation. Furthermore, access to communication assets has a great 
impact on market participation, suggesting that access to information is likely to result in 
increased agricultural output and improved market participation. Farmer associations play a 
significant role in market participation and intensity of participation as they are found to be 
good platforms for exchanging information, enabling farmers to link to buyers at a lower cost 
and thereby lowering the fixed transaction costs of market participation.  
 
Furthermore, male-headed households participated more in the market, possibly because 
female-headed households are resource-constrained, lacking access to productive assets (such 
as land and finance) which limits their production capabilities and market participation. The 
positive impact of education implies that advancement in education increases ability to obtain 
and process market information, hence market participation. The impact of geographic 
location of households on market participation is directly attributed to differences in the 
physical infrastructure, especially the quality of roads and communication. It may also be 
affected by other factors such as differences in agro-climatic conditions necessary for 
production of agricultural crops. In particular, households located in high potential and 
relatively good physical infrastructure areas were found to be more likely to participate in 
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markets and be able to produce more marketable surplus compared to the low potential and 
relatively remote areas.  
 
The empirical results from chapter four established that transaction costs (such as lack of 
market information, greater distance to market and poor road infrastructure to market) reduce 
smallholder farmers’ opportunity to access distant and profitable market channel, such as 
wholesalers. As regards the household wealth, it was found that relatively wealthier farmers 
are more likely to sell to wholesalers in more distant markets, possibly because they are better 
able to meet transport and other costs incurred in selling through this channel. Farmers were 
able to access traders and wholesalers market channels when they are members in farmers’ 
associations/groups. Farmers’ associations/groups may increase access to information critical 
to production and marketing decisions and can also contribute towards reduced transaction 
costs and strengthen farmers’ bargaining power. Access to extension services and credit are 
important in increasing the ability of farmers to acquire relevant price information and related 
production information which, in turn, increases production and farmer’s ability to choose the 
profitable market channel. Extension services are also expected to facilitate smallholder 
linkages with input and output markets. Therefore, access to extension services may thus be 
associated with higher market participation and the likelihood of choosing profitable market 
channel. The positive, significant effect for trust suggested that farmers’ degree of trust 
towards buyers is important in choosing market channel since higher levels of trust reduce the 
perception of risk and hence transaction costs in an exchange relationship. 
 
The empirical results from chapter five revealed that maize and pigeonpea market 
participation have significant positive impact on rural household welfare. The key message 
drawn from the results is that market participation plays a crucial role in improving food 
security and poverty alleviation among smallholder farmers. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
specifically in Tanzania, where the majority of the population relies on agriculture for their 
livelihood, smallholder farmers can turn their surpluses into income only if they have access 
to markets. Increased incomes, in turn, increase food security and help to alleviate poverty. 
Furthermore, the level of market participation has a significant positive impact on household 
welfare for both maize and pigeonpea. This implies that the level of market participation for 
both maize and pigeonpea increases per capita consumption expenditure of smallholder 
farmers in rural Tanzania. The heterogeneous impact of market participation based on farm 
size, education level and level of market participation shows that gain in consumption 
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expenditure per capita from market participation is highest for those household heads with 
better access to education. Although there are significant consumption expenditure per capita 
gains in all quintiles of farm size for maize, the gain is higher for households with smaller 
farm sizes. Consumption expenditure per capita also increased with the level of market 
participation for both maize and pigeonpea. This implies that market participation is likely to 
benefit the poor and those with better education.  
 
The welfare impact of market channel choice revealed that selling to rural traders and 
wholesale has a positive and significant effect on consumption expenditure per capita relative 
to brokers, for both maize and pigeonpea. This confirms the role of formal channels in 
increasing income for smallholder farmers. Selling to rural traders and wholesale channels 
can reduce the number of intermediaries and make farmers to realize the benefits of their 
produce. Although rural traders and wholesale channels have significant positive impact on 
smallholder farmers’ welfare but also associated with transaction costs that can hinder the 
majority of smallholder farmers from selling through this channel. Yet, the majority of 
smallholder farmers are unable to produce sufficient quantities to make it attractive to arrange 
their own transport to these more distant buyers.   
 
Regarding the research hypotheses, the research findings suggest that the null hypotheses of 
the study outlined in Section 1.4 of Chapter 1 should be rejected.   
Hypothesis (i): Farmers with better access and endowment to assets (wealth) do not 
participate in the market. This hypothesis should be rejected because, the results from 
Heckman selection model showed that access to assets (such as land, transport and 
communication assets) have a significant impact on market participation among maize and 
pigeonpea smallholder farmers. The determinants of the intensity of maize and pigeonpea 
outputs included farm size and productive assets. 
Hypothesis (ii): Transaction costs do not influence smallholder farmers’ market participation 
and channel choice. This hypothesis should be rejected because, the results from Heckman 
and Multinomial logit models showed that transaction costs have a significant impact on 
market participation and channel choice among maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers. 
Hypothesis (iii): Market participation and channel choice do not influence household welfare. 
Empirical analysis from Propensity score matching (PSM) and Multinomial endogenous 
treatment model suggests that this hypothesis should be rejected because, market 
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participation and channel choice were found to have a positive impact on household welfare 
among maize and pigeonpea smallholder farmers. 
 
6.3 Policy Recommendations 
 
The role of proportional transaction cost variables (such as distance and quality of road) to 
hinder market access and choice of a profitable channel suggests that providing better access 
to markets by improving rural road infrastructure could be an important policy intervention. 
Improving rural road infrastructure would also lead to more traders penetrating the rural areas 
and this will increase competition and could benefit smallholder farmers through better prices 
and enabling them to take advantage of profitable market channels such as wholesalers.  
 
The empirical findings suggest that improving access to market information through 
appropriate sources and making them easier to access could lower the transaction costs 
associated with searching for trading partners, contracting and enforcing the contract among 
smallholder farmers and enhancing market participation. Policies geared towards enabling 
farmers to access and utilize telecommunication technologies (such as mobile phones) for 
trade purposes should be supported. The utilization of these technologies would lower 
transaction costs, and thus, enhance market participation. Use of communication and 
information technologies offers exciting new opportunities to smallholder farmers and 
presents an opportunity to resolve the market information problems commonly encountered 
in Tanzania. By facilitating the rapid and timely exchange of knowledge and information, 
they accelerate the spread of improved technologies within rural communities and help get 
up-to-date market information.  
 
The importance of local collective action organizations (such as farmer groups/associations) 
in influencing market participation, marketable surplus and profitable market channel choice, 
call for appropriate policies to strengthening establishment and existence of farmer 
groups/associations which can act as platforms for smallholders’ technology and information 
exchange, enhancing bargaining capacities and trust between farmers and buyers, especially 
in areas where infrastructure is weak. Collective action organizations are also critical factor in 
enabling farmers’ access to production assets (such as tractors, machinery and vehicles to 
transport produce to market). However, there is a need for policies and programs that support 
121 
 
inclusion of smallholder farmers in more profitable marketing channels. This can be done 
through supporting the development and strengthening of functional, effective and 
sustainable farmer production and marketing groups, which could reduce transaction costs, 
improve collective action and rural household welfare. Moreover, institutional support from 
different stakeholders (such as NGOs and government organizations) could improve market 
participation among smallholder farmers. This can be done through designing appropriate 
institutional support programs that could better link smallholder farmers to markets such as 
public–private partnerships. For instance, the public sector may provide the physical 
infrastructure and market linkage services could be offered by private agents. 
 
Policies and interventions which support smallholders’ asset building and wealth creation 
should be encouraged. Such policies could target enhancing productivity and market 
participation. Policies that improve farm households’ access to assets enhance smallholders’ 
productivity and capacity to produce marketable surplus and result in better market 
participation and profitable market channel choice. Such policies could involve designing 
appropriate property right regimes that enable smallholders acquire, own and transfer 
production assets. 
 
Improvement of human capital appears to be crucial in smallholder market participation, 
marketed supply and welfare effects. Improved human capital that complements other forms 
of capital can increase agricultural productivity which is often considered as an engine for 
economic growth and rural development, especially in developing countries. The importance 
of market participation to more educated households suggests that providing farmers with 
basic education might enhance productivity, market participation and household welfare. 
Moreover, increased targeting of women for market participation may increase the impact of 
policy interventions focused on improved market access and welfare of rural households. 
Providing sustainable support to women, who supply more than 70% of agricultural labour in 
sub-Saharan Africa, will be a critical element of any new smallholder-led development effort. 
When women obtain the same level of education, experience, farm inputs and market 
information as men, they produce significantly higher yields in a range of farming systems 




Household capacity to produce marketable surplus stand out as critical to improve household 
market participation, level of participation and welfare. New innovations and technologies 
that target increased agricultural productivity should be promoted. In addition, the 
government should also consider advances in knowledge through training in farm production 
and farm business management for increased productivity, market participation and 
household welfare. The next section highlights the limitations of the study and makes 
suggestions for further research. 
 
6.4 Limitations of the study and suggestions for future research 
 
In the pursuit of this thesis, several limitations became apparent. Firstly, in this study, welfare 
impacts of market participation and profitable market channel choice are analyzed using 
cross-section data that were available. The results from cross-section data, however, have 
limitations in giving a general and robust picture of the move towards welfare effects. In this 
regard, the impact of market participation and profitable channel choice on household welfare 
can be analyzed more effectively using panel data.  The main advantage of panel data, 
compared to a single cross-section is that it allows one to control for temporally persistent 
differences among individuals that in many instances may bias estimates obtained from cross-
sections (Hsiao, 1986). Panel data treat individual firms, states or countries as heterogeneous. 
Cross-section studies are not adequately capable of controlling for this heterogeneity and run 
the risk of obtaining biased results (Klevmarken, 1989). Using panel data in future research in 
the areas of measuring welfare impacts of market participation and profitable channel choice 
can provide further insight on the relationship between market participation, channel choice 
and household welfare. This is achieved because panel data can control for unobserved 
specific heterogeneity, provide more robust evidence and enable the researcher see whether 
the results persist over time.  
 
Secondly, one of the set of variables that seemed to be significant in determining market 
participation and market channel choice was transaction cost variables. Considering that 
transaction costs are “hidden costs”, quantifying them can be a challenge. This study only 
captures variables relating to transaction costs but falls short of quantifying them. Future 
research that attempts to quantify transaction costs for better observations and inference 
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should be considered. This may involve quantifying actual costs incurred in searching for 
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PART 0: INTERVIEW BACKGROUND  
 
1. Respondent’s name:.............................................................................................................. 
 
2. Mobile phone No……………………..…… Landline phone no............................................... 
 
3.   Date of interview: Day:…..………       Month:..........................     Year:…….………... 
 
4. Interviewed by (enumerator’s name):…................................................................................ 
 
5. Date checked: Day:……..………       Month:..........................     Year:………..…….. 
 
6. Checked by (supervisor’s name) ........................................................................................... 
 
7. Date entered:   Day:……………       Month:..........................     Year:…...…………. 
 
8. Entered by:……………….……............................................................................................ 
 
9. Zone............................................................. 10. Region..................................................... 
 
10. District:…..……………….…..….….………. 13. Division ………..…………………………. 
 
11. Ward .......................................................... 15. Village..................................................... 
 
 
PART 1: FARMERS IDENTIFICATION AND VILLAGE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1. Major family language …………..................................................................................  
2. Religion of the household head (Codes A)................. 
3. Does main residential house have the following inbuilt? (Codes B)   1. Kitchen…………… 2. Grain 
store............; 3. Livestock pen………………………. 
4. Type of toilet used .............................................1. Flash toilet private; 2. Flash toilet shared;   3. Pit latrine 
private; 4. Pit latrine shared; 5. Bucket latrine; 6. No toilet/use open air 
5. Main walling material of main residential house……………………………………………………...(Codes C) 
6. Main roofing material of main residential house……………………………………..…………….. (Codes D) 
150 
 
7. Experience in growing maize (years)…………………………………………..……………………………….. 
8. Experience in growing legumes (years) Haricot bean..................... Soybean……....….. 
Pigeonpea……………. Groundnut…..…… Cowpea…………. (Other, specify name) .............................Years 
of experience……............ 
9. Taking all means into consideration (own food production + food purchase + help from different sources + 
food   hunted from forest and lakes, etc), how would you define your family’s food consumption in the last 
year?.........   1. Food shortage through the year, 2. Occasional food shortage, 3. No food shortage but no surplus,  
     4. Food surplus. 
10. Distance to the village market from residence (km) ...................minutes of walking time ................................ 
11. What means of transport do you use mainly to get to the village market? (Code E)……………………….…..  
12. Average single trip transport cost (per person) to the village market using this means of transport 
(TSh/person)……………………... 
13. Distance to the nearest main market from residence (km)…….…..………..minutes of walking 
time……...……....…… 
14. Number of months road to main market is passable for cars in a 
year................................................................... 
15. Quality of road to the main market………………………….1= Very poor; 2= Poor; 3= Average; 4=Good; 
5= Very good 
16. Average single transport cost (per person) to the main market using a car 
(TSh/person)....................................... 
17. Distance to the nearest source of seed dealer from residence (km) ...............................minutes of walking 
time …………………........ 
18. Distance to the nearest source of fertilizer dealer from residence (km) ................................minutes of 
walking time …………………...... 
19. Distance to nearest source of herbicides and pesticides from residence (km).............................…minutes of 
walking time .......................................... 
20. Distance to the nearest farmer cooperative from residence (km)……………………..……minutes of walking 
time ................................... 




22. Distance to the nearest agricultural extension office from residence (km)……………………….minutes of 
walking time……………………....… 
23. Distance to the nearest health center from residence (km)………………………….…minutes of walking 
time…..…………….…….. 
24. Main source of drinking water………………………………………………………………...(Codes F below) 
25. Do you boil water for drinking?........................................................................................................ (Codes B) 
26. Distance to main water source for drinking from residence (km)…………………..……minutes of walking 
time…………………..….. 
27. GPS readings of village: a) Altitude.......................................; b) Latitude……………………….………;  
c) Longitude……………………………… 
Codes A: 0. No religion/atheist; 1. Orthodox Christian; 2. Catholic; 3. Protestant; 4. Other Christian 5. Muslim; 6. Other, specify…………. 
Codes B: 1. Yes: 0.No 
Codes C: 1. Burned bricks; 2. Unburned bricks; 3. Stone; 4. Earth; 5. Wooden (timber); 6. Other, specify……………..…...…… 
Codes D: 1. Grass thatch; 2. Iron sheet; 3. Tiles; 4. Other, specify……………………………………………………………….… 
Codes E: 1. Walking; 2. Bicycle; 3. Tractor; 4. Minibus;   5. Other, specify……………………………………………………… 
Codes F: 1. Piped; 2. Borehole protected and covered; 3. Borehole unprotected & uncovered; 4. Stream; 5. River; 6. Lake;  












Name of household 












































For those under the age of 6 (see 
column 5) 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
01             
02             
03             
04             
05             
06             
07             
08             
09             
10             
11             
12             
13             
14             






1. Married living with 
spouse 
2. Married but spouse away 
3. Divorced/separated 
4. Widow/widower 
5. Never married 
6. Other, specify…… 
Codes C 
0. None/Illiterate  
1. Adult education or 
1 year of education 
* Give other 
education in years 
completed 
Codes D 




5. Son/daughter in-law 
6. Grand child 
7. Other relative 
8. Hired worker 
9. Other, specify…… 
Codes E 
1. Farming (crop + livestock) 
2. Salaried employment 
3. Self-employed off-farm 
4. Casual labourer on-farm 
5. Casual labourer off-farm 
6. School/college child 
7. Non-school child  
8. Herding 
9. Household chores 















PART 3: SOCIAL CAPITAL AND NETWORKING 
Section A: Membership in formal and informal institutions in the last 3 years (husband and 
wife/wives only. One group membership per row) 
Family 
code 
Type of group the 
husband/wife is/was a 
member of: 
(codes A) 












If No in column 8, reason/s 
for leaving the group 
(codes E), Rank 3 
1st 2nd 3rd 
1st 2nd 3rd 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
           
           
           
           
           
Codes A 
1. Input supply/farmer coops/union 
2. Crop/seed producer and 
marketing group/coops 
3. Local administration 
4. Farmers’ Association 
5. Women’s Association 
6. Youth Association 
7. Church/mosque 
association/congregation 
8. Saving and credit group 
 
9. Funeral association 
10. Government team 





1. Produce marketing 
2. Input access/marketing 
3. Seed production 
4. Farmer research group 
5. Savings and credit 
6. Funeral group 
7. Tree planting and nurseries 
8. Soil & water conservation 
9. Church group/congregation 
10. Input credit 









1. Left because 
organization was not 
useful/profitable 
2. Left because of poor 
management 
3. Unable to pay annual 
subscription fee 






Section B: Social networks 
1. Number of years the respondent has been living in this village 
……................................................................. 
 
2. Number of people that you can rely on for critical support in times of need within this village  
    Relatives....................................................... Non-Relatives................................................................. 
 
3. Number of people you can rely on for support in times of need outside this village 
    Relatives…………………..………………….. Non-Relatives ........................................................... 
 
4. Are any of your friends/ relatives in leadership positions in formal/informal institutions? 
    ................................    Codes: 1. Yes, 0. No 
 
5. Number of grain traders that you know in this village who could buy your 
grain………………………   
 




7. Generally speaking, would you say that most traders can be trusted?.............................(Codes A 
below)  
 
8. If answer in Question 7 above is 1, 2 or 3, then which types of traders do you trust  more? – give 
names .……………………………………………………………………..……………………….……  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 





9. Do you think you can rely on government support (subsidies, food aid etc) if your crop 
fails?................................Codes: 1.Yes; 0. No 
 
10. Are you confident of the skills of government officials including extension workers to do their 
job?...................................(Codes A) 




PART 4: HOUSEHOLD ASSETS 





If you would sell one of the [….] 
how much would you receive 
from the sale? (TSh) 
Total Value 
1 2 3 4 5= 2*4 
1. Horse/mule cart     
2. Donkey cart     
3. Horse/Mule saddle     
4. Push cart     
5. Ox-plough     
6. Sickle     
7. Pick Axe     
8. Axe     
9. Hoe/Jembe     
10. Knapsack sprayer     
11. Water carrier made of 
canvass/skin/inner tire tube 
    
12. Stone grain mill     
13. Motorized grain mill     
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14. Water mill     
15. Mechanical water pump (hand, 
foot) 
    
16. Motorized water pump (diesel)     
17. Spade or shovel     
18. Radio, cassette or CD player     
19. Cell phone     
20. Improved charcoal/wood stove     
21. Kerosene stove     
22. Bicycle     
23. Motorbike     
24. Cars     
25. picks-ups     
26. trucks      
27.tractors     
28.trailers     
29. Jewellery: gold, silver, 
wristwatches 
    
30. Wooden box     
31 Metal box     
32. Leather bed     
33. Wooden bed     
34. Metal bed     
35. TV     
36. Chairs/sofa     
37. Table     
38. Gun     
39. Grass roofed house     
40. Corrugated iron sheet house     
41.Fish pond     
42.     
43.     
44.     






Section B:  Land holding (acres) during the 2008/2009 cropping year (last cropping year) 
Land category 









1 2 3 4 5 
1. Own land used (A)     
2. Rented in land (B)     
3. Rented out land (C)     
4. Borrowed  in land (D)     
5. Borrowed out land (E)     
6. Total owned land (A+C+E)     
7. Total operated land (A+B+D)     
8. Bought land during long rain season      
9. Sold land during long rain season     




PART 5: CROP PRODUCTION, UTILIZATION AND FOOD SECURITY 







Stock before 2008/09 
harvest (kg) 
Production (Total 
harvest in kg) during 
2008/09 
 
Total available stock after 
2008/09 harvest 
=Column 4 +5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Codes A 
1. Maize 












Part 5 (contd) 





If total available stock of 
2008/09 was not sufficient 
for consumption until 

































7 8 9 10 11 12=6-7-8-9-10-11 13 14 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Codes A 
1. Maize 











PART 6: MARKETING OF CROPS  







































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
Codes A 
1. Farmgate 
2. Village market 

























1. Farmer group 
2. Farmer Union or Coop 
3. Consumer or other farmer  
4. Rural assembler  
5. Broker/middlemen 
6. Rural grain trader 
7. Rural wholesaler 
8. Urban wholesaler 
9. Urban grain trader 
10. Exporter,  




Part 6 (contd) 




Sales tax or 
charges (TSh) 
Time taken to sell 
crop 
(minutes) 
Time taken to get 







11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Codes E 
1. No relation but not a long time buyer 
2. No relation but a long term buyer 
3. Relative 
4. Friend 
5. Money lender  
6. Other, specify…… 
Codes F 
1. Below average 
2. Fair and Average 




2. Hired truck 
3. Public transport 
4. Donkey 
5. Oxen/horse cart 
6. Back/head load 




PART 7: TRANSFER AND OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME DURING 2008/09 
CROPPING YEAR 
[If several household members earn the same income source, fill according to the earning 

















Amount per unit 
(Cash & in-kind) 
Total income (cash 
& in-kind) Total 
income 









1 2 4 5 6 7 8= 5*6 9= 5*7 10= 8+9 
1. Rented/sharecropped out 
land         
2. Rented out oxen for 
ploughing         
3. Salaried employment          
4. Farm labour wages          
5. Non-farm labour wages         
6. Non-farm agribusiness 
NET income (e.g. grain 
milling/trading) 
        
7. Other business NET 
income (shops, trade, tailor, 
sales of beverages etc) 
        
8. Pension income         
9. Drought/flood relief         
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10.Safety net  or food for 
work         
11. Remittances (sent from 
non-resident family and 
relatives living elsewhere) 
        
12. Marriage Gifts         
13. Sales of firewood, brick 
making, charcoal making, 
poles etc 
        
14. Sale of maize crop 
residues  
        
15. Sale of legumes crop 
residues 
        
16. Sale of wheat crop 
residues 
        
17. Sale of teff crop residues         
18. Sale of other crop 
residues 
        
19. sale of hay         
20. Quarrying stones         
21. Sale of dung cake         
22.Rental property (other 
than land) 
        
23.         
24.         




PART 8: ACCESS TO FINANCIAL CAPITAL, INFORMATION AND 
INSTITUTIONS 
Section A:  Household credit need and sources during 2008/09 cropping year 




If Yes in 
column 2, 
then did 
you get it? 
Codes A 
If NO in column 3, 
then why not? 
Rank 3 (codes C) 
 
 
If Yes in column 3... 
 


























at end of 
season 
(TSh) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Buying seeds           
2. Buying fertilizer           
3. Buy herbicide and 
pesticides  
          
4. Buy farm 
equipment/implements  
          




6. Buy oxen for traction           
7. Buy other livestock            
8. Invest in irrigation 
system 
          
9. Invest in seed drill or 
minimum tillage system 
          
10. Non-farm business 
or trade 
          
11. To pay land rent           
12. Buy food           
13. Consumption needs 
(health/education/travel
/tax, etc) 
          



















1. Borrowing is risky 
2. Interest rate is high 
3. Too much paper 
work/ procedures 
 
4. Expected to be rejected, so 
did not try it 
5. I have no asset for 
collateral 
6. No money lenders in this 
area for this purpose 
 
7. Lenders don’t provide 
the amount needed 
8. No credit association 
available 
9. Other, specify……… 
 
 
Section B: Household savings 
Saving family member  
(1=Husband; 0=Wife) 




Total amount saved  
during 2008/09 (TSh) 
1 2 3 5 
    
    
    
    
    
Codes A 
1. Saving at home (personal)  
2. Commercial or other banks 
 
3. Rural micro-finance 
4. SACCO (credit society) 
 
5. Merry go-round 
6. M-Pesa 
 
7. Saving by lending to money lender 
8. Other, specify………….… 
 
 
Section C: Access to extension services  
Issue 











Main information source 
for 2008/09 
(codes B) 
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. New varieties of maize         
2. New varieties of legumes         
3. Field pest and disease 
control        
 
4. Soil and water management         
5. Crop rotation         
6. Minimum tillage         
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7. Leaving crop residue in the 
field        
 
8. Adaptation to climate 
change        
 
9. Irrigation         
10. Crop storage pests         
11. Output markets and  prices         
12. Input markets and prices         
13. Collective action/farmer 
organization        
 
14. Livestock production         





1. Government extension 
service 
2. Farmer Coop or groups 
3. Neighbour farmers 
 
4. Seed traders/Agrovets 
5. Relative farmers  
6. NGOs 
 
7. Other private trader 
8. Private Company  
9. Research center  
 
10. School  
11. Radio/TV 
12. Newspaper  
 
11.  Mobile phone 
12. Other, specify…… 
 
 











If yes in 
column 2, 
where did 
you get the 
information? 
(Code B) 
Ever failed to 
sell due to 
lack of buyers 
or poor price? 
Codes A 
No. of buyers who came to buy 
at farm gate last season 
(2008/09) 
If you did not sell to some of 
these buyers, then why? Codes 
























































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Maize             
2. Beans             
3. Pigeonpea             
4. Groundnut             
5. Soybean             
6. Cowpea             
Codes C:  1. No buyer came 
                 2. Price offered was low  
3. Unreliable scale or weight  
4. Unable to meet the desired quality 








PART 9: LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP 
Livestock type 
Number of livestock at end of 
2008/09 cropping season 
(including bought ones) 
If you would sell one of the 
[…], how much would you 
receive from the sale? (TSh) 
Cattle   
1. Indigenous milking cows   
2. Cross-bred milking cows   
3.Exotic milking cows   
4. Non milking cows (mature)   
5. Trained oxen for ploughing   
6. Bulls    
7. Heifers   
8. Calves   
Goats   
9. Mature milking goats   
10. Other mature female goats   
11. Young male goats   
12.Young female goats   
Sheep   
13. Mature female sheep   
14. Mature male sheep   
15. Young female sheep   
16. Young male sheep   
Other livestock   
17. Mature trained donkeys   
18. Young donkeys   
19. Horses   
20. Mules   
21. Mature chicken   
22. Local Bee hives   
23.Modern Bee hives   
24.Pigs, mature   
25.Pigs, young   
26.Turkeys, mature   
27.Guinea fowls, mature   
28.Ducks, mature   
29.Rabbit, mature   
   
   






PART 10: HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE 
(Not during 2008/09 but looking back from today) 
(Here, wife and/or the person involved in purchases should be the principal respondent/s). 






Total consumed in the last 
7 days for only members of 
the family 













time (e.g. 2 














1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10= 8*9 
Staple foods          
1. Maize (dry)          
2. Maize (green)          
3. Teff           
4. Wheat          
5. Barley          
6. Rice          
7. Sorghum          
8. F/millet          
9. P/millet          
10. Cassava          
11. Potatoes          
12. Beans dry          
13. Beans fresh          
14. Cowpea fresh grain          
15. Cowpea dry grain          
16. Cowpea leaves          
17. Groundnut fresh          
18. Groundnut dry          
19. Soybean          
20. Pigeonpea fresh          
21. Pigeonpea dry          
22. Greengram          
23. Bananas (for cooking)          
24.          
25.          
26.          
Vegetables          
27. Tomatoes          
28. Onions          
29. Cabbage          
30. Spinach          
31. Kale          
32. Carrot          
33. Okra          
34. Pumpkin          
35. Egg plant          
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Total consumed in the last 
7 days for only members of 
the family 













time (e.g. 2 














1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Vegetables (contd)          
36.Cucumber          
37.Pepper          
38. Garlic          
39.          
40.          
Fruits          
41. Oranges          
42. Mangoes          
43. Pawpaws          
44. Pineapple          
45. Bananas (ripe)          
46. Apple          
47. Guava          
48. Coconut          
49. Sugar cane          
50.          
51.          
Meat & other animal products        
52. Cow meat          
53. Goat meat          
54. Sheep meat          
55. Pig meat          
56. Chicken          
57. Turkey          
58. Ducks          
59. Bush meat          
60. Fish          
61. Eggs          
62. Milk          
63. Cheese/Ghee          
64. Butter          
65. Yoghurt          
66. Honey          
67.          
68.          
Beverages and drinks         
69. Tea (leaves)          
70. Tea (liquid)          
71. Coffee (powder)          
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Total consumed in the last 
7 days for only members of 
the family 













time (e.g. 2 














1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Beverages and drinks (contd)        
72. Coffee (liquid)          
73. Soft drinks          
74. Juices          
75. Local beer          
76. Bottled beer          
77. Wine          
78. Drinking water          
79. Water for livestock          
80. Water for other uses          
81.           
82.          
83.          
84.          
Fats, oils, sweeteners, snacks and others       
85. Cooking fat          
86. Margarine          
87. Groundnut oil          
88. Coconut oil          
89. Bread          
90. Biscuits          
91. Popcorn          
92. Cashew nuts          
93. Sugar          
94. Salt          
95. Chocolate          
96. Curry          
97. Ginger          
98.          
99.           
Meals eaten away from home (specify)       
100.          
101.          
102.          
103.          













time (e.g. 2 kg; 










1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Clothing      
2. Shoes      
3. Blankets      
4. Bed sheets      
5. Soap/washing products      
6. Electricity      
7. Fuel wood      
8. Charcoal      
9. Kerosene      
10. Batteries      
11. School fees      
12. School books and supplies      
13. Health care (medicare, treatment etc)      
14. Grain milling      
15. Land tax      
16. Church contributions      
17. Dowry      
18. Contributions to farmer 
associations/cooperatives 
     
19. Contributions to other 
associations/cooperatives 
     
20. Other membership fees      
21. Funeral group payments      
22. House building/construction      
23. Contribution to sports      
24. Guard/security      
25. Newspapers, magazines etc      
26. Travel expenses      
27. Mobile phone air time (voucher)      
28. Radio/TV service charge      
29. Payment for extension advisory 
services 
     
30.  Pay for improvement of communal 
services (roads etc) 
     
31. Kitchen utensils      
32. Personal care (soap, toothpaste etc)      
33. Furniture (tables, chairs, beds etc)      
34. Home repairs      
35. Purchase of cars      
36. Purchase of bicycle, motorcycle etc      
37. Repairs for vehicles, bicycles etc      
38. Petrol and engine oils for cars      
39. House rent      
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40. Utility bills (water, telephone etc)      
41. Cigarettes, tobacco etc      
42. Remittances paid      
43. Deposits to savings account      
44. Debt payments      
45. Ceremony and other entertainments      
46.      
47.      
48.      
49.      










Appendix 4.1. Hausman test of the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
 
Omitted outcome Distribution Test statistic p-value 
Maize    
Traders 2(12) 7.920 0.791 
Wholesalers 2(12) 8.342 0.758 
Brokers 2(12) 10.709 0.554 
Pigeonpea    
Traders 2(12) 3.807 0.987 
Wholesalers 2(12) 0.450 1.000 
Brokers 2(12) 9.604 0.651 
 
 





eigen values % variance eigen values % variance 
PC1 2.44 27.14 2.70 30.05 
PC2 1.73 19.27 1.23 13.68 
PC3 1.13 12.52 1.19 13.29 
PC4 0.99 11.07 0.95 10.59 
PC5 0.87 9.66 0.87 9.70 
PC6 0.84 9.33 0.70 7.80 
PC7 0.49 5.44 0.59 6.54 
PC8 0.32 3.52 0.41 4.58 

















































































































































Number of observations 663 253 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes: First stage probit: NGO market linkage program probit; Second stage probit: Market participation probit. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 















expenditure per capita 
by farm households 





expenditure per capita 
by farm households 
that did not participate 
Information sources     
















Wald test on information 
sources 
χ2 = 125.59*** F-stat. = 1.29 χ2 = 49.19*** F-stat. = 1.61 
Sample size 663 291 253 63 
Source: SIMLESA project survey data (2010). 
Notes: Model 1: Probit model; Model 2: ordinary least squares.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
